The Amherst Books

THE LIBERAL COLLEGE

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BY

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

BOSTON
MARSHALL JONES COMPANY
1920

THE · PLIMPTON · PRESS · NORWOOD · MASS · U · S · A

To

E. F. AND N. A. L. V.

PREFACE

THE title of this book was chosen by the managing editor of the series to which it belongs. It is appropriate, I think, that the title page of the first of the Amherst Books should thus express the authority of the Board and of the purpose by which the series is to be dominated. Amherst College enters upon the publication of these books with very high hopes. It is willing to set aside desires far more compelling than that of a writer for his title, if thereby something may be attempted in honor of the legend Terras Irradient.

The editor's justification of the title is that it indicates accurately, as it does, the subject-matter of the book. The writer, however, would have preferred another title. He would have chosen the name "Making Minds," and that largely because it invites misunderstanding. I am sure the editor will reward the willing submission of the writer by allowing him to use a few words in the Preface to indicate the notion which he would have liked to express.

The book itself is a collection of papers and addresses dealing with the liberal college. From cover to cover it expresses the conviction that liberal study enriches and strengthens the lives of individual men and of groups of men. It is based upon the belief that for a man and for his fellows it is well that he have a good mind, if possible an excellent or even a distinguished mind.

But with respect to such a belief as this misunderstandings flourish and abound. In general people have a peculiar interest in the processes by which they themselves were made. And the discussion of those processes and especially the suggestion that they might have been better than they were does not, for obvious reasons, conduce to calmness of mood. Psychologically it is not hard to understand

why each man yearns to think his college best and hesitates to agree that changes might make it better. For this and for many other reasons men are not thinking thoughts when they discuss the teaching process. They are rather giving voice to affections, purposes, prejudices, desires; and the terms which they employ vary in quite undiscoverable ways with the emotional qualities which lie behind them.

In such a field as this misunderstandings are sure to come. With respect to them we may take either of two lines of action. We may ignore them in the hope that they will go away, or we may invite them to make themselves at home with the hope that they will lose the hostile quality of the alien. My own choice would be that of ready hospitality. It is good to be as well and as quickly as possible acquainted with the misunderstandings which may visit you. Acquaintance tends toward understanding and for misunderstandings there is no other cure.

If then the Editor will allow, I should like to present in this short Preface three misunderstandings which regularly call upon us. I should like also to devote the Introduction to a genuine attempt at making their acquaintance.

If one says that the purpose of the liberal college is to make minds, these misunderstandings or, shall I say, objections immediately appear. Education, we shall be told, should make not minds of men, but Men. And again it will be said that it is nonsense to speak of making minds or making men; such living things as these must grow; they are not made. And finally we shall be told that whether the process be one of minds or of men, be one of growth or of manufacture, the college has little to do with the achievement of the end; the college tends to take itself too seriously; men learn to live by living and not by spending four short years cut off from life by college walls and college customs.

To consider these misunderstandings will be the chief purpose of our Introduction.

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MAKING MINDS—AN INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTIONS are of necessity rather formal affairs with some regard for rules and proprieties. Now there is one rule with respect to the meeting of arguments which may at least be mentioned as our misunderstanding friends draw near. It is this,—a number of different arguments may not properly oppose another argument if they are opposed to each other. They have no right to ask a common enemy to kill them off if they have within themselves the possibility of mutual extermination. In a word, arguments must settle their own differences before they attempt to settle a common foe. One need not press the point; it is sufficient to know that whether pressed or not the principle is at work in the inevitable logic of the situation.

I

The objection that the college should make Men rather than Minds is the most aggressive and headstrong of our opponents. Boys should be prepared for life, it says, not for the reading of books or the spinning of theories. Education should be practical; by it bodies should be strengthened, friendships should be established, manners should be acquired, spirits should be purified, appreciations should be enriched and directed, the will should be fortified and inspired and subjugated, all the powers of body, mind and soul should be so trained and correlated that from them shall be made such a man as a man should be.

This argument is hard to meet because it very discourte-

ously gives us at once the feeling of being not merely in the wrong but quite disgracefully so. Without intending it we seem to have said that bodies should not be strong and that wills might just as well be weak, and that appreciations are of no importance, and that the spirit of man is a matter of no concern to us. Why do we seem to have said this? It is because the phrase, "Not minds but Men" seems to demand as its opposite "Not men but Minds. But we had no intention of saying this. We did not advocate the making of minds for the sake of opposing the making of men. We had rather supposed that the making of minds was just a part of the making of men. In fact, when we said "Making Minds" we meant "Making the minds of Men." Let us then protest at once that we are not hostile to the making of men; we are rather modestly engaged in it and are meanwhile keeping an eye on the third approaching objection which is waiting to jump at us for taking too seriously our part in the process.

This demand that a teacher of physics, for example, should make not minds but men is of the same general value as would be the assertion that a farmer should grow not wheat but men. What is the good of food stuffs, one asks; are they not for the feeding, the nourishing of men? And if they are, then why does not the farmer proceed directly to the end, why waste his time in seed and soil and all that care called agriculture; why not make men at once; why throw one's hours away on crops? It is a sordid soul that values crops above the men for whom the crops exist.

One can imagine a farmer somewhat bewildered by such an attack as this. And many a teacher is bewildered too. Are men more important than food? Yes, food is for men. Are men more important than minds? Yes, minds are for men. Does it then follow that the farmer should grow men in his wheat fields, or that teachers of physics should construct men in the laboratory rather than make pupils wise in the realm of physics?

The trouble with the argument is that it is so true that it cannot help becoming false if one dwells upon it. It is the lazy fallacy which confuses ends and means. It is a favorite fallacy of practical men in fields with which their practice has not made them familiar. It is the fallacy of those who say "Give us results" and who have no time to inquire what results are wanted nor how they may be gotten. It is also the fallacy of the sentimentalists who opine that telling a boy to be a man will make him one or that willing to be a man is all that one needs in the way of training and study.

But now we must stop calling names and meet our guest with proper decorum and respect. He comes suspecting that we are hostile to him, that we oppose minds to his men. We must try to make him see that this supposed hostility is an illusion, a misunderstanding. How shall we do it?

First let us assure him that we know the limitations of the mind and of its training. All the values of life, all the things worth while in life are found in the feelings, the emotions, the sentiments of men. And further, all the ways of realizing these values lie in the realm of will, of action. The mind, in the narrow sense, neither feels nor acts, neither is value nor makes value. But on the other hand the mind is the informing of the feelings and the directing of the actions. It is the guide which makes feelings delicate and true, which makes actions precise and successful. The mind is not all of life but it is the intelligence which directs life to the achievement of its ends. This is what we mean when we say that intelligence is power — not that it acts, but that it makes action successful. It is the eye which sees the rapier's mark but not the hand which it directs to grasp and thrust the weapon to the spot.

A second observation follows closely upon the first. We see that four short years of teaching minds is only a little part of human education. All that men are and do must be developed and trained. And in the doing of this all human institutions, all human experiences have a part.

The home, the church, the school, playmates, friends, climate, food, health, employers, servants, social relations of every sort, all these are making men, making a man for seventy years, making him until his day is done. Amidst all this the special training of the college course is rather a little thing. At any rate it is a very special thing, as special and peculiar a thing as books are in the material world, those collections of paper pages with ink-marks on them, as special as words are among the actions of men and nature, those sounds made by the human throat and lips. In terms of quantity the college course is not a major part of education. We count it some forty hours a week for thirty to forty weeks in each of the four years from seventeen or eighteen years of age to twenty-one or twenty-two. Not all of one's education is acquired in these hours.

And now since we are speaking in the spirit of friendship rather than of controversy, we must tell our inquiring guest what we actually do along this line of his suggestion. There are three aspects of our attitude of which he should approve.

First, we count upon the wider education which precedes the college training and upon that which follows it. The college experience we recognize as an episode, one of peculiar value, and yet as following from earlier experience and as leading into later living. In general we must send young men back again into the society from which they came, not as they were but better trained in mind for that society than any other kind of living would have made them.

Second, we recognize that during these four years, the life of the individual student and the social life of the community must be maintained, must be kept vigorous, fine, and high in quality. A college must be a good place in which to live as well as a good place in which to study. For this reason we have our chapel and church, our fraternity houses and dormitories, our athletic games and other student activities, our friendships of pupils and teachers each with his fellows and each with the members of the other group. Taking them all in all. I doubt if

there are better communities in all our social scheme than are our colleges.

And finally let us make one genuine concession in the hope of friendly understanding. Let us admit that when we speak of Making Minds the meaning which we give to Mind is a very broad one. Judge us by our deeds and you will see. Our course of study includes the careful training of the body for three of the four years of residence, our teaching of music, of drama and of literature seeks to inspire as well as to inform the appreciations; (to many of us it seems that other arts should make this contribution greater than it is); the college discipline or lack of it intends to bring the will to fairness and to strength of character; but more than all things else the teacher, teaching his subject, captures his student for the kind of life he thinks worth while; to go to college is to live in fellowship with students and teachers; it is their personalities which give its liberal meaning to the phrase "Making Minds.

II

Our second guest comes with the objection that "Making" is not a term to apply to minds; "Minds," he says, "are not made; they grow." What shall we answer? There is no genuine difference here. Or rather, if there is a difference, our critic is right. Only in a certain peculiar sense may we speak of making minds. They are not made, as if they were constructed, but they are made to grow — made, by proper cultivation, to grow properly.

The objection to external or mechanical descriptions of education is a thoroughly valid one. No interpretation of teaching is more fallacious than that which regards the teacher as giving learning or knowledge or wisdom to the pupil, putting this desirable attribute into him. The teacher may feel wisdom going out of him in the teaching process, but, strictly speaking, he cannot be sure that the pupil is taking it in. The relation of teacher and pupil is always a somewhat mystical one. Learning is chiefly

by imitation or by contagion. If a teacher is working and is influential, pupils will learn to work; if a teacher is trying to make others work, pupils will learn to do that too; if a teacher loves wisdom wisely, pupils will love it as well.

And yet we must not let the principle of growth run riot. A college is not a hot-house in which the whole being with all its powers is to be forced into early flowering. College teachers are men of special powers; they are quite different in type from other men; they have very different and very special lessons to impart. It is essential that they do their special work because they can do it and others cannot, and most of all because the opportunity for it is very brief. The mere establishing of an "atmosphere" for student growth is not enough. The "aromatic" theory of education is almost as bad and certainly far more unwholesome than the mechanical one. A college is a place where something is to happen and to happen definitely because certain men know what they intend, and are determined that what they intend shall be accomplished.

In this connection it may be noted that with respect to the relation of learning to life there are three types of able teachers. Of these three types, two should be kept away from a college by every device which the art of man can imagine. The third should be sought after as men of old sought after the philosopher's stone or the secret of perpetual youth, though one would hope with somewhat more success.

First there are men who are strong among their fellows but whose strength comes from sources other than abstract knowledge. They are men who have built up power by experience in practical affairs, by sentiment, by will, or in any other way than by the use of books and other instruments of study.

Second, there are men well versed in books, learned in scholarship of certain sorts, masters of some special aspects of a field of knowledge, who are yet negligible as men among their fellows; no one feels them to be important.

Both these types of men the college should avoid when choosing teachers — avoid them as a merchant would shun the advertising of a competitor's wares. The college is engaged in making men stronger and finer by means of learning. It must not then take as its agents men who achieve strength primarily in other ways, nor men who have failed to achieve it in this way. As against these the college teacher of the third type is a man who is powerful among his fellows but whose power springs from the studying which he has done, from the learning which he loves and is. If teachers are of this type we may let young people grow in their presence with the assurance that they will grow properly in the special way in which a college seeks to make a student grow.

III

Our third objection has already had its say. In fact we have been speaking for it or it for us as we have sought to come to understanding with its fellows.

The college training is a limited, special thing. It is not all of education, it is not even all the education which one receives during the four years of its duration. And yet it counts — counts heavily in making men, in making groups of men. Out of the quiet little places where men and boys assemble for study of human life and of the world — out of those places has shone forth a light which has illumined human life, which has made clearer the world in which we live. These colleges are neither big nor strong nor independent in external ways. They are like nervous centres in an organism, — not very large in bulk, not self-sufficient, not adequate for action in the world of things and facts. And yet they are in charge of action, decide what it shall be, and see that it is done. Men everywhere are making human life, are making mankind to be a stronger, finer thing than it has been. And in the doing of that task, they choose to set aside some quiet groups for Making Minds. Those groups are Liberal Colleges.

PART I

THE DETERMINING PURPOSE

THESE four papers are four different attempts to express the notion which underlies liberal college teaching.

The first paper, "What the College is Not," was given at the one hundredth anniversary of the founding of Allegheny College on June 23, 1915. It was the closing paper of a long series dealing with the work of the American College. It is a study of the purpose of the college as revealed in the minds of its founders. It challenges the statement that the old college, having as a major aim the educating of ministers, was therefore professional in intent. It asks what kind of education was regarded as good for the ministers of older days and may be equally good for those of a later time.

The second paper, "What the College is," was given as an inaugural address of the President of Amherst College, October 16, 1912. It is a consideration of the purpose of the college as perceived by the college teacher. It seeks, therefore, to define the college endeavor as it is construed and felt by the teachers and scholars who, in the deepest sense, are the college.

The third paper, "What does the College Prepare for," is a popular talk which has been given many times to different audiences and perhaps, alas, more than once to the same audience. It is intended primarily to state the purpose of the college to persons who are not familiar with college teaching, or who, having had such familiarity, have lost it. It is a controversial paper making its points, or trying to make them, over-sharply as one is tempted to do

when speaking to audiences at whom one has only a single chance, or with whose point of view one is radically out of touch.

The fourth paper, "Making the Mind of a Nation," is an extract from a speech delivered at an Amherst Alumni banquet in Boston, February 4, 1916. It tries to indicate to the graduates of a college what part they have to play in building up the life of a nation. It demands that we achieve for the nation as a whole the same intellectual integrity and coherence which every good teacher seeks to fix upon the spirit of the individual student.

I

WHAT THE LIBERAL COLLEGE IS NOT

I MUST begin this paper by asking a question — a question addressed to the audience. The answer is a matter of vital concern to me. I wish to ask you whether from one statement which I shall give another logically follows. If we say that everything that could be said about the American college has been said, does it follow that there is nothing more to say? My own opinion is that it does not follow at all and I appeal to the science of logic for justification. That science tells us that whatever has been said in one way can be said again in another, and that perhaps just such translation into other forms is the chief task of what we call thinking. And especially logic tells us that whatever has been said in affirmative terms may often, to great advantage, be expressed in negative terms.

If it is truly said that "John is in Boston," it is also safe to remark that "John is not in New York," and this latter statement may be of much greater importance to some of John's friends. There is, of course, a difficulty, namely, that it is hard to exhaust the content of the negative judgment. When once you start on this process the trouble is not to find something to say but to tell where to stop in the illimitable expanse which lies before you. It is well enough to say that John is not in New York, but if you proceed to tell all the places in which John is not, considerable time must be allowed for the operation. While, therefore, I insist that this logical principle be accepted in order that I may have a subject to talk about, I beg the audience not to be terrified by its possibilities. For general purposes, logical principles must be applied sparingly and with dis-

cretion. It is quite possible to have too much of a good thing.

But the one point on which I do insist is that in spite of all the wisdom of these ten wise men who have preceded me there is still something left to consider. They have told you what the college is. I may try to tell you what it is not. They have told you what the college has, what it does, what it has accomplished, what it dreams, what it will be in the days to come. Somewhere within the field of what it has not, what it does not do, what it has not done, what it does not dream, what it will not be — somewhere within this field, for which one might claim infinite time, there lies the subject of this paper.

If, then, we were with any fullness to define the function of the college in negative terms it would be necessary to show and to explain that the college is not a high school, not a professional school, not a university, nor any part thereof. But everyone knows that there are many kinds of high school, many types of professional school, many separate schools within a university. If we should discuss each one of these *separatim et seriatim*, showing that the college is not any one of them, is different from them all, I fear that the consequence for you would be much weariness of the flesh and great vexation of the spirit. But again the kindly science of logic will hurry to our rescue. That science has another valuable principle, viz., that there is no sense in denying a statement unless someone has asserted it. What assertions, then, of the identity of the college with other institutions are just now being made with sufficient insistence to demand our attention? There are teachers who seem to find little difference between the college and the high school, but their lack of perception is not very important. We are just emerging from a period in which the college has been regarded as a part of the university and has been identified with the whole in essential attitude and spirit. But the day of that confusion is rapidly closing. The one confusion which does today

threaten our understanding of the function of the college is that which identifies it with the professional school, which declares that there is no genuine education which is not really professional, which characterizes the belief in a "liberal education," separate from and independent of vocational and professional study, as an idle creation of dream and fancy. In these pragmatic days such a confusion as this is likely to spread far and wide. It is not the only instance of pragmatic thinking which just now threatens the clarity of our educational policy, but it is an especially dangerous one because it strikes at the very roots of all our liberal teaching. Amid these days of celebration and study of the American liberal college, I should like to smite as hard as I can hit at this heresy which denies the very belief on which that college is built.

I

The heresy is hard to meet just now because in a sense it catches us off our balance. Under the influence of the university ideal the colleges had been saying to their students, "Study anything you like; all knowledge is good; in fact, all knowledge is equally good; make your choice, follow your bent; if only you keep going in any direction a liberal education is assured." But as against this, we are seeing more and more clearly every day that the content of a liberal education is not thus indefinite and indeterminate, that there is an intellectual culture which one must master if he is to travel the way of liberal education. And in our enthusiasm we have been crying: "Back to the good old college of earlier days, away with the extravagances of election and specialization, let us return again to the fathers, to the requirements which they established, to the college which they founded." And here it is that the subtle and dangerous heresy finds its opportunity. "Do you wish definite and coherent requirements?" it asks. "Very well, you will find them in the professional

school." And if we protest that these are not the requirements that we had in mind, that they are not liberal but technical, then there descends upon us a crushing and bewildering argument. "You wish to return to the spirit and practice of the old colonial college," it says; "very well, do so, but first recognize that the college which you imitate was itself a professional school. The colonial forefathers were not wasting idle dreams on this airy nothing which you call 'liberal training.' They needed ministers for their churches and so they founded colleges to train those ministers. The colleges which they established were in essential purpose schools of divinity, schools to train young men for the profession of the ministry. They were devised for a special purpose and the forefathers were shrewd enough to see to it that that purpose was realized." And from this assertion as its premise, the argument proceeds to its conclusion.

"The old college was professional in spirit; then so too should they be who imitate it in spirit. But the old college intended to train for only one of the professions. To that end all its courses of study, all its methods of teaching, were adapted. It will never do to give the same courses of study, the same teaching, to the boys who are planning for other professions. Loyalty to the old college demands that for each profession its own special system of preparation be devised; we in our day must do for lawyers, engineers, physicians, architects, for each of these what the fathers in their day did for the students of divinity." So by the argument the college becomes simply a collection of professional schools; liberal education as a thing apart has disappeared. And we arrive at a new definition of the American liberal college, — it is an institution which some people had mistakenly believed to exist.

In considering the effect of such an argument as this it is necessary to take into account the secondary result as well as the primary. The first effect, as in the case of all honest conflicts with convincing arguments, is that you

find yourself knocked down. The second stage of the experience, however, reveals two facts: (1) that you can get up again and (2) that you are not hurt, indeed that you are rather exhilarated by what has happened. This secondary stage is proof positive that you have not been hit by anything solid. At this time, it is in order to inquire what it was which, at the moment of impact, gave such an impression of solidity.

The most interesting feature of the argument is that the premise on which it depends is not true. The premise asserts that, in the sense in which we now use the term, the colonial college was a professional school. But it was not, nor was it intended to be. The supposed evidence for the assertion is simply a confusion as to the meaning of another statement which is true. There is no doubt that one of the primary motives of the founders of the early colleges was to provide for the education of the clergy. But the assertion under discussion is not identical with this, nor does it follow from it. And apart from questions of inference, the plain facts of record concerning the purpose of the founders forbid the suggested interpretation of their intention. He who would hold to this interpretation must maintain two assertions concerning our colonial forefathers: (1) that they did not mean what they said, and (2) that they did not get what they paid for. My impression is that the antecedent probability is in both cases strongly against the maker of the statements.

With regard to the purpose which the colleges were intended to further, there are clear expressions in the charters under which they were established. The assertion under discussion is that these colleges were established to give professional training to ministerial students. The charter of Harvard College, granted in 1650, defines the aim as "for the advancement of all good literature, arts, and sciences." The new articles of 1780, reviewing the achievements of the college, say "in which University many persons of great eminence have, by the blessing of

God, been initiated in those arts and sciences which qualified them for public employments *both in Church and State.*"

The charter of Yale University, the Collegiate School of Connecticut, describes it as a school "wherein youth may be instructed in the arts and sciences, who through the blessing of Almighty God may be fitted for Public employment *both in Church and Civil State.*" The charter of the Academy and Charitable School in the Province of Pennsylvania approves the project, "hoping that this academy may prove a nursery of wisdom and virtue, and that it will produce men of dispositions and capacities beneficial to mankind *in the various occupations of life.*" The charter of Kings College in New York provides for the instruction and education of youth in the learned languages and in the liberal arts and sciences. The announcement reads in part as follows:

"A serious, virtuous, and industrious Course of Life being first provided for, it is further the Design of this College, to instruct and perfect the Youth in the Learned Languages, and in the Arts of Reasoning exactly, of Writing correctly and Speaking eloquently; And in the Arts of Numbering and Measuring, of Surveying and Navigation, of Geography and History, of Husbandry, Commerce, and Government; and in the Knowledge of all Nature in the Heavens above us, and in the Air, Water, and Earth around us, and the various Kinds of Meteors, Stones, Mines, and Minerals, Plants and Animals, and of every Thing useful for the Comfort, the Convenience, the Elegance of Life, in the chief Manufactures relating to any of these things; And finally, to lead them from the Study of Nature, to the Knowledge of themselves, and of the God of Nature, and their Duty to Him, themselves, and one another; and every Thing that can contribute to their true Happiness, both here and hereafter."

Surely this is a strange course of study for a divinity school

One of the most illuminating cases is that of Brown University. The expressed intention of the founders of Brown University was "to establish a seminary of polite literature subject to the Government of the Baptists," and beyond question they were planning for the education of their own candidates for the ministry. But does this mean that they planned to give professional theological training in the college? If so, why is it specified that youth of all religious denominations shall be accepted? Was it intended that Congregationalists and Episcopalians should become Baptist ministers? And why is it so definitely stated that "the Sectarian differences of opinions shall not make any Part of the Public and Classical Instruction?" Is it customary in a divinity school to forbid the discussion of the tenets of the sect by which the school is established? There was no such restriction when the first divinity school was established at Andover in 1807, for then the project was delayed until the founders could agree what creed should be taught, and until it had been voted that each professor should assent to the creed which the Hopkinsians had prepared. Is there not a different motive here from that expressed in the charter of Brown which says, "Into this Liberal and Catholic Institution shall never be admitted any Religious Tests but on the Contrary all the Members hereof shall for ever enjoy full free Absolute and uninterrupted Liberty of Conscience"? In 1770 the trustees of the new college in Rhode Island voted "that the children of Jews may be admitted to the institution and intirely enjoy the freedom of their own religion without any constraint or imposition whatever." Was it in order that they might be prepared for the priesthood of their own church, or was it in the hope that the free and unhampered dialectic of their own Jewish faith might bring them eventually into the Baptist pulpit?

I have given only a few quotations from the charters and early statutes, but on these we may safely rest the case as to the purpose of the founders of the colonial colleges.

Some people are saying to-day that the intention was to give technical training for the ministry. The charters say that the colleges were established to give teaching in literature, the arts, and sciences, with the expectation that this teaching would be of value both in church and state, in all the various occupations into which young men might go. For my own part, the evidence of the charters is the more convincing. I am inclined to think that the colonial forefathers knew what they meant and meant what they said.

But now for the test of the work done. Whatever they said, did the colleges actually train men for the ministry in the sense in which professional schools are now preparing them for separate occupations? In his book on Educational Reform, President Eliot records that in the ten years from 1761 to 1770 the percentage of ministers among the graduates of Harvard College was twenty-nine, among those of Yale thirty-two, and among those of Princeton forty-five. In the first thirty-nine classes graduated from Brown only twenty-five per cent of the members entered the ministry. Now what shall we say of the seventy-one per cent at Harvard, the sixty-eight per cent at Yale, the fifty-five per cent at Princeton, and the seventy-five per cent at Brown? These men were planning to practice law, medicine, teaching, business. Why did they go to a divinity school? Did they think that a man who is ready for the ministry is ready for anything? The statement is perhaps true, but hardly relevant. I venture to suggest that their real opinion was that expressed in the charters we have quoted, viz.: that the education which the college gave was regarded as of value to a man whatever the profession into which he might go. If it be urged that there were no other schools to which they could go, I should reply that in that case, if they had wanted something else, they would have made protest long and loud, and would have demanded changes in the old colleges or the establishment of new ones. But a record of the attitude of the lay graduates of our colleges is not one of fault-finding and protest.

Rather have they shown unswerving loyalty and gratitude, and because of their faith in the college and its teaching, they have poured out the wealth which has enlarged the college to proportions of which its founders never dreamed. Benefactors and graduates alike have believed in non-professional education, and have believed they were receiving it. He who says that they have paid for professional education says that they have paid for what they thought they were not getting. Knowing them as I do, I find the statement hard to accept.

The point just made presents itself in another form when viewed in relation to present conditions. To the old college there went students planning to enter all the professions, and they found there the education which they sought. Of what professional school is it true to-day that candidates for the other professions go to it for training? Are there many law students in the medical schools, many engineering students in the divinity schools, many architects in the schools of music? Would it not be a new type of engineering school which should attract forty-five, fifty-five, seventy, or seventy-five per cent of students going into other professions? I think that if we found an engineering school of that type we should begin to give it another name, should recognize it as having a different function from the one we had assigned it, should take away from it the name "professional" and call it "liberal," a school in which are to be found studies and teaching of value to a man whatever his profession may be. To call such a school technical or professional is simply to twist terms out of all resemblance to their ordinary meanings. It indicates a confusion of thought which demands more careful analysis of the argument than we have yet given. It will be worth while to examine it more closely.

The argument as it stands is one of the most common types of fallacy. It says, "The colonial college prepared men for the ministry; hence it did nothing else." It is the argument "*A* is *B*, hence *A* is only *B*;" or again, it is, "If an

object have a given quality, then it has no other quality." "Charles Darwin was an Englishman, hence of course he was not a biologist." "Spinoza was a grinder of lenses, hence he cannot have been a philosopher." But Darwin was a biologist in spite of the argument; and Spinoza did dominate the thought of Europe, even while grinding lenses in his garret. The trouble with the argument is that the conclusion does not follow; there is no logical connection between conclusion and premise. *A* may be *B* and yet be also *C* and *D* as well. A college may be a good place for a young man who plans to enter the ministry and may yet have qualities and purposes of which that statement is in no sense an adequate description. It may well be that its value for ministerial students is only one phase of its total and fundamental function. That this is true is already apparent from its appeal to students of other professions. If we can now define this total appeal, the confusion should disappear and the modicum of truth which the argument contains should separate itself out from the vast error in which that truth has been involved.

The real motive of the founders of the early colleges, so far as it concerned students for the ministry, appears in the account given by Walter Cochrane Bronson in his History of Brown University. The Baptists, he tells us, were eager to have a college under their own control, to which their ministerial students might go. But why? Was it because they were not sufficiently supplied with ministers, or that the candidates were unable to secure the technical training needed for their profession? Not at all. The reason, he tells us, was that at the time Brown was established "there were only two Baptist ministers in all New England who had what is called a liberal education; and they were not clear in the doctrines of grace." Now in accordance with the custom of the time, the leaders of the denomination could easily provide for the professional training of their boys by placing them in the charge of older men who regularly gave such instruction to their appren-

tices. But they recognized that the denomination could not hold its own, could not achieve its purpose in the community unless its ministers were men of power and intelligence, men who could lead and dominate the men about them. And so the Baptist Church provided for the education of its young men who were candidates for the ministry. Did it provide for their technical theological instruction? The charter of the college specifically denies this. The purpose was to educate ministers, — but in what sense? Our opponents have interpreted the purpose as that of educating men to be ministers. The real purpose was that of educating ministers to be men. And at the same time by the same methods colleges were educating lawyers to be men, and teachers, physicians, and business men to be men. The same argument which proves the old college to have been a divinity school would prove it to be a law school, a medical school, a school of pedagogy, a business school. But the argument proves too much. There is a limit to the number of different things a single thing can be. The old college did educate ministers just as it educated candidates for other professions, but it did not give to each of these groups a different education. It was dealing with something common to them all, and so it gave to them all the same instruction, — the culture of a liberal education.

II

I think it is clear that the issue we are discussing rests upon the interpretation of a phrase — "founded for the education of ministers." There is no doubt that the phrase expresses in large measure the purpose of the early colleges. But what does it mean? It is amazing to see how, in the face of definite records to the contrary, this statement has been taken to mean that the colleges were schools of divinity. But the phrase admits of another interpretation which has the advantage of agreeing with the records. What does it mean to teach a minister? Does it mean only to teach

him to be a minister? He has many other things to learn besides that. He is taught by his wife, taught by his children, by his friends, and by his enemies. But the caddie who teaches him to play golf does not thereby become a member of a faculty of divinity; he may even not be a professor of religion. A school for the deaf does not necessarily teach deafness, nor does a school for foreigners usually teach them to be foreign. A school for anybody may undertake to teach him what he needs to know. Our colonial forefathers were persuaded that ministers as well as other men need knowledge of things outside their profession, need knowledge of the arts and sciences, and it was that belief which found expression in the colleges which they established.

The argument which we have been attacking has told us to follow the example of the colonial college. If I understand at all the purpose of the modern liberal college that is just what it is doing. There is a vast difference in intellectual content as between the old college and the new, but the two institutions are at one in the belief in the value of knowledge as the guide of human life, and in the conviction that certain elements of knowledge are of common value to all men whatever their differences of occupation or trade.

I should like to have the privilege of attempting one last restatement of this conviction in positive terms before this paper is closed.

III

In the old colonial community, the clergyman, as in lesser degree the lawyer and the teacher, was the man of ideas. He was no mere teacher of the gospel and tender of the parish. While his people lived their lives it was his task to reflect upon their living, to formulate the beliefs on which it was based, to study the conditions by which it was molded, to bring to clearness the problems by which it was faced, to study the moral, social, economic, political

situations of which it was constituted. It was his part and the part of men of like intellectual development to attempt to understand the lives which other men were living with lesser degrees of understanding. It was his task to serve as prophet and seer, as guide and counselor of his people.

It was for this task that the liberal college intended to prepare him. And in these latter days, as the scope of education has been extended more and more broadly, the same liberal education has been given to great numbers of our young men, whatever the professions they are planning to enter. At the present time a very small percentage of our college graduates become ministers; more than half of them enter into some form of business occupation. But whether they are to be in business or in the ministry, the same education must be given them, since the new community has the same need as had the old of understanding itself, of stating itself in terms of ideas.

This fundamental belief of liberal education can be stated in terms of two principles. The first is shared by both liberal and technical teaching. The second applies to liberal education alone. The principles are these: (1) that activity guided by ideas is on the whole more successful than the same activity without the control of ideas, and (2) that in the activities common to all men the guidance by ideas is quite as essential as in the case of those which different groups of men carry on in differentiation from one another.

The first principle applies to all higher education. We recognize that human deeds may be done in either of two ways, — first, by habit, by custom, by tradition, by rule of thumb, just as they always have been done; or, on the other hand, under the guidance of study, of investigation, of ideas and principles by which men attempt to discover and to formulate knowledge as to how these activities can *best* be done. Now all higher education, liberal or professional, rests on the belief that on the whole an activity

which is understood will be more successful than one which is not understood. Knowledge pays; intelligence is power.

The liberal school and the professional are, however, separated by their choice of the activities which each shall study. Every professional school selects some one special group of activities carried on by the members of one special trade or occupation and brings to the furtherance of these the full light of intellectual understanding and guidance. The liberal school, on the other hand, takes as its content those activities which all men carry on, those deeds which a man must do in virtue of the fact that he is a man; and within this field it seeks to achieve the same enlightenment and insight. The liberal college would learn and teach what can be known about a man's moral experience, our common speech, our social relations, our political institutions, our religious aspirations and beliefs, the world of nature which surrounds and molds us, our intellectual and aesthetic strivings and yearnings — all these, the human things that all men share, the liberal school attempts to understand, believing that if they are understood, men can live them better than they would live them by mere tradition and blind custom. But one of the terrible things about our generation is that the principle which it accepts so eagerly in the field of the vocation it refuses and shuns in the deeper things of human living. I have known fathers, planning for the training of a son, who would see to it that in the preparation for his trade every bit of knowledge he can have is supplied him. If the boy is to be a dyer of cloth, then he must study the sciences that understand that process. All that can be known about the nature of fabrics, the constitution of dyestuffs, the processes of application and development of the dye — not one bit of all this may be lacking from the teaching of the boy. To put him into the shop without that knowledge, to let him learn by imitation, pick up the rule of thumb, follow the ways of master workmen of the trade — to do that would be to make him only a workman, one who can do what

has been done, can do what he is told to do. But the father is not content with this. His boy must understand and know the trade so that he may be the leader and the guide, may give the orders rather than obey them. But how often the same father is unwilling that his boy attempt to understand his own religion, his own morals, his own society, his own politics! In these fields, surely the father's opinions are good enough! Keep the boy's mind at rest regarding his religion and his economics; what has been believed before had better still be believed! It may be bad for business, may interfere with a boy's success if he becomes too much interested in the fundamental things of life! And so such parents invite us to leave the universal things, the things most sacred and significant, to blindness, to the mere drift of custom, to tradition, and rule of thumb. And here it is that the liberal college again asserts its loyalty to the men who founded the older institutions. Those men had intellectual faith; they believed that it is worth while to know the life of man, and so they studied it and taught it to their pupils. I know that I speak for the teachers and the administrators of the liberal college here represented to-day when I pledge anew our loyalty to the men in whose footsteps we follow. So far as we can bring it about, the young people of our generation shall know themselves, shall know their fellows, shall think their way into the common life of their people, and by their thought shall illumine and direct it. If we are not pledged to that, then we have deserted the old standard; we are apostates from the faith. But I think that a good many of us are still loyal. We welcome every new extension of vocational instruction. We know that every man should have some special task to do and should be trained to do that task as well as it can possibly be done. The more the special trades and occupations are guided and directed by skill and knowledge the more will human life succeed in doing the things it plans to do. But by the same principle we pledge ourselves to the study of the universal things in human life, the

things that make us men as well as ministers and tradesmen. We pledge ourselves forever to the study of human living in order that living may be better done. We have not yet forgotten that fundamentally the proper study of mankind is Man.

II

WHAT THE LIBERAL COLLEGE IS

IN the discussions concerning college education there is one voice which is all too seldom raised and all too often disregarded. It is the voice of the teacher and the scholar, of the member of the college faculty. It is my purpose to devote this address to a consideration of the ideals of the teacher, of the problems of instruction as they present themselves to the men who are giving the instruction. And I do this not because I believe that just now the teachers are wiser than others who are dealing with the same questions, but rather as an expression of a definite conviction with regard to the place of the teacher in our educational scheme. It is, I believe, the function of the teacher to stand before his pupils and before the community at large as the intellectual leader of his time. If he is not able to take this leadership, he is not worthy of his calling. If the leadership is taken from him and given to others, then the very foundations of the scheme of instruction are shaken. He who in matters of teaching must be led by others is not the one to lead the imitative undergraduate, not the one to inspire the confidence and loyalty and discipleship on which all true teaching depends. If there are others who can do these things better than the college teacher of today, then we must bring them within the college walls. But if the teacher is to be deemed worthy of his task, then he must be recognized as the teacher of us all, and we must listen to his words as he speaks of the matters entrusted to his charge.

In the consideration of the educational creed of the teacher I will try to give, first, a brief statement of his

belief; second, a defense of it against other views of the function of the college; third, an interpretation of its meaning and significance; fourth, a criticism of what seem to me misunderstandings of their own meaning prevalent among the teachers of our day; and finally, a suggestion of certain changes in policy which must follow if the belief of the teacher is clearly understood and applied in our educational procedure.

I

First, then, What do our teachers believe to be the aim of college instruction? Wherever their opinions and convictions find expression there is one contention which is always in the foreground, namely, that to be liberal a college must be essentially intellectual. It is a place, the teachers tell us, in which a boy, forgetting all things else, may set forth on the enterprise of learning. It is a time when a young man may come to awareness of the thinking of his people, may perceive what knowledge is and has been and is to be. Whatever light-hearted undergraduates may say, whatever the opinions of solicitous parents, of ambitious friends, of employers in search of workmen, of leaders in church or state or business, — whatever may be the beliefs and desires and demands of outsiders, — the teacher within the college, knowing his mission as no one else can know it, proclaims that mission to be the leading of his pupil into the life intellectual. The college is primarily not a place of the body, nor of the feelings, nor even of the will; it is, first of all, a place of the mind.

II

Against this intellectual interpretation of the college our teachers find two sets of hostile forces constantly at work. Outside the walls there are the practical demands of a busy commercial and social scheme; within the college there are the trivial and sentimental and irrational misunderstandings of its own friends. Upon each of these

our college teachers are wont to descend as Samson upon the Philistines, and when they have had their will, there is little left for another to accomplish.

As against the immediate practical demands from without, the issue is clear and decisive. College teachers know that the world must have trained workmen, skilled operatives, clever buyers and sellers, efficient directors, resourceful manufacturers, able lawyers, ministers, physicians and teachers. But it is equally true that in order to do its own work, the liberal college must leave the special and technical training for these trades and professions to be done in other schools and by other methods. In a word, the liberal college does not pretend to give all the kinds of teaching which a young man of college age may profitably receive; it does not even claim to give all the kinds of intellectual training which are worth giving. It is committed to intellectual training of the liberal type, whatever that may mean, and to that mission it must be faithful. One may safely say, then, on behalf of our college teachers, that their instruction is intended to be radically different from that given in the technical school or even in the professional school. Both these institutions are practical in a sense in which the college, as an intellectual institution, is not. In the technical school the pupil is taught how to do some one of the mechanical operations which contribute to human welfare. He is trained to print, to weave, to farm, to build; and for the most part he is trained to do these things by practice rather than by theory. His possession when he leaves the school is not a stock of ideas, of scientific principles, but a measure of skill, a collection of rules of thumb. His primary function as a tradesman is not to understand but to do, and in doing what is needed he is following directions which have first been thought out by others and are now practised by him. The technical school intends to furnish training which, in the sense in which we use the term, is not intellectual but practical.

In a corresponding way the work of the professional

school differs from that of the liberal college. In the teaching of engineering, medicine, or law we are or may be beyond the realm of mere skill and within the realm of ideas and principles. But the selection and the relating of these ideas is dominated by an immediate practical interest which cuts them off from the intellectual point of view of the scholar. If an undergraduate should take away from his studies of chemistry, biology and psychology only those parts which have immediate practical application in the field of medicine, the college teachers would feel that they had failed to give to the boy the kind of instruction demanded of a college. It is not their purpose to furnish applied knowledge in this sense. They are not willing to cut up their sciences into segments and to allow the student to select those segments which may be of service in the practice of an art or of a profession. In one way or another the teacher feels a kinship with the scientist and the scholar which forbids him to submit to this domination of his instruction by the demands of an immediate practical interest. Whatever it may mean, he intends to hold the intellectual point of view and to keep his students with him if he can. In response, then, to demands for technical and professional training our college teachers tell us that such training may be obtained in other schools; it is not to be had in a college of liberal culture.

In the conflict with the forces within the college our teachers find themselves fighting essentially the same battle as against the foes without. In a hundred different ways the friends of the college, students, graduates, trustees and even colleagues, seem to them so to misunderstand its mission as to minimize or to falsify its intellectual ideals. The college is a good place for making friends; it gives excellent experience in getting on with men; it has exceptional advantages as an athletic club; it is a relatively safe place for a boy when he first leaves home; on the whole it may improve a student's manners; it gives acquaintance with lofty ideals of character, preaches the doctrine of

social service, exalts the virtues and duties of citizenship. All these conceptions seem to the teacher to hide or to obscure the fact that the college is fundamentally a place of the mind, a time for thinking, an opportunity for knowing. And perhaps in proportion to their own loftiness of purpose and motive they are the more dangerous as tending all the more powerfully to replace or to nullify the underlying principle upon which they all depend, Here again when misconception clears away, one can have no doubt that the battle of the teacher is a righteous one. It is well that a boy should have four good years of athletic sport, playing his own games and watching the games of his fellows; it is well that his manners should be improved; it is worth while to make good friends; it is very desirable to develop the power of understanding and working with other men; it is surely good to grow in strength and purity of character, in devotion to the interests of society, in readiness to meet the obligations and opportunities of citizenship. If any one of these be lacking from the fruits of a college course we may well complain of the harvest. And yet is it not true that by sheer pressure of these, by the driving and pulling of the social forces within and without the college, the mind of the student is constantly torn from its chief concern? Do not our social and practical interests distract our boys from the intellectual achievements which should dominate their imagination and command their zeal? I believe that one may take it as the deliberate judgment of the teachers of our colleges to-day that the function of the college is constantly misunderstood, and that it is subjected to demands which, however friendly in intent, are yet destructive of its intellectual efficiency and success.

III

But now that the contention of the teacher has been stated and reaffirmed against objections, it is time to ask, What does it mean? And how can it be justified? By

what right does a company of scholars invite young men to spend with them four years of discipleship? Do they, in their insistence upon the intellectual quality of their ideal intend to give an education which is avowedly unpractical? If so, how shall they justify their invitation, which may perhaps divert young men from other interests and other companionships which are valuable to themselves and to their fellows? In a word, what is the underlying motive of the teacher, what is there in the intellectual interests and activities which seems to him to warrant their domination over the training and instruction of young men during the college years?

It is no fair answer to this question to summon us to faith in intellectual ideals, to demand of us that we live the life of the mind with confidence in the virtues of intelligence, that we love knowledge and because of our passion follow after it. Most of us are already eager to accept intellectual ideals, but our very devotion to them forbids that we accept them blindly. I have often been struck by the inner contradictoriness of the demand that we have faith in intelligence. It seems to mean, as it is so commonly made to mean, that we must unintelligently follow intelligence, that we must ignorantly pursue knowledge, that we must question everything except the business of asking questions, that we think about everything except the use of thinking itself. As Mr. F. H. Bradley would say, the dictum, "Have faith in intelligence" is so true that it constantly threatens to become false. Our very conviction of its truth compels us to scrutinize and test it to the end.

How then shall we justify the faith of the teacher? What reason can we give for our exaltation of intellectual training and activity? To this question two answers are possible. First, knowledge and thinking are good in themselves. Secondly, they help us in the attainment of other values in life which without them would be impossible. Both these answers may be given and are given by college teachers. Within them must be found whatever can be said by way

of explanation and justification of the work of the liberal college.

The first answer receives just now far less of recognition than it can rightly claim. When the man of the world is told that a boy is to be trained in thinking just because of the joys and satisfactions of thinking itself, just in order that he may go on thinking as long as he lives, the man of the world has been heard to scoff and to ridicule the idle dreaming of scholarly men. But if thinking is not a good thing in itself, if intellectual activity is not worth while for its own sake, will the man of the world tell us what is? There are those among us who find so much satisfaction in the countless trivial and vulgar amusements of a crude people that they have no time for the joys of the mind. There are those who are so closely shut up within a little round of petty pleasures that they have never dreamed of the fun of reading and conversing and investigating and reflecting. And of these one can only say that the difference is one of taste, and that their tastes seem to be relatively dull and stupid. Surely it is one function of the liberal college to save boys from that stupidity, to give them an appetite for the pleasures of thinking, to make them sensitive to the joys of appreciation and understanding, to show them how sweet and captivating and wholesome are the games of the mind. At the time when the play element is still dominant it is worth while to acquaint boys with the sport of facing and solving problems. Apart from some of the experiences of friendship and sympathy I doubt if there are any human interests so permanently satisfying, so fine and splendid in themselves as are those of intellectual activity. To give our boys that zest, that delight in things intellectual, to give them an appreciation of a kind of life which is well worth living, to make them men of intellectual culture — that certainly is one part of the work of any liberal college.

On the other hand, the creation of culture as so defined can never constitute the full achievement of the college.

It is essential to awaken the impulses of inquiry, of experiment, of investigation, of reflection, the instinctive cravings of the mind. But no liberal college can be content with this. The impulse to thinking must be questioned and rationalized as must every other instinctive response. It is well to think, but what shall we think about? Are there any lines of investigation and reflection more valuable than others, and if so, how is their value to be tested? Or again, if the impulse for thinking comes into conflict with other desires and cravings, how is the opposition to be solved? It has sometimes been suggested that our man of intellectual culture may be found like Nero fiddling with words while all the world about him is aflame. And the point of the suggestion is not that fiddling is a bad and worthless pastime, but rather that it is inopportune on such an occasion, that the man who does it is out of touch with his situation, that his fiddling does not fit his facts. In a word, men know with regard to thinking, as with regard to every other content of human experience, that it cannot be valued merely in terms of itself. It must be measured in terms of its relation to other contents and to human experience as a whole. Thinking is good in itself, — but what does it cost of other things, what does it bring of other values? Place it amid all the varied contents of our individual and social experience, measure it in terms of what it implies, fix it by means of its relations, and then you will know its worth not simply in itself but in that deeper sense which comes when human desires are rationalized and human lives are known in their entirety, as well as they can be known by those who are engaged in living them.

In this consideration we find the second answer of the teacher to the demand for justification of the work of the college. Knowledge is good, he tells us, not only in itself, but in its enrichment and enhancement of the other values of our experience. In the deepest and fullest sense of the words, knowledge pays. This statement rests upon the

classification of human actions into two groups, those of the instinctive type and those of the intellectual type. By far the greater part of our human acts are carried on without any clear idea of what we are going to do or how we are going to do it. For the most part our responses to our situations are the immediate responses of feeling, of perception, of custom, of tradition. But slowly and painfully, as the mind has developed, action after action has been translated from the feeling to the ideational type; in wider and wider fields men have become aware of their own modes of action, more and more they have come to understanding, to knowledge of themselves and of their needs. And the principle underlying all our educational procedure is that on the whole, actions become more successful as they pass from the sphere of feeling to that of understanding. Our educational belief is that in the long run if men know what they are going to do and how they are going to do it, and what is the nature of the situation with which they are dealing, their response to that situation will be better adjusted and more beneficial than are the responses of the feeling type in like situations.

It is all too obvious that there are limits to the validity of this principle. If men are to investigate, to consider, to decide, then action must be delayed and we must pay the penalty of waiting. If men are to endeavor to understand and know their situations, then we must be prepared to see them make mistakes in their thinking, lose their certainty of touch, wander off into pitfalls and illusions and fallacies of thought, and in consequence secure for the time results far lower in value than those of the instinctive response which they seek to replace. The delays and mistakes and uncertainties of our thinking are a heavy price to pay, but it is the conviction of the teacher that the price is as nothing when compared with the goods which it buys. You may point out to him the loss when old methods of procedure give way before the criticism of understanding, you may remind him of the pain and suffering when old

habits of thought and action are replaced, you may reprove him for all the blunders of the past; but in spite of it all he knows and you know that in human lives taken separately and in human life as a whole men's greatest lack is the lack of understanding, their greatest hope to know themselves and the world in which they live.

Within the limits of this general educational principle the place of the liberal college may easily be fixed. In the technical school pupils are prepared for a specific work and are kept for the most part on the plane of perceptual action, doing work which others understand. In the professional school, students are properly within the realm of ideas and principles, but they are still limited to a specific human interest with which alone their understanding is concerned. But the college is called liberal as against both of these because the instruction is dominated by no special interest, is limited to no single human task, but is intended to take human activity as a whole, to understand human endeavors not in their isolation but in their relations to one another and to the total experience which we call the life of our people. And just as we believe that the building of ships has become more successful as men have come to a knowledge of the principles involved in their construction; just as the practice of medicine has become more successful as we have come to a knowledge of the human body, of the conditions within it and the influences without; — just so the teacher in the liberal college believes that life as a total enterprise, life as it presents itself to each one of us in his career as an individual, — human living, — will be more successful in so far as men come to understand it and to know it as they attempt to carry it on. To give boys an intellectual grasp on human experience — this, it seems to me, is the teacher's conception of the chief function of the liberal college.

May I call attention to the fact that this second answer of the teacher defines the aim of the college as avowedly and frankly practical? Knowledge is to be sought chiefly

for the sake of its contribution to the other activities of human living. But on the other hand, it is as definitely declared that in method the college is fully and unreservedly intellectual. If we can see that these two demands are not in conflict but that they stand together in the harmonious relation of means and ends, of instrument and achievement, of method and result, we may escape many a needless conflict and keep our educational policy in singleness of aim and action. To do this we must show that the college is intellectual, not as opposed to practical interests and purposes, but as opposed to unpractical and unwise methods of work. The issue is not between practical and intellectual aims but between the immediate and the remote aim, between the hasty and the measured procedure, between the demand for results at once and the willingness to wait for the best results. The intellectual road to success is longer and more roundabout than any other, but they who are strong and willing for the climbing are brought to higher levels of achievement than they could possibly have attained had they gone straight forward in the pathway of quick returns. If this were not true the liberal college would have no proper place in our life at all. In so far as it is true the college has a right to claim the best of our young men to give them its preparation for the living they are to do.

IV

But now that we have attempted to interpret the intellectual mission of the college, it may be fair to ask, "Are the teachers and scholars of our day always faithful to that mission? Do their statements and their practice always ring in accord with the principle which has been stated?" It seems to me that at two points they are constantly off the key, constantly at variance with the reasons by which alone their teaching can be justified.

In the first place, it often appears as if our teachers and scholars were deliberately in league to mystify and befog

the popular mind regarding this practical value of intellectual work. They seem not to wish too much said about the results and benefits. Their desire is to keep aloft the intellectual banner, to proclaim the intellectual gospel, to demand of student and public alike adherence to the faith. And in general when they are questioned as to results they give little satisfaction except to those who are already pledged to unwavering confidence in their *ipse dixits*. And largely as a result of this attitude the American people seem to me to have little understanding of the intellectual work of the college. Our citizens and patrons can see the value of games and physical exercises; they readily perceive the importance of the social give and take of a college democracy; they can appreciate the value of studies which prepare a young man for his profession and so anticipate or replace the professional school; they can even believe that if a boy is kept at some sort of thinking for four years his mind may become more acute, more systematic, more accurate, and hence more useful than it was before. But as for the content of a college course, as for the value of knowledge, what a boy gains by knowing Greek or economics, philosophy or literature, history or biology, except as they are regarded as having professional usefulness, I think our friends are in the dark and are likely to remain so until we turn on the light. When our teachers say, as they sometimes do say, that the effect of knowledge upon the character and life of the student must always be for the college an accident, a circumstance which has no essential connection with its real aim or function, then it seems to me that our educational policy is wholly out of joint. If there be no essential connection between instruction and life, then there is no reason for giving instruction except in so far as it is pleasant in itself, and we have no educational policy at all. As against this hesitancy, this absence of a conviction, we men of the college should declare in clear and unmistakable terms our creed — the creed that knowledge is justified by its results.

We should say to our people so plainly that they cannot misunderstand, "Give us your boys, give us the means we need, and we will so train and inform the minds of those boys that their own lives and the lives of the men about them shall be more successful than they could be without our training. Give us our chance and we will show your boys what human living is, for we are convinced that they can live better in knowledge than they can in ignorance."

There is a second wandering from the faith which is so common among investigators that it may fairly be called the "fallacy of the scholar." It is the belief that all knowledge is so good that all parts of knowledge are equally good. Ask many of our scholars and teachers what subjects a boy should study in order that he may gain insight for human living, and they will say, "It makes no difference in what department of knowledge he studies; let him go into Sanskrit or bacteriology, into mathematics or history; if only he goes where men are actually dealing with intellectual problems, and if only he learns how to deal with problems himself, the aim of education is achieved, he has entered into intellectual activity." This point of view, running through all the varieties of the elective system, seems to me hopelessly at variance with any sound educational doctrine. It represents the scholar of the day at his worst both as a thinker and as a teacher. In so far as it dominates a group of college teachers it seems to me to render them unfit to determine and to administer a college curriculum. It is an announcement that they have no guiding principles in their educational practice, no principles of selection in their arrangement of studies, no genuine grasp on the relationship between knowledge and life. It is the concerted statement of a group of men each of whom is lost within the limits of his own special studies, and who as a group seem not to realize the organic relationships between them nor the common task which should bind them together.

In bringing this second criticism against our scholars I

am not urging that the principle of election of college studies should be entirely discontinued. But I should like to inquire by what right and within what limits it is justified. The most familiar argument in its favor is that if a student is allowed to choose along the lines of his own intellectual or professional interest he will have enthusiasm, the eagerness which comes with the following of one's own bent. Now just so far as this result is achieved, just so far as the quality of scholarship is improved, the procedure is good and we may follow it if we do not thereby lose other results more valuable than our gain. But if the special interest comes into conflict with more fundamental ones, if what the student prefers is opposed to what he ought to prefer, then we of the college cannot leave the choice with him. We must say to him frankly, "If you do not care for liberal training you had better go elsewhere; we have a special and definite task assigned us which demands that we keep free from the domination of special or professional pursuits. So long as we are faithful to that task we cannot give you what you ask."

In my opinion, however, the fundamental motive of the elective system is not the one which has been mentioned. In the last resort our teachers allow students to choose their own studies not in order to appeal to intellectual or to professional interest, but because they themselves have no choice of their own in which they believe with sufficient intensity to impose it upon their pupils. And this lack of a dominating educational policy is in turn an expression of an intellectual attitude, a point of view, which marks the scholars of our time. In a word, it seems to me that our willingness to allow students to wander about in the college curriculum is one of the most characteristic expressions of a certain intellectual agnosticism, a kind of intellectual bankruptcy, into which, in spite of all our wealth of information, the spirit of the time has fallen. Let me explain my meaning.

The old classical curriculum was founded by men who had

a theory of the world and of human life. They had taken all the available content of human knowledge and had wrought it together into a coherent whole. What they knew was, as judged by our standards, very little in amount. But upon that little content they had expended all the infinite pains of understanding and interpretation. They had taken the separate judgments of science, philosophy, history and the arts, and had so welded them together, so established their relationships with one another, so freed them from contradictions and ambiguities that, so far as might be in their day and generation, human life as a whole and the world about us were known, were understood, were rationalized. They had a knowledge of human experience by which they could live and which they could teach to others engaged in the activities of living.

But with the invention of methods of scientific investigation and discovery there came pouring into the mind of Europe great masses of intellectual material, — astronomy, physics, chemistry. This content for a time it could not understand, could not relate to what it already knew. The old boundary lines did not enclose the new fields, the old explanations and interpretations would not fit the new facts. Knowledge had not grown, it had simply been enlarged, and the two masses of content, the old and the new, stood facing each other with no common ground of understanding. Here was the intellectual task of the great leaders of the early modern thought of Europe: to re-establish the unity of knowledge, to discover the relationships between these apparently hostile bodies of judgments, to know the world again, but with all the added richness of the new insights and the new information. This was the work of Leibnitz and Spinoza, of Kant and Hegel, and those who labored with them. And in a very considerable measure the task had been accomplished, order had been restored. But again with the inrush of the newer discoveries, first in the field of biology and then later in the world of human relationships, the difficulties have returned,

multiplied a thousand fold. Every day sees a new field of facts opened up, a new method of investigation invented, a new department of knowledge established. And in the rush of it all these new sciences come merely as additions, not to be understood but simply numbered, not to be interpreted but simply listed in the great collection of separate fields of knowledge. If you will examine the work of any scientist within one of these fields you will find him ordering, systematizing, reducing to principles, in a word, knowing every fact in terms of its relation to every other fact and to the whole field within which it falls. But at the same time these separate sciences, these separate groups of judgment, are left standing side by side with no intelligible connections, no establishment of relationships, no interpretation in the sense in which we insist upon it within each of the fields taken by itself. Is it not the characteristic statement of a scholar of our time to say, "I do not know what may be the ultimate significance of these facts and these principles; all that I know is that if you will follow my methods within my field you will find the facts coming into order, the principles coming into simple and coherent arrangement. With any problems apart from this order and this arrangement I have intellectually no concern."

It has become an axiom with us that the genuine student labors within his own field. And if the student ventures forth to examine the relations of his field to the surrounding country he very easily becomes a populariser, a litterateur, a speculator, and worst of all, unscientific. Now I do not object to a man's minding his own intellectual business if he chooses to do so, but when a man minds his own business because he does not know any other business, because he has no knowledge whatever of the relationships which justify his business and make it worth while, then I think one may say that though such a man minds his own affairs he does not know them, he does not understand them. Such a man, from the point of view of the demands of a

liberal education, differs in no essential respect from the tradesman who does not understand his trade or the professional man who merely practices his profession. Just as truly as they, he is shut up within a special interest; just as truly as they he is making no intellectual attempt to understand his experience in its unity. And the pity of it is that more and more the chairs in our colleges are occupied by men who have only this special interest, this specialized information, and it is through them that we attempt to give our boys a liberal education, which the teachers themselves have not achieved.

I should not like to be misunderstood in making this railing accusation against our teachers and our time. If I say that our knowledge is at present a collection of scattered observations about the world rather than an understanding of it, fairness compels the admission that the failure is due to the inherent difficulties of the situation and to the novelty of the problems presented. If I cry out against the agnosticism of our people it is not as one who has escaped from it, nor as one who would point the way back to the older synthesis, but simply as one who believes that the time has come for a reconstruction, for a new synthesis. We have had time enough now to get some notion of our bearings, shocks enough to get over our nervousness and discomfiture when a new one comes along. It is the opportunity and the obligation of this generation to think through the content of our knowing once again, to understand it, so far as we can. And in such a battle as this, surely it is the part of the college to take the lead. Here is the mission of the college teacher as of no other member of our common life. Surely he should stand before his pupils and before all of us as a man who has achieved some understanding of this human situation of ours, but more than that, as one who is eager for the conflict with the powers of darkness and who can lead his pupils in enthusiastic devotion to the common cause of enlightment.

V

And now, finally, after these attacks upon the policies which other men have derived from their love of knowledge, may I suggest two matters of policy which seem to me to follow from the definition of education which we have taken? The first concerns the content of the college course; the second has to do with the method of its presentation to the undergraduate.

We have said that the system of free election is natural for those to whom knowledge is simply a number of separate departments. It is equally true that just in so far as knowledge attains unity, just so far as the relations of the various departments are perceived, freedom of election by the student must be limited. For it at once appears that on the one side there are vast ranges of information which have virtually no significance for the purposes of a liberal education, while on the other hand there are certain elements so fundamental and vital that without any one of them a liberal education is impossible.

I should like to indicate certain parts of human knowledge which seems to me so essential that no principle of election should ever be allowed to drive them out of the course of any college student.

First, a student should become acquainted with the fundamental motives and purposes and beliefs which, clearly or unclearly recognized, underlie all human experience and bind it together. He must perceive the moral strivings, the intellectual endeavors, the aesthetic experiences of his race, and closely linked with these, determining and determined by them, the beliefs about the world which have appeared in our systems of religion. To investigate this field, to bring it to such clearness of formulation as may be possible, is the task of philosophy — an essential element in any liberal education. Secondly, as in human living, our motives, purposes and beliefs have found expression in institutions, — those concerted modes of procedure by

which we work together, — a student should be made acquainted with these. He should see and appreciate what is intended, what accomplished, and what left undone by such institutions as property, the courts, the family, the church, the mill. To know these as contributing and failing to contribute to human welfare is the work of our social or humanistic sciences, into which a boy must go on his way through the liberal college. Thirdly, in order to understand the motives and the institutions of human life one must know the conditions which surround it, the stage on which the game is played. To give this information is the business of astronomy, geology, physics, chemistry, biology and the other sciences of nature. These a boy must know, so far as they are significant and relevant to his purpose. Fourthly, as all three of these factors, the motives, the institutions, the natural processes have sprung from the past and have come to be what they are by change upon change in the process of time, the student of human life must try to learn the sequence of events from which the present has come. The development of human thought and attitude, the development of human institutions, the development of the world and of the beings about us — all these must be known, as throwing light upon present problems, present instrumentalities, present opportunities in the life of human endeavor. And in addition to these four studies which render human experience in terms of abstract ideas, a liberal education must take account of those concrete representations of life which are given in the arts, and especially in the art of literature. It is well that a boy should be acquainted with his world not simply as expressed by the principles of knowledge but also as depicted by the artist with all the vividness and definiteness which are possible in the portrayal of individual beings in individual relationships. These five elements, then, a young man must take from a college of liberal training, the contributions of philosophy, of humanistic science, of natural science, of history, and of literature. So far as knowledge

is concerned, these at least he should have, welded together in some kind of interpretation of his own experience and of the world in which he lives.

My second suggestion is that our college curriculum should be so arranged and our instruction so devised that its vital connection with the living of men should be obvious even to an undergraduate. A little while ago I heard one of the most prominent citizens of this country speaking of his college days, and he said, "I remember so vividly those few occasions on which the professor would put aside the books and talk like a real man about real things." Oh, the bitterness of those words to the teacher! Our books are not dealing with the real things, and for the most part we are not real men either, but just old fogies and bookworms! And to be perfectly frank about the whole matter, I believe that in large measure our pupils are indifferent to their studies simply because they do not see that these are important.

But if we really have a vital course of study to present this difficulty can in large measure be overcome. It is possible to make a Freshman realize the need of translating his experience from the forms of feeling to those of ideas. He can and he ought to be shown that now, his days of mere tutelage being over, it is time for him to face the problems of his people, to begin to think about those problems for himself, to learn what other men have learned and thought before him, in a word, to get himself ready to take his place among those who are responsible for the guidance of our common life by ideas and principles and purposes. If this could be done, I think we should get from the reality-loving American boy something like an intellectual enthusiasm, something of the spirit that comes when he plays a game that seems to him really worth playing. But I do not believe that this result can be achieved without a radical reversal of the arrangement of the college curriculum. I should like to see every freshman at once plunged into the problems of philosophy,

into the difficulties and perplexities about our institutions, into the scientific accounts of the world especially as they bear on human life, into the portrayals of human experience which are given by the masters of literature. If this were done by proper teaching, it seems to me the boy's college course would at once take on significance for him; he would understand what he is about; and though he would be a sadly puzzled boy at the end of the first year, he would still have before him three good years of study, of investigation, of reflection, and of discipleship, in which to achieve, so far as may be, the task to which he has been set. Let him once feel the problems of the present, and his historical studies will become significant; let him know what other men have discovered and thought about his problems, and he will be ready to deal with them himself. But in any case, the whole college course will be unified and dominated by a single interest, a single purpose, — that of so understanding human life as to be ready and equipped for the practice of it. And this would mean for the college, not another seeking of the way of quick returns, but rather an escape from aimless wanderings in the mere by-paths of knowledge, a resolute climbing on the high road to a unified grasp upon human experience.

VI

I have taken so much of your time this morning that an apology seems due for the things I have omitted to mention. I have said nothing of the organization of the college, nothing of the social life of the students, nothing of the relations with the alumni, nothing of the needs and qualifications of the teachers, and even within the consideration of the course of study, nothing of the value of specialization or of the disciplinary subjects or of the training in language and expression. And I have put these aside deliberately, for the sake of a cause which is greater than any of them — a cause which lies at the very heart of the liberal college.

It is the cause of making clear to the American people the mission of the teacher, of convincing them of the value of knowledge: not the specialized knowledge which contributes to immediate practical aims, but the unified understanding which is Insight.

III

WHAT DOES THE COLLEGE PREPARE FOR

COLLEGE education, like all other genuine education, is of course practical. It is preparation. Its underlying principle is very simple. Young people are to be called upon later to carry on certain activities. The purpose of the preparation is to bring it about that those activities will be better done than they would have been if the preparation had not been given. If in any case it can be shown that a student is not thus made ready for better doing, if it appears that the graduates of a school are not more successful than they would have been had they not attended the school, then study and school are alike condemned and should be discarded. School and college are both to be judged by practical standards.

But what are the activities in which students may be expected to engage, for which they should be prepared? In relation to the goods, the possessions of life they fall into three groups. If our education prepares properly for each of these then it is socially justified.

The classification suggested above is obvious enough. First, men are making goods, making things which they want. Second, they are distributing these goods, are assigning to each man his share of them. And third, they are using goods, each man the share which falls to his lot.

For example, men take the forces, the stuff of the material world and of human nature, and by processes of cultivation and of manufacture, make out of these books, trees, fruits, sermons, songs, boats, shoes, railways, tennis racquets — all the multitudinous things which taken together become the common stock of human possessions. Again, men build

up ways of distributing these possessions, of determining to whom each bit of value shall go to be kept as his own. Thus we have the customs of rent and wages and property and courts and inheritance and taxes and all the rest of our machinery of social justice. And finally each man in his own way uses what he has for such purposes as he thinks best. He reads books, or puts them up for decoration; he listens to sermons, sails a boat, travels in a train, swings a tennis racquet, lies under the shade of a tree, sips the juice of a fruit, in general makes of what he has what he wants in the way of experience.

Now it is these three sets of activities for which our schools and colleges are making young people ready. We want manufacturing and growing better done; we want distributing better done; we want using better done. If these ends be accomplished then our teaching plays its proper part in social and individual living; if not, it fails to play its part.

As a teacher surveys these three sets of activities with which his work is concerned, two observations will readily occur to him — two judgments of comparison. He may ask first as to the relative importance of the three tasks assigned, and second, as to their relative difficulty. In both cases he will find, I think, an ascending scale running from manufacture, through distribution, to use, an ascending scale of importance and of difficulty.

The comparison as to importance is rather hard to put into a form which will stand the test of criticism. To ask whether the making or distributing or the using of wealth is the most important is dangerously like inquiring whether chickens precede eggs, or eggs chickens. Obviously enough, all three activities are essential. There is not much to be gained by making things if they are not to be given to any one, nor much gained by giving them if they are not used. But they cannot be used unless they are given, nor can they be given unless they are made. To distinguish relative values in this realm seems like comparing white and black

crows in the dark. And yet there is a certain sense in which the using of value is more fundamental than either making or distributing it. In a very real sense, using is human life itself, it is the human experience for the sake of which the other activities are carried on. To use what we have is the very process of living; to that end all other acts are merely contributory; they are its instruments and machinery.

The differences as to difficulty are much more readily perceived. Relatively manufacture, the production of goods, is an easy task for men. It is easy in the sense that we master it with ease. This does not mean that we are not called by it to strenuous endeavors. It does mean that our endeavors are successful. What we do in this field pays quickly and surely in terms of results. The last century has seen such a developing control of the processes of manufacture and growth that our wealth has increased by leaps and bounds. The technical processes which have been devised by the application of natural science to the accomplishment of human purposes have so enlarged our productive power that as compared with our fathers and grandfathers we roll in wealth and in the assurance of greater wealth in the future. Relatively speaking, we have the processes of the production of wealth in hand.

In the distribution of wealth we are not so successful. The world is torn with conflicting theories as to how this should be done. Men are quarreling as to the possession of goods. Nations quarrel with nations, individuals with individuals, and we do not easily find a basis for the settlement of these quarrels.

In a country driven mad by injustice and tyranny, men have escaped from their bonds and are wildly seeking to formulate and to put into action principles of distribution subversive of all that men in other countries have counted secure and essential. In safer countries where the pressure is not so severe, men are in dread lest it may become so and are forming into parties which view each other with

hostile eye and with stealthy suspicion. Here we find the men who believe that whatever has been is right. They hold to the view that to their grandfathers a scheme of social justice was revealed by splendid intuition and that he who would depart from this is a traitor and a thief. To such men the cries of the madmen in the country which has found release are so dreadful that they must stop their ears, nay, must stop the ears of their fellow-countrymen as well. These two groups are the extremists with respect to social justice — the men who would break our present scheme to pieces and start anew and those who hold that scheme so sacred that the suggestion of changing it is not simply false but also vicious and sacrilegious. Between these two are most of us, men who try to have patience and common sense, but who are sadly puzzled and perplexed just now. One thing we know, namely, that the way is not clear, old procedures are not surely right, old answers cannot be accepted without question. The world is seeking wisdom as to social justice in distribution, and that wisdom is hard to get.

But more difficult yet than the distributing of values is the human task of using them. And the most serious aspect of the difficulty is that we do not feel it. We may be baffled by the problems of social justice but at least we are interested in them. In a college community as well as in a public forum men can be stirred to eager and desperate activity by the perception that other men are not being fairly treated, that human beings are being robbed of a fair chance at the opportunities of living. We may not know what to do but our impulse is generous and our will resolute to do something, if only the mind would tell us what it is. But in the realm of use, in apprehension of the necessity of taste and insight and appreciation of value, we are hardly conscious of difficulty at all. We have a certain blind faith that if only the opportunities of life are given they will be taken and human lives will be in general what they ought to be. Nothing could be more obvious than the

falseness of such a faith as this. Wealth has not very generally brought to those who have it the fineness of taste and the niceness of discrimination which the use of it demands. Quite as often it has brought coarseness of feeling and dullness of appreciation. Our civilization does not very clearly become more fine as it becomes more rich. We are in danger of having the world in our hands and losing it because our fingers slip. What shall we do with the world which is given us? That is, I think, the hardest lesson which the teacher has to learn and teach.

Here then, are the three tasks of the teacher. How do they bear upon the work of the liberal college? In a broad general way it is true that the teaching of the production of value rests with the technical and professional schools. They are engaged in devising ways of making goods. And again may we say that relatively speaking their task is an easy one. The liberal schools, on the other hand, are concerned with both the second and the third endeavors. They are expected to inform our people as to how the goods of life should be shared and how they should be used. These are the two fundamental aims of liberal teaching.

In the remainder of this paper I should like to press upon the college the claims of the third of these tasks as against a constant over-emphasis of the second. And may I protest that this is not because one loves the second less but rather because one loves the third more. It would perhaps be truer to say that the second without the third is nothing and that therefore love for it demands that we leave it no longer bereft of its fellow. If only we can show that the notion of social justice is not a complete account of life, that it needs the supplementation of this third conception, then perhaps in homes and churches and schools and colleges we may get a wiser and saner teaching of life than is now given. Let us then condemn and vilify the ideal of social justice in order to bring its adherents to their senses.

The point at issue was brought to clear formulation in

a public discussion in which the writer of this paper took part a few years ago. The first of two speakers said, "I would not give a snap of my finger for a scheme of education which does not find its final term of value in Service." To which the second speaker replied, "I would not give a snap of my finger for a scheme of education or of life which does find its final term of value in Service." Such statements as these have all the exaggeration of public controversy but carefully considered they define an issue which demands the attention of the liberal teacher.

Strictly speaking it seems to me clear that the second of the above statements is right. Service, as such, is not a term of value at all. To give to another is valuable only in a secondary and derivative sense, never in a final one. It is the thing given which is of value. There is nothing gained by giving to another something which is not worth giving. To serve one's fellows is to give to them what they need, what they enjoy, what is worth while. And if one is in search of the final term by which all our activities and all our teaching are to be justified we must find it among those things the having of which is good and the lack of which robs human living of its value. To serve is to give something and service is good only in so far as that something given is good.

At the risk of seeming flippant and unfair I should like to press this point home by a number of statements which though they are only half-truths are yet needed because the other half is so constantly torn away from its fellow and kept before our students as if it were the total and the sufficient truth.

Much of the teaching and preaching which our students hear is far too self-centered in its emphasis upon social justice and upon the duty of service. After all, the essential thing is not that we should make the world right, but that it should be right. One often feels that some of our youthful enthusiasts are haunted by the dreadful fear that there may be no sinners for them to save, no broken lives for them

to put together again. As against this one must protest that in the last analysis the receiving of value does as much for human living as does the giving of it. If for no other reason, this is true because after all no one can give unless there is some one who will take his gift. And if the taking be not good, then the giving, whose final justification lies within it, cannot be good either. Clearly enough, in the grand total of human experience, giving cannot have more value than the taking and using of the thing given. If it be not good to use then it is not good to give the thing used.

And from another point of view, the determination to serve one's fellows needs to be kept clear in mind so that it may be successful. It is well enough for youthful enthusiasts to go out with the determination to make a hundred men happy, to make a hundred lives worth while. But simple arithmetical calculation assures us that such expectations will not be realized. On the average one man cannot make more than one life worth while, for the obvious reason that somebody must have the life which is so practiced upon. If we base our calculation upon "welfares" as the term of measurement, and say that each man would like to make as many welfares as possible, the hard fact remains that on the average we cannot each make more than one of them. A welfare must belong to somebody and if there were actually created more welfares than men, the trouble would be that there would not be enough men to take them. There is no danger of course of such a calamity as this. Human life hardly furnishes us on the whole with half a welfare apiece. But there is danger that our young people misconstrue their task, state it to themselves in exaggerated sentimental terms and so doom themselves to the disappointment and sense of futility which come when idle dreams collapse.

From still another point of view, one is here protesting against the externalism of our social teaching. We teach too much about the machinery of life and far too little

about life itself. We tell too much about the things which may be done and too little about what they are done for. As a people we have immense admiration for a man who builds a great library and profound disdain for a man who sits down quietly in the library to read a book. What is he doing there, we ask. Of what use is the reading of the book? What will it enable him to do? And if one answers that he reads because reading a good book is a good human experience and that therefore it may be done not for the sake of something else but for its own sake, practical men think that we have gone mad. But again, let us protest that if reading is not good then the building of the library was not good, and our benefactor is not good and nothing has been accomplished by all that he has given and done. If there are not values in life then doing has no value and the builder and the dreamer go down together in a common crash.

The same principle holds on other sides of our life. We admire men who can write books and men who can paint pictures. Such men seem to us to have succeeded — if someone else tells us that their work is highly regarded. But we as a people are robbing both writers and painters of their proper success because we do not give them readers and seers who can appreciate, who can take the meaning, the beauty which they give. It is true that we pay them money for their efforts, but it is also true that we say "Ah" in the wrong place, that we are thrilled by the vulgar and stupid thing and left cold by the beauty into which the spirit of the artist has poured itself. There is no surer way of killing artists and writers than to be stupid and dull in the presence of what they have created. For such murders a wealthy crass civilization has a heavy burden of guilt to bear.

What then shall the liberal teacher teach as the representation of the learning which seeks to know what life may be? Shall he forbid men to serve their fellows? We have not said that. To say that in colleges men preach service

badly is not to say that in human society we have too much generous friendship. We have far too little of it. By every means in our power we must build it up so that in the sharing of the goods of life men may act toward one another like friends and fellows rather than like competing beasts, each struggling for the plunder which strength and cunning will enable him to take from other men. College students, like other men, must learn how values should be shared and then must pledge themselves to see to it that justice is done, nay rather must be as eager that other men shall have the values which they crave as that the goods they wish should come to them.

But still the point holds good that all such eagerness as this will come to little unless the man who gives and he who takes have taste for life. There is the final test of value. There is the point where all our strivings succeed or fail.

Can college teachers teach that lesson? Perhaps they can if they have learned it. But they will find a hundred other teaching powers outside the college fighting against them. What shall they do? It seems to me that first they should remain apart from the machinery of life, refusing to be busy with it. And second they should with very steady eyes survey the goods which life affords, should try to see what life may be in terms of its experiences, should make a list of books, and trees, and songs, and friends, and games, and arguments, and all the other splendid things that men can use. And third they should be sensitive themselves, discerning what is fine and true and generous and permanent, and cutting it off with sharp, clear-cut avoidance from the vulgar, false, selfish and transitory things that cheapen life. And finally, having some taste and insight, they should teach them to their pupils, in whatever ways teaching may be done.

There is no one in all our social scheme more ambitious than is the teacher. He is making the mind of his pupil so that it may be fitted to the world in which he lives.

Knowledge and skill must be developed for the making of wealth; wisdom and fairness must be established for the distributing and sharing of wealth. But above all, and as the end of all, taste and sensitiveness and fineness and intensity of appreciation must be built up, so that our wealth may be worth giving and worth having.

IV

MAKING THE MIND OF A NATION

HAS this nation a mind? I fear not. A mind has unity or at least seeks to have it. Perhaps better, a mind is unity in action. A mind is an activity which gathers up disconnected opinions, impulses, theories and brings them into order. Ideas, if they are within the same mind, have relations to one another, are responsible each to the other. They may not live in isolation, nor even in little separate clusters. The mind whose they are, demands that they be one in spirit and in truth. This craving, this zest for unity is the very essence of a life of thought. Only so far as a man expresses it can he be said to live as an individual mind at all. Without it or with little expression of it he is a bundle of things, a group, a mass, a welter of conscious processes. With it he is a human spirit. Just so it is with the thinking of a nation. If there are within it many separate streams of impulse, of opinion, of prejudice, of information, of doubt, or of dogmatism; if these do not know each other; if they have not taken as a common hope the goal of mutual acquaintance and understanding, the nation has no mind. It is a group or many groups. Its life is incoherence and its fate is that which incoherence gives — the life of those who know not what they do nor see the way they go.

For many reasons we as a people are now failing to achieve intellectual unity. People from many separate and different races have been poured into our ranks. Our own national tradition of individualism has unfitted us for the breaking down of barriers. The splitting up of knowledge and of life into separate compartments, — sciences,

arts, trades, professions — this has sundered many of the connections of earlier days. We are not dull, and yet as a people we are not intelligent. Our minds are active, keen, spirited, determined, each in its special sphere. The separate things we do are done with skill and energy. And yet we, as a people, have not a mind. Our common life rises very little above the level of the mob, the crowd — which feels but does not think; which does not judge but follows changing impulse and caprice. Perhaps we are as yet too young to have a mind. Perhaps we grow too fast to keep ourselves in mind.

But now whither shall we turn to seek the making of a mind? To whom shall we go for judging of our separate interests, for understanding of our follies, conserving our truths, cooling our passions, questioning our dogmas, criticising our thoughts. Where, in our social scheme, is judgment to be found? What is the nervous center of our life? Where is the place of understanding? Is the place of judgment to be found in the newspaper? I fear that we do not so regard that institution. Do we not rather think of it as partisan, as special pleader, as used to represent a cause, rather than as judge or critic, assigning to every case its proper value and significance? This common judgment upon editor and news collector may not be true, but yet we make it, and so long as it is made, the newspaper cannot be a center for our common thinking. Nor can the magazine or book perform the service. We do not use them in this way; we do not read enough of things worth reading to make a common understanding. Nor for another set of reasons can the home, the many homes, nor yet the church, the many separate, unrelated churches, furnish the thing we need. No one of these commands our thinking as a whole. And even less are our public men equipped for bringing our thinking under their control. More even than the newspaper, they too are talked about as advocates of parties, interests, sections, creeds, rather than as the guides whom we may trust to lead us. And when they

come before us discussing public policy, we are as often busy in peddling gossip behind their backs, in talking scandal and petty spite, as in listening to their words, discussing their thoughts, weighing their arguments, considering the nation's policy. Perhaps they are at fault; perhaps their hearers; more likely they and we are both at fault. However that may be, they do not lead us in trying to understand a nation's life in fair and generous meeting of opinion; they do not master us in shaping a nation's mind.

Where then shall we go to find the place of understanding, where plead that judgment may be given upon the issues of our common life? More than any other institution, it seems to me, the school and college must assume the task. And especially the liberal college must endeavor to become the place where mind is made and molded. The liberal college is a place where we are trying to gather up the elements of life, — moral, aesthetic, religious, political, industrial, social, — are trying to bring these together so that men may understand them. Out of this stuff, this content of experience, the college tries to make a single thing, a meaning, a scheme of life, an interpretation of what men are and may become. Just that and nothing else is what the college of liberal arts intends to do. With that accomplished, it succeeds according to the measure of the accomplishment. With that neglected or not done, whatever else it may achieve, no institution is a college. Call it whatever else you please, a school for boys, a country club, a factory for making tools for industry, an idler's paradise, a shop for grinding gerunds, a rag-bag store house for ill-assorted facts — these are not colleges. To be a place of understanding, to fashion minds for men, to make a nation's mind, that is the aim that leads us on.

Of course, to gaze at such a goal as this is dreaming; of course, one knows that such a vision will never be made true. But these are days for daring deeds that cannot be done. And colleges are always young enough in spirit to

follow the roads that never come to endings. The task cannot be done but still it must be done. To make a nation's mind, — to help in making it, perhaps to lead the way — that is the task for every one of us, trustee and teacher, graduate and undergraduate alike. This nation has so great a part to play that it must know its lines. And we must read the play, assign the parts and make them altogether into one. We must not be a mob, a crowd, our speech an incoherent clash and clatter of unrelated groans, and shouts and yells. This nation, like an individual mind, must seek to understand itself, to feel, to will, to appreciate the part it has to play, must play its part with understanding. And we within that part must try to make our lines stand out vivid and clear. This nation needs a mind with which to play its part. The college must know the play and make the mind, the minds, which shall interpret and express it.

PART II

THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE PROCESS

THE three papers which follow are given to a consideration of the friends and supporters of the college. Their relations to each other and their relations to the college are regarded with somewhat anxious eyes.

The first paper was given at the meeting of the Phi Beta Kappa society of Harvard University, June 18, 1917. It takes the motto of the society, "Learning at the Helm of Life," as the governing ideal of the college. It summons trustees, teachers, presidents, graduates, and undergraduates to give an account of their allegiance to that ideal.

The second paper, "The Freedom of the College," appeared in the *Atlantic Monthly* of January, 1918. It is concerned with the relationship between teaching and study on the one hand and freedom of thought and speech on the other. It finds freedom to be, both for college and for teacher, primarily not a privilege but a duty.

The third paper was given at a meeting of the New England Association of Colleges and Preparatory Schools, November 7, 1914. It was one of a series of papers which discussed the values of various factors in the life of the college as a whole. This paper finds side by side with the studies of the classroom, the Student Activities of the community outside the classroom. It asks as to the proper relationship between activities and studies.

I

THE COLLEGE AS CRITIC

I COME to-day to talk with you about colleges. I have not in mind Harvard, nor even Amherst — but just colleges in the large, especially American colleges. We shall be concerned not with technical schools or professional schools or even with universities, but with plain, old-fashioned colleges of liberal culture.

I feel justified in presenting this theme to-day because of the relationship between the society of Phi Beta Kappa and the liberal college. I suppose a member of the society may be defined as "a person who has been very successful in a liberal college." To know one of these two institutions is then to know the other. If we can know what a college is and so what success in a college is, we may be able to tell the members of Phi Beta Kappa just what they are. I am sure they would be interested to know. But if, on the other hand, they already know what they are and will tell us, we may reverse the procedure. If what they have done constitutes success in college life, and if they will tell us what they have done, we then, knowing what success in college is, may learn what a college intends to be and do. That surely we should be interested to know.

As between these two procedures, courtesy would suggest that we assume that the members of this society do know what they are about. I propose, therefore, that we take the society and its principles for granted, and that from these as our starting-point we attempt to define the nature of the college, its aims, and its problems.

What, then, is the society? Does it describe itself; does it set forth its purpose and ideal? It flies a pennant,

as you all know well. Those letters of its name are not mere empty sounds. They mean a thought, φιλοσοφία βίου κυβερνήτης, which is, being translated, "Learning at the helm of life." I love the figure which those words suggest: the bark of life adventuring out into the open sea, tossed by the waves which bear it up, driven by the winds, carried by the currents, swinging with the tides, but ever as it goes, with learning at the helm — learning which knows the waves and watches them, learning which spies upon the winds and turns the bark to use them, learning which measures the currents and the tides and plays the winds against them, learning which knows the port behind and sees the port before, learning which does not fetch or carry, which does not drive or batter, learning which sees and guides — learning, the pilot, at the helm of life!

Yes, I think we know. The members of Phi Beta Kappa are the men who fly that pennant. They have not all been elected to the society, and perhaps some men have been voted in who have never looked aloft to see the pennant where it flies. But whether in or out, those are the men of whom we talk to-day. These men have taken learning as their guide. Let strength and custom bear them up and carry them on, let feeling drive them forth, let mood and circumstance divert their course, let yearnings sweep them here and there, but yet they try to see, to know, to understand, to tell whither they ought to go and how it shall be done. Learning at the helm of life! I greet the goodly fellowship of those who fly that flag.

But now what is a college? Why, it is that in which to fly this flag is to succeed and to fly another, any other, is to fail. A college is a place, a group, a comradeship of those who follow learning as their guide and who welcome others in the same pursuit. A college is a spirit, a way of life, a manner of being; it is the will to see the way we go. And we who set our bounds by fence and yard, by brick and stone, credits and tests, books and degrees, what does the college think of us? These days of strife are days when

men must tell what flag they fly, what leader they obey, what loyalty they own. I am inclined, therefore, as speaker for the society of those who follow learning, to demand of colleges that they present themselves and give account of what they have done and failed to do in striving for our goal.

My proposal is that we summon to the bar of judgment of this society those groups of men who call themselves the sons and servants of Alma Mater. Let them appear in turn, graduate, undergraduate, teacher, president, trustee, benefactor, friend. Let each one come and we will see how he comports himself in presence of the flag we raise.

I

And first, by rules of good procedure, I summon the alumni. In the courts of moral judgment it has been decreed of men and institutions that by their fruits they shall be known. Let the college, then, bring forth its fruits, those spirits which it has nourished and cultured; let us see how good or bad they are.

And as the court prepares to hear the case, what is the charge? It is a serious one. "Their heads have been turned round; they who should look ahead are looking back; the college, when it taught them, set them with eyes before to see the way, but they have craned their necks until the muscles are all awry; their eyes are looking backward. And be it further said that they have done this thing because of love for us, though a mistaken love. They think the college far behind them, an experience of their youth, and so they look around. But it is far before, leading them on, and they are missing it because their heads are turned."

"But," the defense will urge, "this is a new and strange demand. There is no law upon the statute-book that specifies which way a college man shall hold his head. Have we not done the things the college asked of us? Have we not loved it, worked for it, supported it, declared abroad

that it is best of all the colleges the world has ever seen? We should have thought that some sort of moral leprosy had befallen any man who failed of this. Have we not labored hard to serve the fortunes of the college? Have we not arranged and sat through banquets, have we not canvassed the schools for boys to fill the ranks, have we not formed committees and councils to make the college grow and boom; have we not given our time and our money, and planned that other men should give their money too?" Yes, they have done these things; and college presidents, whose hope it is to change the baser metals into gold, have called them good. But in the judgment of the court we hold to-day, that verdict must be modified. "These things which you have done are good not in themselves but only in so far as they express a loyalty which lies far deeper than they go. These acts of kindness to the college would seem to make of it a beggar to its children, a thing that lives on alms, that cries aloud for bounty. But in the deeper sense, the college is not poor but rich; she has great wealth to give; and in the last resort the only thing her sons can do for her is to take from her hands the riches that she offers. To take, and not to give, is what she asks her children. And he who fails to take from her and take again, no matter what he does in outward act, is not her own; she will have none of him."

But now another plea may come. "Of course," we shall be told, "no one would ever measure loyalty in terms of banquets and committees, gifts made and students found. These are the incidentals of a man's affection for his college. But the real test lies, as you say, in the use one makes of what she gave him. He serves his college best who justifies her training by the work he does. Let him go out and make his place in the world. Let him succeed and do, and men will give the glory to the college from which he came." And so we count our graduates and study their careers. We find among them doctors, lawyers, merchants, ministers, teachers, and, if their work is good, we say,

"There is the proof; see what a college we have here; you know it by its fruits indeed; its men have made their marks in life; need any more be said?"

But here again the plea is only half a truth and cannot be accepted for the whole. We are not trying at the bar a school of business or a school of law, but a college of liberal arts. We wish for evidence that those whom it has trained have done its work, have not departed from its spirit. What shall the evidence be; how shall we show that any man has done the college work? I know no other test than this — that man is loyal to a college who shares its interests, does what it would do. If a college believes that biology should be studied, no man can be a member of the college unless he wants to know the truths biology has to tell. If it be the purpose of a college to follow after learning, whether it be science or philosophy, literature or art, no man is of the college who has ceased from that pursuit. What is the college for? Is it not this: to start men on the way of learning? If you would know in this case or in that whether or not philosophy has been well taught, I should advise that you inquire whether or not the boys who learned in college have kept on learning through their later years. If economics be not studied by the graduates, it did but little for the boys who listened to the talk or read about it in the books. The college is a group of men who follow after learning; if any man has ceased from this, I care not how he may succeed in other things, he is not of the college.

There is a current theory implicit in the plea just made, which we who judge to-day cannot accept and must condemn while now we have the chance. It is the theory that what boys study in college makes no difference. "All that is needed for a college education is that some subjects shall be studied well, that proper method shall be gained, and so the mind shall be well trained to meet the serious tasks which wait it in the world." That theory has done so much of harm in every way, the court with difficulty restrains itself within the bounds of proper language. The

theory makes of literature and science, history and art, not human interests and pursuits, but five-finger exercises for children's discipline. It says to boys: "These are the things we give to drill you in your plastic youthful years; take them and do as you are told until the drilling has been done; and then forget them when you have become a man."

But as against this theory, I protest, the value of the subjects taught in college is that they are the learning which serves men as their guide. They are not play or drill for children; they are the wisdom of the world gathered for human life. They are not learned in four short years nor yet in fourscore either. As against the counter-theory I would declare, "No subject has a right within a college course unless we may expect our boys who study it to keep on studying it so long as they may live." I know the statement is extreme and "subject" is a term that needs to be defined. But I am crying out against a monstrous thing, and so I cry aloud, forgetting for the moment the presence of the court and the sobriety its laws demand.

But now to sum it up, what shall we say of college graduates? Are we to judge them good or bad? And still we say, in spite of pleas, "not very good; their heads are turned around." I fear they think of college as a place in which their liberal studies reached an end, a place in which to have one's taste of history and art, philosophy and science, and then to put them aside except so far as they may serve professional ends. The college is for them too much a school for boys, a home of childish interests and pursuits, — a thing which they may help, may serve, may love, — the place from which they come to meet the world, and yet essentially a place which they have left behind with other boyhood things. But they are wrong. College is not an ending but a commencement of a way of life. Here men are not to cease from liberal study, but to find out what it is. Here are revealed the vital interests of mankind and so set forth that one may take them to himself, make

them his own and follow where they lead. No, he who thinks of college as a place to cease from learning, to get it done with so that he may go to work, is all turned round. Good fellow he may be, loyal and true, strong and efficient, and yet the mother whom he loves yearns over him in vain, because his eyes are seeking her where she is not. How shall she make him turn and see her where she is?

II

And now the undergraduate comes forth to face the court. He is a clever lad, a very clever lad at meeting charges. I know that well from many years of being a Dean. "What do you say?" we ask him. And he replies, "Whatever charge you make I will admit, and yet I am 'Not guilty.' There may be something wrong with me but I am not to blame." And if you do not catch him up he will go on with counter-charge something like this: "I understand you say I do not study. Whose fault is that? I study hard enough at law or medicine or office desk. Why don't I study hard with you? And why, I'd like to know, do so many of my friends, four out of every ten who come to get the training which you give, put it aside and, leaving college, turn to other things that seem worth while? Oh, yes, there's something wrong all right; but, it seems to me, it's up to you, not me." What can one do in face of such a counter-charge as this? The boy is right. We have not even made him see that "wrong all right" is wrong, that "up to you" is not a phrase to use in presence of the court or Dean. But there the trouble lies. Somehow we have not made him see. The court dismisses the defendant as "guilty but not responsible," and as he goes he cocks an eye and grins delightfully. "I knew you wouldn't get me," he declares, "you'd better try the Faculty."

III

I must confess some hesitation in taking the step which now awaits us. To summon the teacher to appear before

the bar of judgment requires much courage: the thought of it may make one tremble and shrink for fear of meeting at some turn the ghost of Academic Freedom. But, I recall, it is not I who give the summons, but the society that speaks through me. And so, leaning on one another, we call the college teacher to appear. It may be he will come. And if he does, let us go on.

"You are the man who made the graduate?" we ask. "Yes," he replies, "I made him out of such stuff as was provided me." "And are you satisfied with what you have produced?" "Oh, no," he says, "the stuff was not adapted to my purpose. You see, the boys who come to college are not well fitted for the college work. There is no learning in their homes, nor any love of it; there is no genuine training in the schools; the social world from which they come, to which they go, sets little value on the scholarship we have to give, and so the boys have little longing for it." "We understand you then to say, the work is unsuccessful but you are not to blame?" "Yes, that is it. When homes and schools and social life are better, I shall do better work, but not till then."

And shall we let him too escape, after the manner of the undergraduate? No, he must stand and take responsibility. There are not many things of which I am sure about a college, but this I know — the teacher is the college in the active sense; all other things are circumstance, machinery, arrangements; he is the mind that learns and teaches; if he does well, then all is well; if he does ill, the college is a failure.

Admitting, then, that there are many evils of circumstance, what is our charge against the college teacher? What does he fail to do that might be done to master circumstance? He seems to me to lack a proper sense of his importance. He does not clearly realize the task he has to do. He teaches subjects, studies, fields; he does not lead men in following learning as the guide of life. May I explain?

If learning is to be the guide of life, it must be one, not many. Learning is criticism; it is interpretation. And criticism, what is that? It is the bringing together of separate things to find out their relations. It is the calling to account of this or that in terms of that or this. It is the finding of principles that run through many separate things and bind them together, making them one. Learning interprets; it takes the fragments of our life, our knowledge, and makes of them a unity, a whole. Each bit, by itself, is clear but meaningless. Learning interprets them, gives them significance one for another, makes out of them a scheme of life, a system of knowledge which one can understand and use. Learning interprets, criticizes, makes the many one.

But what of college teachers? Do they believe in learning? It seems to me that many of them believe much more in subjects, believe in knowledge in the scattered sense. Each one of them knows one field well, better than any other member of his college does. This is his field and here he speaks with high authority. But does he talk of other fields as well? No, he had better not do that! To speak of things that others know better than you is not professionally wise. You may be wrong, and then where are you? But if the teachers all do this, where are the students? We in our wealth of knowing have split up knowledge into many hundred parts. Of these a teacher takes some two or three. The undergraduate, by our laws, takes five a semester, ten a year, and when in four years he has taken forty of them, his work is done and he may graduate. But does he understand the things he knows, can he interpret them, make use of them in knowing life? How shall he know his subjects in this way if they are taught the other way? How shall his mind be liberalized by minds whose law it is to know the special from the special point of view? I wonder if our teachers do believe in liberal training?

Is this a strange, nonsensical demand? I do not wish

to be absurd nor yet to be misunderstood. But it seems clear, terribly clear, to me that teachers in the colleges are not commanding and dominating the spirits of their boys because they have no purpose which has a proper claim to domination. They can relate their subjects to the trades, can show how botany will serve the grower of food, how physics guides the engineer, how economics helps the business man, and if a boy is looking to a trade, they grip him hard and carry him away. Yet this is not the learning that we seek, but only some fragments of it. Can they interpret botany and food supply, physics and engineering, economics and business, each for the others and each for any other bit of knowledge that men have gained about the world? Can they bring all this knowledge into order, reducing it to principles, making of it a knowing of the world in which men live and of the human life itself? Can they interpret what we know and make it all significant?

I know what men will say against this thing I urge. How can a man know more than one field well? And if one cannot, what is the value of making judgments in a realm you have not mastered, of trying to understand the things you do not know? But what is the alternative? Are men to be, so far as they may study at all, simply a group of experts, each master in his field? And what of those who do not specialize in any branch of knowledge? Are they to have no intellectual life at all? Just as a protest, I would define a liberally educated man as one who tries to understand the whole of knowledge as well as one man can. I know full well that every special judgment that he makes will be inadequate. I know the experts have him on the hip, each expert at one point. But yet for human living as a whole, for living as men should live, I'll match a liberally educated man against the field of experts and have no fear that any one of them will beat him.

Have we not tragic illustration of the principle to-day in this great war which we have entered? Have we not

seen a people which was the very centre of learning of the world, beloved and honored for the knowledge that it gave, have we not seen it let that knowledge fall asunder into separate parts, the sciences and arts which make life merely efficient? Have we not seen the generous, human view of life which bound it to the world contract and split to special, partial views that cut men off, and send them at each others' throats to murder? And just the tragedy is this, — the special view when taken by itself is so convincing and so clear, so accurate, that if you take it as it stands it cannot but be true; you must be ruthless in your disregard of all things else. But meanwhile other men with other points of view fully as clear are blind to you as you are blind to them. And so men fight. But we have entered on the war to put an end to fighting, not for a special interest of our own, not for a private cause which we would serve, but in the hope that men may come to understanding, may find a way to know each other and to live in peace.

It seems to me we need to-day a Socrates to come again as Socrates of old to Athens, to tell us that just as life is one, so learning is one and every man should have it so far as one man can. And then with Socrates we might inquire how learning may be taught, and just like him might gather young men round us to study the way of life. If that should come again, we should have colleges as nowhere in the world we have them now.

What, then, should teachers say to boys who come to college? I think they should say this: "The college is a place where men are studying human life, man and the world in which he lives. We take it that your coming here means that you join us in that enterprise, that you are eager to understand what human living is and does." And if a man outside should hear the words, I doubt not he would sound a loud guffaw. "Oh ho," he says, "you ask a boy of eighteen years to master human life, to know it as a whole; is this the thing that you would have him do in college?" Yes, that is the thing he should do in college,

should do so long as he may live; he will not finish it in four short years, nor yet in fourscore either. But he may join the brotherhood of those who fly the flag, who have put learning at the helm of life. He may array himself with men, wiser than he, who have labored long and are yet laboring for the cause. He may join others, foolish like himself, but who in joyful youth delight in doing things that never can be done. He may feel kinship with the older men who went before along the path and yet are traveling it, with hope and fear, in the goodly company of those who seek to see the way and follow it. This, it would seem to me, would be to go to college.

What will the teacher answer to the verdict of the court? What will he say? If I have known his spirit there are two answers he will make. First, "I cannot do this task; it is too great." And second, "Shall I have a chance to try it freely, with no one coercing or restraining me?"

And to the first the court replies: "Whether you can or not, you must. No people can live and rule itself by its own thought and will, no people can be free, unless it be interpreted and criticized within itself. And if the college cannot give such learning, then who can? You may not shun the task. To you as critic and interpreter, all men must come. To you the church, the state, the home, the school, rich man and poor, the builder-up, the breaker-down, each one must bring his thoughts, his hopes and fears, his doubts and creeds, his strivings and opinions, and you must show him what they are in terms of their relations to others which his fellows bring. You must be sane as other men are not; you must have knowledge which others cannot gain; you must be fearless and honest as others, tied by interest, may seldom be; you are the student set apart to view the whole, to try to understand, a free untrammeled human spirit seeking the truth for guidance of mankind. And you must gather round you younger men, young lads whose wits are keen, whose wills are strong and spirits high, and set them to the task, must

make them join with you in trying to think the problems through, and then must send them forth to play their parts in the activities of men and yet to follow learning as their guide. You will not do it well; your heart will break with disappointment and despair; and yet you will keep on for very joy of it, because in doing this you make a college, and that is what, as teacher, you are to do."

And now the second answer: "Shall you be free with no one coercing or restraining you? Who would restrain you?" "Why, any special point of view that thinks itself the truth might try to hinder me. Perhaps the church, perhaps the state, perhaps the home or school, perhaps the radical who finds the world all wrong, or the conservative who finds it right, — each one of these, thinking his own the truth, may hate me for the other truths I hold beside his own. And shall I yet be free to criticize, to seek the meaning of the whole?" And still the court replies: "Of course you shall; who could restrain you?" And then the secret fear that lurks within the teacher's heart comes out. "Perhaps the college might restrain me. Have you forgotten that I am chosen and paid by other members of the college group? I do not choose myself as teacher. I do not decide whether or not I shall be kept, nor on what terms. I am the servant of another group of men whose will is law. Perhaps they might restrain me."

IV

It is quite clear the court must summon the trustee, to ask of him the answer to the teacher's question. "Are you the owner of the college?" "Yes, in the legal sense, I am." "And who elected you to hold this place of power?" "My fellow trustees." "And have you, as a group, the power to choose the teachers, to fix their terms of service and of compensation, to tell what subjects shall be taught and how they shall be taught?" "We have." "And are you as a group the representatives of all the different classes,

interests, and parties within the social order, or are you very much alike in point of view?" "We are, I think, a special group, and being chosen by ourselves, we tend to keep within a fairly limited point of view." "What then, we ask of you, shall be our answer to the teacher's question? Is he a free man in his work? May he have confidence that in the task of bringing different points of view together you will support him, and not demand that he give favor to your own?" And here, I think, a trustee who is honest and intelligent, will hesitate and qualify his answer. "We are not paragons of wisdom," he will say; "we have our frailties and our prejudices, our interests and our limitations, and doubtless these have their effects upon the judgments which we make about the business of the college. And yet against this fact two others may be weighed. We are trustees, not for the furthering of our interests, but for the sake of education, because we wish to do whatever we can to help the cause of learning. Again, although we are a special group, we are upon the whole within the class of those who hold the splendid human faith in freedom of thought and speech, by which all higher civilizations have been lifted up. You ask me whether or not the teacher may be free, and I reply, 'Yes, that is our purpose, however well or ill we may succeed in making it effective.'"

What, then, shall we say of the trustee? I think his plea is good. He does not claim to do more than he can. In the days gone by he has done splendid service for the colleges. And yet the method of self-election cannot remain as a final form of college organization. A college is a place of criticism. From this it follows that not even in the legal sense can it be permanently owned by any special self-selecting group of men. I am not raising here the question of special interest or self-seeking. That issue seems to me at present unimportant. I am not asking how the personnel of boards of trustees may be improved. I do not think that any other method of choice would have given us trustees so able or so well adapted to their work.

But the real issue is that of the intellectual leadership of a people who believe that they believe in democracy. The colleges cannot lead, as critics lead, unless the people trust them. And in the field of thought, as in the realm of politics, our people will not permanently follow leaders whom others choose to guide them. The college as critic must command the confidence of every one who comes to it for judgment. It may not be of any party, any sect, or any creed. It may not be committed to any interest, any cause or any class. It must in some sense stand apart, aloof; it must command the confidence of men. I think that we have kept the present scheme of choosing our trustees because there is no other group whose wisdom we could trust to choose them. But we are on the road toward giving this responsibility to the graduates. What charge could be more terrible against the college than this — that those whom it has trained, whom it sends out prepared to care for other institutions cannot be trusted to take care of it? However terrible the charge, I think it has so far been true. But in the future, as we learn to do our work, I think our graduates will be toward us more nearly what they ought to be. I think their heads will be turned round again, and as they go with us along the way we shall trust them to take the fortunes of the college in their hands, to keep it safe and free from harm. They have the will to do it now, and we must add to this an understanding of what the college is and what it wills to do.

V

But now the teacher speaks again: "What of the president? You have not summoned him. His is the power which all men fear." Then, let him come! What is the charge? "He is too powerful. Through him trustees must act and speak; by him teachers are recommended for election; to his approval teachers must submit their work; by him the college is explained abroad; to him

come graduates seeking for information and offering advice; he must be master of the college life; he, as the common servant of them all, assumes to dominate the whole." This is the charge. What does the culprit answer? We feel his kinship with the undergraduate when once again we hear the plea, "Guilty but not responsible." The president is far more powerful than he ought to be. But just what is his power? Is it not this, that he adjusts conflicting interests? All about him are parties and causes, men who cannot agree, and they demand some one to judge between them. Trustees and donors, departments and faculty, teachers and other teachers, alumni, old and young, serious and gay, the undergraduate boy of every type and kind, — each has his point of view, each has his special purpose, each serves a cause. And all these forces surging in the college must find some place of meeting, some point of contact. That point of contact is the president. But all the power he has comes from the forces round about him. If they can understand each other; if they, amid their separate points of view, can find the common purpose of the college as a whole; if they are minded not so much to urge the special cause as to advance the general cause of learning, — just in so far as they do this, administrative power will dwindle and fall away. I do not mean that members of the college are selfishly pursuing separate claims, but I do mean that we have fallen into a way of doing college business that constantly increases presidential power. I think this way of doing things has come upon us quite inevitably, — and that because we have not been content with studying and teaching; we have been growing too. At times it seems as if that were our greater task. More wealth has come, more books, more land, more buildings, more prestige, more students, more courses, more teachers, more of everything. And every member of the college has been stirred by instincts of growth to claim his share and use it. But I am daring to hope that for the colleges at least the days of growth are nearly past, that we

shall soon decide we have enough of things that men can give, so much we cannot well take more. And when that day does come, we may be quiet and peaceful, doing our work. And when the day is here, I venture to predict the president will lose much of his power, will take the place he really ought to hold. During the time of growth the struggling, fighting forces of the college life have torn him from his proper place and hurled him aloft above the heads of all. And they have kept him there by the sheer pressure of their contacts from beneath. But in the happier days to come when conflicts cease, I hope he may escape from his captivity, may come to earth to stand among his peers, teacher and student as his fellows are, officially, if you please, the chairman of the faculty.

You see the court predicts that in the coming years two changes will take place in college organization — two changes by absorption. Trustees, we think, will be absorbed by graduates, become their council, agents, representatives. And presidents will be absorbed by faculties, lions by lambs. And we shall have within the college walls three groups, — teachers, their pupils, and the pupils they have had before. Thus shall the teacher lose his fear of interference from without, thus shall he be the college in the active sense.

VI

The college as teacher! The teacher as critic and interpreter! That is the word I bring to you to-day, the principle that underlies all the deliberations of this our court. Do we need teachers, scholars who stand aside to criticize and to interpret us? Surely we do. We as a people are embarked upon a fearsome enterprise. We have the thirst for freedom on our lips, the zest for justice in our veins. Do we need guidance as we venture forth? Never did people need it more. And we must make it for ourselves; freedom accepts no guidance from outside. We must put learning at the helm of life. And who shall place and keep

it there if not the colleges? I dream of college teachers who shall be guides for all the thinking of our people — men who shall watch the things we do, shall understand them as the men engaged in them can never do, men whom their fellows reverence and trust because they find them intimate with truth — interpreters and critics of our common life. I would not have them run to every market-place to shout their theories; I would not have them claimed by any party, sect or creed; I would not have them try to do the active work which active men can do with greater skill than they. But I would have them at the helm of life, looking before to see the way men go. And round them here and there would gather boys to study with them and to catch their spirit. And older men, knowing their teaching, would come to talk with them and share their wisdom. Thus, at this point and at that, would be a college, men following a way of life, a life with learning at the helm.

II

THE FREEDOM OF THE COLLEGE

I

THERE have been many disputes about freedom. And there will be many more. It is a matter about which men feel deeply. It has therefore been argued about more than it has been studied. "Shall not a man be free to think what he thinks and say what he thinks?" one group demands. "What are you going to do with a fellow who has no common sense?" retorts the other. And on the relations of Liberty and License, especially as both names begin with *Li*, there have been many passionate pronunciamentos.

We are apparently just entering on another phase of this old conflict. It is presented very commonly in the headlines of our newspapers. "Another professor dismissed. Teaching investigated and condemned. Faculty members protest in vain. Trustees firm." The reader is given the impression that a conflict is going on in the colleges, that trustees and professors are arrayed in opposing camps. It is understood that one party is demanding freedom of thought and speech while the other is insisting upon common decency and common sense. And further, it is noted that the two parties find their demands mutually hostile and irreconcilable. Just why freedom and common sense should be irreconcilable does not appear to the casual observer, or perhaps appears only to him. And yet it is very easily taken for granted that they are. And so the issue is formulated. Trustees and professors are in conflict about freedom of thought and speech.

Now if there be such a conflict within the college, it is

not to be avoided. It would be well to have it out, and that quickly. I should like, in this paper, to contribute, so far as I may, to the "having it out." I do not expect to end the controversy. My purpose is rather to find out whether or not there is one, and if so what it is. Especially I should like to know just what it is that the professor wants and that the trustee is said to be unwilling he should have. What is academic freedom?

In the first place, what kind of a thing is it? Is it a right, or a duty, or an obligation, or a privilege, or a perquisite, or what is it? Is it something which the professor wants for his own private satisfaction? That would make it a perquisite or a privilege. And we should have the very natural question, "Why may not other people have the same freedom which the professors claim?" But the question which we really ask on this plane is just the opposite one. The question is, whether the professor may have the same degree of freedom as other men have; whether, because of his peculiar responsibilities, he ought not to be specially limited in thought and speech. There are, we all know, dangers with professors. There is always the danger that some one will take a professor seriously; and so it may be necessary to take care what he says. And it is also possible that his thinking may carry him along one of the roads that thought travels, that he may really get somewhere else; therefore there may be need of prescribing whither he shall and shall not go. These are dangers which mark him off from the common run of men. And so the question on this level is, to what degree the professor should be denied this privilege of freedom of thought and speech which a democracy normally allows its citizens.

But freedom as a privilege is not fundamental. The duty or obligation to be free is the essential thing. I take it that the community is so related to the college and the college so related to the professor, that the community makes a demand upon the college with regard to the professor. It says, "I demand of you that for the sake of my

welfare you see to it that the study of my scholars and the learning of my children be free." And the duty, the obligation, of the professor is to the college just as the obligation of the college is to the community. In order do to its service, he must be free; he is a trickster and a fraud if he is not free. When he speaks of freedom, he is not playing with his own perquisites and possessions; he is facing his master and the commands of his duty are upon him.

The essential principle in the doctrine of academic freedom as a duty may, I think, be stated in this way. Most men, outside our institutions of learning, having the choice between freedom and non-freedom of thought and speech, choose the privilege of the latter. They prefer not to be free. It is for this reason that they demand that the man within the college shall adopt the former. To explain this statement, I must try to explain what colleges are for. If we can understand this, I think we may get a grip on academic freedom. May I therefore try to describe the mission of the college with regard to human opinions and judgments?

Every one knows, or may know if he stops to think about it, that his opinions, the judgments which he believes, are not very good, are not so true as they might be. "Mine own they are," we say, "but poor things." In the realm of politics, for example, we all have opinions and act upon them, but we know that we do not know very much about politics, and further that, if we did know more, we could make better opinions. And the men who differ from us, as well as those who agree with us, are in like situation. They too are doing each his best, and yet it is not very good. Our judgments upon politics, yours and mine, are rather poor things; they are not very true; for reasons of our own we claim the privilege of holding opinions, of believing them, of acting on them, even though we know that as opinions they are no better intellectually than are we who make them.

There are two ways in which this unsatisfactoriness of our opinions is brought home to us, and each of them seems to me to reveal the need of colleges which are free.

The more obvious bit of evidence about the quality of our opinions is that our neighbors think less highly of them than we do ourselves; in fact, they contradict them. And these contradictions come, not only from our equals in intelligence, but also from our superiors. I may believe in Social Coöperation, but my neighbor holds fast to Individualism. And on the whole he seems to be as good a mind as I. In other words, I think that my opinion is true, but just as good a mind as mine thinks it is not. That makes the chances even that I am wrong. But worse and more disturbing than our equals are our superiors, the better men who differ from us. No matter what opinion we hold, we know that other minds, better informed and better trained than ours, can make a better. And so, however brave a face we put on it, we know that our superiors, the men whose mental fibre is stronger and more delicate, can think their way to better thoughts than ours. I feel sure that this awareness of our ineptitude, this knowledge of our ignorance, is one of the reasons why we build colleges.

The second and more disturbing observation about our beliefs is that of their connection with our interests. Here again, not in a conscious way, but none the less effectively, we seem to have chosen not to be free. Men seem to think by classes, and thoughts to express desires and needs rather than facts. We do not like the story that when the Constitution was made men voted in groups according to the bearing of the votes upon their holdings or lack of holdings in property. And yet the story is told. And in the telling is revealed, not conscious lack of honesty, not conscious putting of private interests before the public good, but rather a blind unconscious bias in human thinking. And in the present day there is no lack of illustrations. Holders of property to-day are very much agreed about the rights

of property. And laboring men are on the whole convinced that labor does not get its share and must have more. Germans agree that Germany must have her place out in the sun, and France and England find the moral law demanding that they keep the Germans in their proper place. Even professors sometimes agree — as to the interests they have in common. They are in large agreement concerning college presidents, college trustees, and professorial freedom. They hold the dogma of their class, that members of the class should have more power. And when one leaves his class and joins the presidents, we know the merry farce of changing points of view, of widening experience, of greater insight into many things.

I do not wish to press the point too far. I am not saying that human beliefs are simply selfish desires finding expression in the forms of thought. The man who proves that human thinking is "interested" in this sense, proves that his proof is "interested," and we should ask of him not whether his proof is good or bad, but what he hopes to gain for himself by setting up the proof. Nor am I taking as my own the current popular philosophy which scoffs at "absolutes" and finds the meaning of truth in service to the actual ends of actual men. That doctrine too is rendering doubtful service in these times of stress. But I am only saying this — that as we view our fellows and ourselves, we find ourselves in groups according to our interests, and in those groups we find common beliefs related to those interests. There is a bias in our thinking. We cannot trust ourselves to be impartial. To do our daily work we must be special in our points of view. Unconsciously we use our thoughts as instruments to further our ends. But when we stop to think about it, we hate the special interested point of view; we know that it is not true, not worthy of our deeper selves. And in the seeking for escape from it, we find a second impulse to the building of the colleges, the colleges which shall be free.

If now the college be defined in terms of these two im-

pulses, it is essentially, not accidentally, a place of freedom. It is a place in which the human mind is seeking deliverance from its bonds — the bonds of partial knowledge and self-interest. It has no hope of fully achieving such freedom, and yet this end defines its work. Men form their opinions from partial knowledge; the college must know, so far as may be known, all that the human mind has thought and learned which bears on these opinions. Men fashion their thoughts according as their interests and activities have molded and shaped their minds; the college may have no special interests shaping it. It must in this sense stand apart, viewing all interests of men alike with equal eye, and measuring each in terms of every other and the whole. It is a place of knowledge and of criticism.

What then is academic freedom? It is, it seems to me, the very quality of a college. The question whether or not a college is free is meaningless. An institution which is not intellectually free is not a college, whatever else it be. States may be servants of partial insights and partial interests, and so may factories and corporations, and even schools of medicine; but not so colleges. A college is our social and individual striving to escape the bonds which the world's work would fix upon us. It is the search for freedom from ourselves

II

The actual carrying on of the college enterprise brings one to many rather puzzling problems. Even for an individual self-criticism is not an easy task. To do two things at once — to go about one's work, planning and acting as if one's thoughts were true, and yet to know and act as if one's thoughts were wrong and partial — to do both things at once is hard for busy, single-minded men. It is no wonder that we fail. But it is even harder for an institution like a college to do the task. A college has so many independent parts which do not know each other, which take themselves for granted, which have not stopped

to think about themselves, or other parts, or even the college as a whole. Trustees, professors, presidents, departments, graduates, students, donors, outside world are all factors in the situation. Each has its share in making for our people knowledge and self-criticism. And they have hardly begun to criticize, to understand themselves, to realize the work they have to do.

But worse than either of these difficulties is the fact that, though the college has compounded its medicines to cure the public mind, the patient does not come for treatment; he does not know that he is ill. We say that colleges are built because men know their ignorance, that is, the ignorance of their fellows, and wish to cure it. But motives are not always clear, even to those who act on them. And I am sure that, in the large, our public does not keenly feel the need of criticism; on the other hand, I am not sure that, if it did, the college is the doctor whom it could choose for diagnosis and prescription.

What shall we do to lure the patient, to get some living forms on which to practice our profession? I see no other way except to hang our shingle out and let it swing in public places. Perhaps to change the figure would give it more attractiveness. "Clearing House for Opinions; Discount on Popular Prejudices; Foreign Exchange!" And if we catch a patient, we must make it clear to him that he is ill, yes, very ill, and that the social mind is ill also, and all his friends. I fear the method is not quite professional. But something must be done to make people understand that colleges are ready to do a piece of work, and that the work is sorely needed in our country and by our generation.

Assuming then that we have caught a patient, may I proceed to tell him just what our methods are and what they are not, to arouse his hopes, excite his fears, especially to let him know what college freedom is?

And first, let it be understood, the college is not simply a school for boys. It is a place to which boys should go because the teachers of men are to be found there, scholars

whom men respect and honor as their guides and leaders. No man who cannot lead his peers is fit to teach the younger generation. The education of a boy consists in coming into active contact with a group of minds which have command of human thinking; he learns by feeling how they think, and by imitating them.

Again, the college has no list of dogmas or doctrines which it seeks to teach. There is no catalogue of things to be believed, nor any list of problems which should not be discussed. I have heard the suggestion made that certain matters are not to be regarded as "subjects of reasonable controversy." I am sure that for a college no such prohibition can be made. I do not mean that every problem of human life will be discussed by every student all the time. There must be pedagogic common sense in choosing things to think about. But are there matters which are not "subjects of reasonable controversy"? I know no other test than this — any matter concerning which reasonable men differ is a subject of reasonable controversy. And if there be such reasonable disagreements, young minds should know about them in proper time.

On the other hand, if there are still other subjects on which all men have the same opinions, there can be little harm in letting younger people know of these agreements. The only genuine pedagogic sin I know is that of dragging our students by the nose to preconceived conclusions, blinding their eyes to paths that lead on this side or on that toward truth, and yet pretending that we are leading them into the ways of human thought. Such teaching is not honest; and it will find its own reward for those who give as well as those who take it.

I do not mean that there is no place for schools which choose to teach some special doctrines which they think important. Such schools are different from free colleges, not in kind but only in degree. No college, however free, can escape the prepossessions of its background, the mental attitude from which it springs. But in the schools of

which I speak, some special conscious limitations are taken on; the school commits itself to teaching this or that as true. Such schools must first of all try to be fair to doctrines other than their own. But they must also deal honestly with those for whose support they ask. They have no right to put a label on and then to act and teach as if the label did not mark them off from others; that is what honest labels do.

Does the receiving of gifts from private donors or public governments destroy or hamper the freedom of the college? Yes, in some degree. Taking the college world at large, such influences are subtly, or not so subtly, felt. But there is no essential reason why they should be present. If they are, some one has failed to understand his task and hence to do it. No college, clearly conceived and honestly administered, would take a gift to which such influence was attached. No college is for sale, and nothing that is for sale, subtly or obviously, can be a college.

I think that the Association of University Professors, fine as it is in purpose, has tended to increase misapprehension at this point. The Association in its proposals and discussions has sundered the college in two. It has opposed the teachers and the administrators. Trustees and presidents, it seems to say, must further the material interests of the college, must pay the bills, and find the wherewithal to pay them. Professors, on the other hand, have no concern with interests like these; they are the scholars and teachers, interested in the truth. Professors are free, but trustees and presidents — well, they must get the money, so perhaps they must give up some measure of their freedom. What does this mean?

It sometimes seems as if professors said, "Let presidents and trustees get money as they can; let them make promises to donors or legislators if need be; but we will see that the promises they give are broken; no man can influence us." Professors free; trustees and presidents slaves, that seems to be the doctrine. But surely such a doctrine is false

and hateful. No college can live half-slave and yet half-free. Professors have no right to freedom unless the college as a whole is free. The freedom of professors is a myth unless it lives within the freedom of the college.

I think that in the large, with very little reservation, the colleges are free, trustees and presidents as well as teachers. Donors and legislators are eager to give to institutions which no man can buy; that is their reason for giving. But public confidence in such freedom is not so easy to secure. Men carry the notions of property and ownership from other fields into the college field; they make a gift into a bargain, and so they fail to understand. The college must explain itself, must make its friends, must make its friends and foes alike perceive that it is one in purpose; honest in dealings, seeking to free men from ignorance and self-interest, seeking to make for men knowledge and self-criticism. It has no other purpose in any part or fragment of its being.

A harder relationship to understand is that of professors and propaganda. How shall men express opinions within the classroom or outside, and yet not make the college seem to be a partisan in public disputes. There are two very different ways in which it might be done. We might arrange that no professor should be a partisan on any public issue; he must remain a scholar, seeing the principles beneath the popular disputes, impartially making all sides clear, and yet not advocating any one of them. Or on the other hand, we might make up a college faculty of many advocates, at least one advocate for every important line of popular thought and impulse, trusting to each to push his cause as strongly as he can. In either case, the college as a whole would remain free and uncommitted. Which is the better plan? I wonder if we need to choose between them.

No one who loves a college can fail to feel the attraction of the former plan. We like to think of scholars as standing apart from common quarrels, as looking deeper into life

than common men, as finding the principles that underlie all common controversies. And so they do, and ought to do. And yet they do not by such study escape men's disagreements; the superficial quarrels reappear down in the lower levels of our thought; scholars are not agreed regarding the issues of human life. They have their points of view, their attitudes of mind, their working theories, their own beliefs. Shall they be advocates of those beliefs? They cannot help it. But on the other hand, are there no limits to the forms their partisanship may take? I think there are. A man who advocates a view as if there were no other views, who finds the total truth in some mere fragment of an insight which has come to him, who sees and formulates no underlying principles beneath the strife of parties, is no proper college teacher. A college has a right to expect that every one who serves its cause, whatever else he do, shall keep its faith, its partial insight if you like, that truth is broader than a creed and deeper than the theories of any sect or class.

Shall college teachers be advocates or critics? I do not think we are ready to choose as yet. We want both types and are not ready to let either go. Most of our men prefer the impartial rôle; some have the zeal of advocates. And if the scholars keep themselves alive to human situations, if partisans hold fast to academic faith, we need not interfere. We should not like to see our "ninety-three professors" declaring that all our acts are right — right beyond question; nor do we wish our scholars to retire to quiet places, reflecting sadly on the weaknesses of fellow men. One thing we know — whatever individual professors do or think, the college must be impartial; it must not be an advocate; it must urge no cause but its own, the cause of knowledge and self-criticism.

There are, however, two or three remarks which may be made upon the issue just considered.

Should we, in choosing teachers, take account of their opinions? If we are well enough acquainted with their

work to pass on their appointments, we cannot well help knowing what they think. And yet we must not take account of it. We might, if we had found ourselves by blind unconscious preference appointing men of our own points of view, seek out opponents of ourselves to keep the balance. But on no other ground could we be justified in choosing a man because of his beliefs.

May teachers be dismissed because they hold and advocate this view or that? Such action would contravene the very spirit and purpose of a college. Professors must be good men, must study well, and teach successfully. If these requirements are met, no question can be raised regarding their opinions. The college has no fear of any opinions. It takes them all and judges them. If this be true, the tenure of the teacher is not that of one who is paid to work as he is told, who may be sent away if those who pay him do not like the work he does. His tenure is rather that of the judge who, by the very nature of the task assigned him, is placed beyond control or punishment by those on whom his judgment must be made.

I think there is a case against the allowing of college presidents to play the rôle of public advocate. So far as teachers are concerned, safety is found in numbers. No one of them can claim to represent the college as a whole. Whatever one of them may say, a dozen of his fellows will be found to take another point of view. But presidents are wont to speak each for his college. Nothing about them is more obvious than just their singularity. And when a president takes his place in sect or party he takes the college with him as no professor can. I have no doubt that in the public mind one president, engaging in propaganda as a partisan, can do more harm in shaking confidence in academic fairness and impartiality than could a hundred teachers if they should storm and rave in every sect and party that the country knows. And if it should appear that, on the whole, the college presidents are very much alike in mental attitude, are in most cases committed to

a single point of view regarding human problems, I think that very rightly the colleges would fail of influence upon the public mind, would lose the public confidence on which the doing of their work depends.

III

How shall we win and keep that confidence? That is the urgent problem for us and for the people whom we serve. How shall we teach unless the people listen? How shall they listen unless they know that we can teach and that we will?

Unless a people find, in colleges or elsewhere, some place of criticism, some place where truth is sought, where thought is free, there is no hope for freedom of the people.

The college must teach, and, first of all, must make the people understand what teaching is. How shall we let them know that we are building knowledge for their use, that we are serving every interest that they have and yet are slaves to none of them, that we will listen to every thought they bring and yet will weigh and value them with thoughts of other men in mind?

There is no other way than this: to study and to teach. And teaching is the attempt to make men free.

Physician, heal thyself!

III

STUDENT ACTIVITIES IN THE COLLEGE

AS I survey the program of yesterday afternoon and this morning my mind is caught by the figure of the cookery or bakeshop. A cook from foreign parts has been brought in to concoct for us some delicious dish, pastry, pudding, or pie. And those of us who precede him on the program are simply bringing out from the pantry the ingredients which he requires. Mr. Eliot came laden with culture, Mr. Thorndike with discipline; Mr. Hocking set forth the specific purpose, and to-day Mr. Stearns has presented athletics for mingling in the bowl. It is with much fear and trembling that I present my own bundle, the Student Activities. I am aware that they are regarded by many cooks of college theory as spoiling the flavor of the educational food. Or at the best they are only a frosting for the cake, a sauce for the pudding, and I sadly fear that this imported cook may have sauces and frostings of his own for the sake of which he may reject with scorn the offering I have been commissioned to bring.

But now as I make my contribution to the program, it seems to me that it should be done, not with apology and timid protestation, but rather with confidence, with the assured conviction that no cake or pudding can be worth the eating unless it have this last delicate touch of perfection which my condiment will give. May I confess that until I found myself obliged to write this paper on Student Actitivies, I had not realized how important, how essential they are. Is it not true in general that one of the best ways of discovering that a cause is important, or a truth significant, is to make a speech about it? Usually one

makes a speech not because he chooses to do so, but because he is invited to do so. And when the speech has to be prepared and delivered the sheer necessities of the case demand that one believe that what he says is worth saying, no matter what it may turn out to be. In order to make this speech at all I must believe that student activities have a place in the life of the college community, and as I seek to determine that place I have no doubt that it will seem more and more important and significant.

I

To begin, then, I am convinced, as I write this paper, that in any ideal college, student activities are of fundamental importance and that any one who would cook up a college without them need hope to find little appreciation of his wares. I can say this with freedom and irresponsibility to-day because mine is not the task of selecting or compounding the elements. I have an article to sell and I will sing its praises long and loud. It is for the cook to decide whether or not he will have it in the dish and if he takes it in, to give it proper mingling with the other stuffs which other vendors have brought in.

The name "student activities" is intended, I presume, to express a difference or contrast. The name marks them off from the studies, those elements of the college life which, by implication, are either not student affairs or not activities. I fear that our teachers in the colleges do not like the implication. We do not like to have studies regarded as peculiarly belonging to the Faculty, nor, on the other hand, do we wish them degraded to the realm of the mere passivities. And so the very name itself arouses antagonism. It suggests that here is a feature of the college life which does not mix very smoothly with the others. It is not a good label if one would recommend his wares to college teachers who are eagerly striving to tempt the intellectual appetities of the boys entrusted to their charge.

If we include under the phrase "student activities apart

from athletics" such enterprises as debating, dramatics, music, newspapers, literary magazines, philanthropic and religious organizations, as well as social functions of various types, one may express a very common faculty point of view concerning them in the words, "The less said about them the better." And with that judgment properly interpreted, I am inclined to agree. But I should personally not intend to minimize the importance of such activities. It is not a safe generalization to declare that phases of human life are important in direct ratio to the degree to which they are publicly talked about. It is rather assumed amongst us that many very elemental and significant features of our common life are not to be talked about at all — they are to be taken for granted, to be accepted as given in the very nature of things. And it is just this "givenness," this inevitableness of "student activities" which should first of all be recognized as we approach them. We choose to bring boys together into social groups in order that we may teach them, may train their minds, may furnish them with information. But it is an inevitable incident of such a process that the boys should find themselves together and should at once engage in common activities which seem to them attractive and at least entertaining. We keep them busy or try to do so five or six or seven hours a day; with due allowance for the separation of sleep, they have many more hours than these to spend together in enterprises of their own choosing. We did not bring them together for the sake of these activities, but from our bringing them together, these activities follow. They are, as it were, a necessary accident of the teaching process. Whether we will or not, there they are and there they will remain in some form or other so long as boys are brought together in the common life of a college campus. And yet, in the presence of these inevitable accidents of our central purpose many of our teachers grudgingly acknowledge their presence, but, resenting it, they say, "Let them alone, the less said about them the better."

Now if this attitude were not born in resentment, I should find it very congenial. The conclusion which it states seems to me excellent, even though the reasoning which leads to it is atrocious. The truth is that we talk too much about student activities, meddle with them too much, and legislate about them too much. And I say this not because they are bad, but because they are too good to be spoiled by our clumsy interferences; not because I am opposed to them, but because I should like to see them freely develop and grow as the spontaneous activities of the boys whose growth and development is our chief concern. To tamper with them seems to me like tampering with one's complexion. In one sphere at least we are sure that the improvement of the general health gives better permanent results for the complexion than temporary tampering, however satisfying for the moment. My impression is that the same principle holds good in the beautification of colleges; make them strong and healthy and the activities will take care of themselves.

II

But whether our ignoring of student activities be due to hatred or to love, there are times when even the most abstract teacher is startled into recognition of them. Last Sunday evening I heard the Dean of one of our great law schools tell about the work of his school. And almost his first remark was, "You will not find any 'activities' at the law school; we give a man enough to do for all the time he can give to activity." And with his words, there flashed across my mind the vision of a liberal college without outside activities. What would it be like to teach liberal studies to a group of students who should give all their time to their studies, whose work should be their play, whose time should be wholly at our command? I think I have still enough of the spirit of the teacher to thrill at that vision. But as I saw it and reflected on it, there came

to mind those terrible words of Newman in which he contrasts the little we can do for the student with the much that he can do for himself.

"I protest to you, Gentlemen, that if I had to choose between a so-called University, which dispensed with residence and tutorial superintendence, and gave its degrees to any person who passed an examination in a wide range of subjects, and a University which had no professors or examinations at all, but merely brought a number of young men together for three or four years, and then sent them away as the University of Oxford is said to have done some sixty years since, if I were asked which of these two methods was the better discipline of the intellect, — mind, I do not say which is *morally* the better, for it is plain that compulsory study must be a good and idleness an intolerable mischief, — but if I must determine which of the two courses was the more successful in training, molding, enlarging the mind, which sent out men the more fitted for their secular duties, which produced better public men, men of the world, men whose names would descend to posterity, I have no hesitation in giving the preference to that University which did nothing, over that which exacted of its members an acquaintance with every science under the sun.

"How is this to be explained? I suppose as follows: When a multitude of young men, keen, open-hearted, sympathetic, and observant, as young men are, come together and freely mix with each other, they are sure to learn one from another, even if there be no one to teach them; the conversation of all is a series of lectures to each, and they gain for themselves new ideas and views, fresh matter of thought, and distinct principles for judging and acting, day by day."

Now with these words of Newman ringing in our ears, let us state and answer a fair question, "Would you, if you could, free an undergraduate college from its activities?" My own answer is flatly in the negative. I believe that

whatever a liberal college may be with them, without them it would be a sorry place in which to live. And for this conclusion there are at least two reasons. First, I am convinced that the complete absorption of the student in his studies would not in most cases give the best kind of college training. Not only are we trying to give college boys acquaintance with a great body of knowledge; more important than this, they must also acquire understanding, interpretation of what they are learning, reconstruction of what they have known. And for this process there is need of leisure, of deliberation and contemplation, of a certain quiet waiting for sub-conscious processes to do their part. These results cannot be achieved merely by digging and grinding. In addition to the work there must be the leisure; the two must be combined if the fruits of culture and intelligence are to be reached. Again, if we view college life fairly, we dare not fail to take account of the constantly repeated statement of graduates that they count certain "activities" as having been of far greater educational value than the studies given and taken in the classroom. I am sure that this statement contains more of falsity than of truth. But there is a truth in it, and it behooves us to isolate it and look it squarely in the face. As I look back on my own experience of teaching and disciplining, I seem to see what these graduates mean. I see it most clearly when I try to single out from the long line of students some one group which shall stand forth as intellectually the best — best in college work and best in promise of future intellectual achievement. Much as I should like to do so, I cannot draw the line round my own favorite students in philosophy, nor the leaders in mathematics, nor those successful in biology; nor could I fairly award the palm to the Phi Beta Kappa men who have excelled in all their subjects. It seems to me that stronger than any other group, tougher in intellectual fiber, keener in intellectual interest, better equipped to battle with coming problems, are the college debaters — the boys who, apart from their

regular studies, band themselves together for intellectual controversy with each other and with their friends in other colleges. I am not concerned to argue here the pros and cons of intercollegiate debate. It has its defects as well as its virtues. But if it be true that in this activity many of our best minds find their most congenial occupation and are furthered in intellectual growth rather than hindered in it, here is a challenge which we cannot fail to meet in the administration of college life and studies. And in some measure, though in different forms, what is true of debating holds true of dramatics, of writing, of music, and the other activities. When boys form their clubs or "crowds" for the spontaneous, enthusiastic pursuit of some chosen ideal, they gain from it a power, a liveliness of interest which can never be gained where that spontaneity is lacking.

But now I shall be asked: Would you substitute these activities for the studies — give up the classroom for the lounging room and the Union? Of course not. The very excellence of these activities is that fundamentally they are the fruits of the classroom. But the point is that by these fruits the work of the classroom shall be known. We need not forget that these activities are only accidental and that the real values lie in the studies and the teaching. But none the less it is true that these activities reveal to us, far better than any examinations can do, the success or failure of the classroom itself. They are, as it were, mirrors in which we can see ourselves and our work. If we want to know the effect of what we are doing in the classroom, let us look to see what the students are doing outside of it when they are free to follow their own desires. If they do not, on their own initiative, carry on activities springing out of their studies, then you may count on it that however well the tests are met the studies are of little value. Show me a college in which literature is taught but in which the boys do not band together to read and write and criticise, in which they do not yearn to be them-

selves "literary." However well literature may be taught in that college it is not well learned. What would you say of the teaching of philosophy which did not send boys off into quarrelling, rending, puzzling groups, determined each to give to his fellows the solutions of the problems that have baffled human thinking? What will you say of the teaching of history, economics, or social science which ends in the passive appropriation of a book? Surely if it is vital, you will find the young men stimulated by it eagerly re-forming and re-shaping in idea the society about them and perhaps going out to do some work to bring their ideas to fulfilment. And if in these and other cases it does appear that the studies in the classroom have no outside effect, lead to no outside activities, what expectation can you have that they will lead to activity after the college days are done? If studies do not stimulate to spontaneous free outside activities, if they are merely the learning of lessons and giving them back, then the results of our training are pitifully small; we may send out good, well-meaning boys, who will do what they are told and refrain from doing anything else, but we shall not send out men of intellectual power and grip who are able to live for themselves the life which the intellect opens before them.

III

What, then, in a word, should be our attitude toward these activities? I think that, without officially looking at them, we should be forever watching them as the mariner watches his barometer when the waves are high. And we must see to it that the classroom dominates the activities, making them what they ought to be. And how is that to be done? Can it be done by legislating out of the college all activities not in harmony with the classroom? I fear that very little can be accomplished in that way. The only real way to dominate the activities is to dominate the men who are in them. In a college where the teacher masters the mind and imagination of the pupil, there will be little

trouble about harmful activities. If teachers are mere taskmasters, assigning lessons and seeing that they are done, they need not expect the boy to do them over again a second time just for the love of the task. When the cat's away the mice will play, and they very seldom play at calling the cat to come back so that they may be chased and terrified again. A college is a place where work should be and must be done, but a liberal college in which the student activities are simply reactions from the studies, ways of escape from the dreary grind — such an institution is not a college at all. If we do not succeed in making boys want to do the things which we deem worth doing, then we may be good drill masters, but we are not good teachers, and we have no proper place in a college of liberal culture.

But I know that I shall be accused of talking in vague generalities and of missing the real point of the issue. Do not these activities interfere with the studies, I shall be asked; do they not take time and energy on which the teacher has a rightful claim? Yes, they do. But there are many other things whose interference is more serious. As for that, one study, if it be successfully taught, interferes with other studies not so well taught. But in the give and take of a college life, a study should be able to take care of itself. The teacher has large power in his own hands; if he cannot exercise it then the fault belongs to him rather than to his situation.

Teachers often tell me of their worries about the overdoing of student activities. And I know that they are overdone. But I have far more worry about the men who underdo them. The men I worry about are those who overdo the inactivities. What of the men who do no debating, no acting, no writing, no reading, no philanthropic services, no music? What have we done to them or failed to do to them in the classroom that they should be willing simply not to be in the hours in which they are free? What in the world do they do with themselves? So far as one can see they just dawdle. They are the men who play

cards or pool, who talk about the teams, read the papers, walk the streets, watch the passers-by. These are the men for whom I feel responsibility, about whose fate I torture my soul with dreadful anticipations. Would you not rather have them engaged in activities? When we have found some way of saving these men from themselves, it will be time for us to deal with their brethren who are at least alive and whose very activity at times puts the classroom to shame.

The one attitude toward student activities which seems to me deplorable is a kind of sullen hostility which one sometimes finds in earnest college teachers. They give one the impression of having been beaten in a fight, of feeling that the worse cause has prevailed over the better, of resenting both their defeat and the unfairness of a conflict in which such a defeat is possible. Now the trouble with this attitude is that it is not sane, and further, that it places the teacher in an utterly false relation to his pupils. No teacher can ever afford to be beaten either by his pupils or by their friends. He must be master and that for the reason that he has in charge the fundamental interests upon which all values depend. For the sake of those interests he must dominate the boy both within the classroom and outside it, and whatever the difficulties, he may never admit himself beaten in the task. I am convinced that the teachers in any of the college communities which we know can make of those communities what they will. If they fail, the fault is not in the situation but in the men whose business it is to master it.

IV

I began this paper by accepting the principle concerning student activities, "The less said about them, the better." I think you will agree with me that I have been loyal to the principle. I have not tried to say anything but simply to define an attitude.

And now I leave my parcel on the cook's table. Let him do with it as he will.

PART III

DISCUSSIONS IN EDUCATIONAL THEORY

THE two papers here given are early adventures into the field of educational theory. The first paper was given at the general meeting of the Religious Education Association held at Brown University in March, 1911. It expresses the conviction that no teaching of knowledge can be successful unless it is based upon a study of what knowledge is. It finds logical reflection upon the intellectual process to be essential to any proper understanding of that process as a teacher ought to understand it.

The second paper was read at a meeting of the Association of Schools and Colleges of New England at Boston University on October 9, 1908. The paper maintains that if the logical distinction between form and content has significance for the description of thinking, then the theory of formal discipline has corresponding validity for the teacher of thinking. It is not necessary, if one seeks to justify this theory, that one appeal to a discarded and discredited psychology of the Faculties. Logic, modern as well as ancient, confirms the statement that the most important single judgment which can be made about the thinking process is that which singles out its form or method from its content. If this be true then formal discipline in some very real and important sense must be at the very heart of all intellectual training and development.

I

LOGIC IN THE COLLEGE CURRICULUM

COLLEGE courses are roughly divided into two classes, (1) those which give training and (2) those which give information, which add to the sum of knowledge. My impression is that logic has kept its place in the curriculum as a member of the first group. The teacher of logic, it is commonly supposed, does not deal with any particular set of facts. He is willing to choose his material from any field of human knowledge. He may discuss such diverse statements as All men are mortal, All cats like fish, A straight line is the shortest distance between two points. But in dealing with these he is expected to give to his students a certain mental technique, a certain delicacy of intellectual touch, a strength of mental grasp, which will fit them for the work of thinking, wherever it may be carried on. Now it is not my intention to minimize the importance of the training value of logic. I would maintain, however, that this contribution to the aims of college education is far less important than the information or, perhaps better, the insight which logic gives — its additions to the sum of valuable and significant knowledge. In support of this contention I must first attempt to state what the science is and then endeavor to tell what it has to give to the upbuilding of the undergraduate mind.

In common with other ancient disciplines, logic has suffered many inroads and encroachments from the so-called modern sciences. The old boundary lines have been sadly broken by the New Psychology with its studies of mental procedure and development, by the New Mathematics in its analysis of necessary relationships, by the New Sociology

in its classification of the sciences and its general enthusiasm for whatever may be called social. But now face to face with these invaders we have a New Logic as well — a logic well able to give a good account of itself in the war of definitions. In popular opinion, logic has commonly been identified with the mere Art of the Syllogism. But this is simply because in schemes of popular education the syllogism has been singled out for its training value and the other more essential features of the science have been ignored or unknown. But logic is to-day a field of study defined by a clear-cut conception — a conception which at once gives unity to all its parts and marks off the whole from other sciences which are themselves sufficiently clear to admit of proper definition. Though the sciences have changed in content and procedure, logic is still the science of the sciences — that is, the science which studies its fellows. It is still the science of thinking, though thinking in the last few centuries has undergone radical transformation. The task of logic is to know the intellectual, the thinking activities of man. Just as the student of ethics takes the activities of willing and choosing — would collate them, describe, classify, explain, organize — in a word, know them — so in a corresponding sense does the logician endeavor to know what thinking is and does and ought to be. Wherever a man is thinking there is material for us to examine. The physicist measures and explains his data; we will measure and explain the physicist. The biologist tabulates and generalizes his observations; we will tabulate and generalize about biologists. Sociology springs into being as a new intellectual movement; we will endeavor to understand that movement, to know what it is, whence it comes, whither it is bound. In a word, other men think about the world; we think about their thinking, and seek to know thought as they know the facts with which their thought deals.

This conception of an external scrutiny of the sciences has never appealed very strongly to the scientists them-

selves. My impression is that they have often felt toward logic as they are now feeling toward the agents of Mr. Carnegie — namely, that they know their own business better than any outsider can know it, and that it would be better if they were left alone to the guidance of their own judgment. It may perhaps clear the issue if I insist, just as Mr. Pritchett does, that our aim is not to dictate what the scientist shall do but simply to know what he is doing. On the other hand, it must be insisted that the logician hopes to understand the work of the scientist in a way and to a degree which is quite impossible to the scientist himself so long as he remains devoted to his own facts and his own point of view. We do not know his facts but we do intend to know him, his aim, his problem, his method, his concepts, his results. For the sake of clearness, however, let me indicate the kind of questions which we ask concerning him.

Our first and fundamental question is, "What are men seeking as they think?" Now, wherever thinking is found, whether on the street, in the mill, in the laboratory, in the study, that question always receives one answer. Thinking seeks to attain Truth and to avoid Error. To define these terms then, to understand the common purpose of all men in their intellectual strivings, to find the common element of which all thought activities are simply modifications, that is our first task — the discovery of the fundamental terms, the unit of explanation — the first task of every scientist in dealing with his facts. Again we find that the intellectual inquiry divides itself into separate fields, each dealing with a separate group of facts. The historian is dealing with individual sequences and coexistences, the physicist with quantitative changes, the biologist with living forms, the psychologist with conscious processes, the economist with prices and exchanges. And in each case it appears that the nature of the inquiry is molded and shaped by the nature of the material considered. Here then is another set of questions. What are

the differences in aim, the differences in method, the differences in concepts employed, which mark off these investigations from one another? Or again, since these separate investigations have the common aim of Truth to bind them together in spite of their differences, what are their relations of significance for one another and for the whole? In a word, we know the whole field of human knowledge not in all its contents, but in its form, with its likenesses and differences, its common problems and its separate problems, its general methods and its special procedures, its fundamental concepts and the modifications of these in special fields. We do not, as is sometimes supposed, claim to know all that is known, but we do intend to know all knowing in exactly the same degree that the biologist can know all life and the physicist know all matter.

Now it is a commonplace of modern logical theory that in spite of their membership in a common family, the children of Truth have very fundamental differences of presupposition, of problem, and of method. For one group of investigations the chosen task is the formulation of facts in terms of quantity and measurement. For another, all comparisons are those of quality, the likenesses and differences of things. In the mechanical sciences the principle of causation is the final term of explanation, while in biological fields the notion of function seems far more fundamental and significant. In the studies of consciousness neither cause nor function seems adequate and both give way before the concept of value as the final term of human experience. Thus we find the sciences, each with its own distinct problem, each dominated by its own presuppositions — Sciences of Number and Quantity, of Quality, of Cause and Effect, of Function, of Value — these as we find them in our studies and in our curriculum stand apart as separate enterprises of the human spirit, each commanding the loyalty and interest of its followers. It is this situation which calls for the organizing activity of the student of logic. If we would know our world at all,

if we would understand our own intellectual experiences, these separate groups of judgments must be understood in relation to each other and to the whole. Can the same fact be explained in terms of Quantity and Quality, of Cause and of Function, in terms of Existence and of Value, and if so, how do these different explanations bear upon each other? Here is a world of apparent discrepancies and contradictions which must be solved if we are to understand our own thoughts. It is in no spirit of vainglorious boasting that the student of logic approaches his task.

One further conclusion of logical theory must here be noted, viz., that you can never get unified knowledge by simply adding together these separate contributions of the separate sciences. Departments of knowledge which have different problems, different methods, different presuppositions, cannot be thrown together as bricks upon bricks. Theirs is rather the organic relation in which no part is properly understood except in the light of the whole and yet in which every part performs a function radically different from every other. The history of human thinking is checkered with the controversies which have arisen from the failure to perceive this relationship. "Are facts describable in terms of quantity? Then the notions of quality must be thrown aside." "Is the life of man genetically derived from lower forms. Then it has no value higher than that of those forms." "Is the human will causally determined? Then it is not free." "Is the world to be conceived as matter in motion? Then it cannot be known as the expression of a divine spirit." These are misunderstandings and misapprehensions, every one of which has come from lack of knowledge of intellectual relationships. To give a way of escape from these misunderstandings is some part of the task of logic.

If now we turn to the conception of Education, the place of logic in the general scheme is not hard to determine. It is, I presume, the function of intellectual education to give to a student a genuine and intimate understanding of

the intellectual life of his people, and to fit him to play his proper part in the activities of that life. It is the presupposition of every institution of learning that education in this sense is good preparation for living as a man ought to live. A man is better, we believe, for knowing what his fellows have thought and are thinking, and for being able to do some thinking for himself.

Now on this presumption what is the place of logic in the curriculum? And especially, how can logic contribute to the moral and religious values of the life of the student? There are two lines of answer which I should like to suggest.

In the first place, the most striking weakness of the curriculum of the American college to-day is that it is a thing of shreds and patches with little pretension to any unity of design or purpose. Under the wide elective system, a student is given opportunity to devote himself to any or all of a great multitude of intellectual inquiries, each with its own special task, each with its own special point of view. How is he to know the significance of these studies for each other, for thought as a whole, or for life as a whole? It is the pride and boast of each scientist that he does not depart from his own problem nor from his own method. Who then is to give to the student the bearings of that method and that problem? That is a question which still awaits an answer. But in these latter days certain measures of improvement have been attempted. A number of colleges have insisted that a student shall work for a little while in each of the great branches of learning, and they are beginning to require that he study thoroughly in at least one department of knowledge. But this is no genuine solution of the problem. Let me ask — If you add together a little Mathematics, a little Literature, a little each of History, Physics, Chemistry, Economics, Social Science, International Law, and Art, what do you get? You certainly get a great deal of something, but what is it? In its parts it is knowledge, because within the parts it is organized, but as a whole it is not knowledge,

for the different parts are not organized, but are simply thrown together. The boy who gets this education knows a great many things but he does not know the world, nor does he in any real sense know the intellectual life either of himself or of his fellows. If logic could only succeed in preventing this piling together of Quantities, Qualities, Functions, and Values into one great heap; if, as the end of a student's college life approaches, it could help him to single out these separate elements, to arrange, relate and unify them, in a word, to understand them, its work would be worth while. If this could be done the college would send forth fewer hodge-podge dilettantes, fewer uneducated specialists. It would give us more men of genuine culture.

But there is another contribution of logic which is of even more immediate value to the interests of morals and of religion. I can simply state it here without stopping to explain. Morals and religion have always construed life in terms of Value. In the last three or four centuries, however, the physical and natural sciences have thrust upon the human consciousness the other concepts, especially those of Quantity, Causation and Function. Now the development of these sciences has been so marvelous, their achievements so great, that by mere fatigue of human attention, by mere distraction of interest, the Value conceptions have been obscured, neglected, and in many cases even lost. Here is a situation with which every college faculty is called upon to deal. No college has a right to-day to send forth boys into the activities of human living without giving them a clear understanding of what the Value conceptions are and how they differ from the notions of Cause and Function which dominate the fields of Physics and Biology. If a boy has not been made to see that human life demands a type of explanation different from those given to matter, to plant, and to animal, then the college has not done its work, and the boy is not intellectually prepared for the moral situations which lie before him.

If now we sum up our conclusions, I think we may say that logic has three contributions to make to the moral and religious welfare of the college student.

In the first place, it has undoubted training value which for purposes of this discussion need only be mentioned.

Secondly, by its studies of the relations of the sciences to each other and to the total work of thinking, it makes possible some intelligible formulation of that world-wide view which underlies every system of religious belief. It frees us from the limitations of special problems, special methods, special fields. It opens up to us the unitary life of the human spirit. This is its contribution to religion.

And thirdly, it makes clear the peculiar and characteristic concepts of Value in terms of which we may best understand this human life of ours. In this it brings clearness and order into the field of morals.

I fear that I have made large claims for the significance of logic. But it is hard to see how, in an institution devoted to thinking, one could claim less for the science which studies thinking itself. I may also plead that this is not the first time that the maxim "Know thyself" has been given an important place in a scheme of liberal education.

II

IS MENTAL TRAINING A MYTH

I AM sure that you have all heard the most recent theory of classical scholarship with regard to the real or mythical character of Homer. It is, you remember, that Homer is a myth, that the Iliad was not written by him, but by another man of the same name. It is in very much the same spirit, I fear, and with very much the same result, that I enter upon the attempt to provoke in your minds a discussion of the theory of mental training or formal discipline. My thesis, in a word, is this: "The theory of mental training, the old presupposition of our educational systems, is false, but its lineal descendant of the present generation is true, and that descendant rightly bears the name of its reverend ancestor."

It is rather a pleasant task for a layman to do what he can in defense of so old and worthy a tradition as that of mental training, for whether true or false, it has done much for the theory and practise of our education. It was formulated not later than the Greeks, it was taught throughout the entire classic tradition, it has been the common dogma of educational science until the present day, it is advocated by college presidents and Committees of Ten; if we accept their own words, it is practised by many of those who declare themselves its enemies. In a word, it is a respectable old theory, perhaps even a sacred one; it has played its part, and done its work well; it is worthy of such gratitude as we may care to offer. So, at least, it appears to the lay mind, for I have observed that however eager we may be to press on to the discovery of new truths and the destruction of old dogmas in our own academic work, most of us

are impatient and distressed when the workers in other fields direct their attacks upon those ancient structures in which we have housed our uncritical beliefs and prejudices. As a layman, then, speaking to students and practitioners of educational theory, may I come before you to stir up discussion by saying a good word for the old theory of formal discipline, and if it be no longer among us to receive the praise, then let the praise fall at the door of that member of the family who to-day lays rightful claim to the ancestral place among educational beliefs.

As one reads over the literature of the discussion, the most satisfactory statements of the position are found in the illustrations rather than in the technical definitions. This may, of course, be due to the layness of one's own mind, but to the lay mind, at least, it indicates that the discussion is still in its preliminary stages. The fact is that the critics of the theory are applying in the educational field a psychological point of view which has not yet, even in its own field, been brought to definiteness and clearness; and, on the other hand, the theory of mental training, formulated centuries ago, has for the most part received expression from men not cognizant of, or, at least, directly concerned with, the recent changes in psychological science — from college presidents, for example, and from other men whose business it is to represent before the public the aims and achievements of school and college. Now, it is possible, of course, that the new view is the true one, and that the college presidents quite unintentionally are misleading their hearers. It may be, for example, that President Woodrow Wilson is mistaken when he says: "We speak of the 'disciplinary' studies . . . having in our thought the mathematics of arithmetic, elementary algebra, and geometry, the Greek-Latin texts and grammars, the elements of English and of French or German. . . . The mind takes fiber, facility, strength, adaptability, certainty of touch from handling them, when the teacher knows his art and their power. The college . . . should

give . . . elasticity of faculty and breadth of vision, so that they shall have a surplus of mind to expend. . . ." So, too, President Timothy Dwight of Yale University may have been wrong when he said of college education, "Such an education is the best means of developing thought power in a young man, and making him a thinking man of cultured mind." It must be admitted that the statements have something of the ring of the discredited and outworn psychology of faculties rather than of that functional science which is claiming the field to-day. But, personally, I am of the opinion that the difficulty is only one of words. I am inclined to think that the college presidents do know what they are driving at, even though, strange as it may seem, they are not able to express it very happily. And if this be so, we may well take upon ourselves the benevolent task of putting words into their mouths. And, at the same time, we may suggest to their critics that they, too, have as yet failed to reach a clearness of statement which would justify the throwing of stones at the windows of their predecessors and present rulers. In a word, what a lay mind like my own would like to do is to reduce the two conflicting theories to the terms of a common point of view so that, face to face and on the same footing, we may fairly determine to which of them belongs the victory in the conflict which they are waging.

To begin, then, with illustrations, we are told that the theory of mental training is a "gymnastic" theory of mind. It is a notion drawn from analogy with the body. Just as the arm may, by exercise, develop strength which may then be used for many purposes, such as throwing a ball, wielding a pen, holding a plow, so the mind and its various faculties may, by proper training, be increased in power, which may then be expended wherever demand may call. For example, by exercising the memory in nonsense syllables or Latin verse, one may improve the memorizing power in general; by training the observation in the laboratory, one may so develop the capacity for sense-discrimination that in every

field perception will be keener and more exact. In short, as the mind has many faculties, each doing its own part of the mental toil, each of these may be strengthened through exercise, and by a proper course of study all of them may be so developed that, to quote Chancellor MacCracken, the student "will possess a better disciplined mind for whatever work of life he may turn his attention to."

Now, against this theory, two lines of argument have been advanced: the first theoretical, a matter of definition, and the second experimental, a matter of fact. The argument from definition has challenged the description of the mind contained in the theory of mental training as given above. It has criticized the division of the mind into faculties, and has shown that division to be absurd. Upon that point there can be no further question, nor need there be, so far as the notion of formal discipline is concerned. It has also challenged the analogy between mind and body implied in the notions of exercise, practise, gymnastic training, and has raised the query whether the mind is really the sort of thing that can be trained and practised. This question we must keep before us as essential to the controversy. On the side of fact, Professor William James, whose hand has gone early and deep into most of the stirrings of the philosophical caldron during the last twenty-five years, has here, too, had a leading part in the melting down of conventional and uncritical dogma. Experimenting upon memory processes, he seemed to find little improvement in grasp of one kind of material as a result of memorizing another, and so he has stated the general question, How far is it experimentally true that exercise in one sort of mental activity gives facility and power in other activities more or less closely akin to the first?

With regard to the question of fact much valuable experimentation has been carried on in the psychological laboratories and the schools during the progress of the discussion. The question being how far one activity of the mind is influenced by the carrying on of other activities,

the answers might *a priori* be expected to range anywhere from the extreme view of formal discipline on the one hand to the equally extreme statement of psychological atomism on the other. According to the former, the mind may, by the exercise of certain general powers, assume immediate and complete command over great masses of concrete functions. According to the latter, each activity of the mind is so separate and independent that only by its own exercise with all its distinctive peculiarities and limitations can it be improved in efficiency and ease. The former view has been so often made ridiculous by the overstatement of its opponents that I think one may be pardoned for retaliation when opportunity presents itself.

What will you say of a theory that the training of the mind is so specific that each particular act gives facility only for the performing again of that same act just as it was before? Think of learning to drive a nail with a yellow hammer, and then realize your helplessness if, in time of need, you should borrow your neighbor's hammer and find it painted red. Nay, further think of learning to use a hammer at all if at each stroke the nail has gone further into the wood, and the sun has gone lower in the sky, and the temperature of your body has risen from the exercise, and, in fact, everything on earth and under the earth has changed so far as to give to each stroke a new particularity all its own, and thus has cut it off from all possibility of influence upon or influence from its fellows. No one, so far as I know, maintains a theory such as this but, on the other hand, no one, so far as I know, maintains a theory of the exercise of the mind in general as giving immediate control of every concrete situation in life. The truth lies somewhere between the two, and just where it lies is matter of fact to be determined by factual investigation so far as may be.

The results of the experimental inquiries thus far made have received their latest summarization in the papers of Professors Angell, Pillsbury, and Judd. According to these

writers, one may say that in practically all the functions open to statistical investigation the influence of practise in one function upon certain others has been established to a degree worthy of the attention of the student of education. For example, with regard to that memory problem to which Professor James first called attention, Professor Pillsbury declares that the investigations seem to leave little doubt that rote memory can be improved by practise, and that the same is true of logical memory so far as can be determined. Professor Judd, after an account of other inquiries, sums up the situation by the statement, "These facts certainly justify the statement that mental functions are interrelated and interdependent in the most manifold ways. Sometimes the training of an attitude aids the positive development of certain other attitudes. Sometimes, one function interferes with other functions. Above all stands the fact that every new experience changes the individual's capacity for new experiences." If these are fair summaries of the results of the investigations, then I think one may safely say that, as yet, the theory of formal discipline is not experimentally disproven.

In the field of definition the first task of those who take the new point of view is that of formulating a principle other than that of formal discipline in which the facts thus far established shall be properly recognized. Almost without exception this has been accomplished by some variation of the formula of Professor Thorndike, "The answer which I shall try to defend is that a change in one function alters any other only in so far as the two functions have as factors identical elements." But if one ask for the precise meaning of this term "identical" or "common elements," it must be said frankly that at this point little seems to have been accomplished. Professor Thorndike tells us that he means by identical elements "mental processes which have the same cell action in the brain as their physical correlate." But this definition can hardly be of immediate service to the student of education, and apart from this attempt at

definition we are given only lists of common elements such as methods, habits of attention, ideals, attitudes of will, and the like, all of which are significant, but no one of which gives us an answer to the question, "What do we mean by the 'common element'?" as employed in the theory in question. The simple fact is that at this point the new theory has not yet reached the stage of clear formulation; it is still in process of development. In short, while psychological experiment and theory have established as a good tentative hypothesis this notion of the common element, experiment has not yet proceeded far enough to carry it beyond the hypothetical stage, nor has the formulation been made so clear and definite as to furnish a secure basis for attack on other theories which have some measure of scientific respectability.

In this situation, it is the primary purpose of this paper to urge that, in our search for the "common element," we turn from the field of psychology into that of another empirical science which deals with consciousness, — I mean the science of logic. And, in justification of this procedure, may I suggest that it was from the point of view of logic, and not of psychology, that the doctrine of formal discipline was first stated and maintained? The very term, formal discipline, gives evidence of its origin, indicating a point of view far removed from that of the psychologist, and it may be that the theory first formulated by logic still retains a significance from the standpoint of that science. At any rate, I venture to offer as a subject for this evening's discussion the following thesis: "For the empirical science of logic the term form, as applied to our intellectual processes, indicates a common element, or a series of common elements, in those processes, which makes the theory of formal discipline at least intelligible and apparently tenable as a doctrine of intellectual training." In other words, formal training is discipline in certain discoverable forms of intellectual activity. It does not imply the bad psychology of the faculties; it does imply the thoroughly sound and

respectable distinction of form and content which is made by the logician.

Now, I know that thus to flaunt logic in the face of the psychologist and his disciples is, in these days, to invite ridicule and gentle intolerance from one's adversaries. Year after year I have the pleasure of seeing a definition of the philosophical sciences frame itself in the minds of an elementary class as they acquire familiarity with current literature of the type represented by Professor Karl Pearson. And the definition is this: "Originally all knowledge was a confused mass of popular and uncritical opinions; from this mass there have emerged separate fragments which have reached clearness of expression and accuracy of method; these are the sciences; that which is still left of the original chaos is philosophy." Such a definition coming from uncritical minds is thoroughly typical of a great amount of the superficial thinking of the time. My impression is that it has found a foothold even within the field of education, for even here I have seen the term philosophical applied to a method as a term of reproach for lack of scientific accuracy. But it is the secondary thesis of this paper to insist that for the student of education the philosophical sciences, especially those of logic, ethics, and esthetics, are essential. With a brave heart, therefore, as the advocate of a cause, I venture to ask you to seek in the field of logic those common elements of intellectual process which the logician calls its forms.

The distinction between form and content on which the science of logic rests is not an easy one to express. Since the doctrine of formal discipline was first stated the concept of form has been shaped and reshaped by many a generation of thinkers, and as this has been done, logic has gone through transformations quite as radical as that of psychology from its earlier to its later stage. Even now the presuppositions of the science are being questioned and tested by the school of Pragmatists, and the end of that controversy is not yet. But meanwhile, the distinction of

form and content seems to me to remain as an essential concept which through long examination has been brought to a relatively high degree of definiteness and usefulness.

The distinction is that of material to be arranged (the content) and the way in which it is arranged (the form). This does not mean, of course, that first we have material which has no form, no arrangement, and thereupon we take it and put it into relationships. It means, rather, that in every actual object of experience we can and must for purposes of description separate in thought the two elements of the content and the form. Thus if I place these pieces of paper in an ordered arrangement and number them 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, — then the papers are for me a certain content, a material, while the numerical order is the form in which I now place them. Or, again, if a man who is building a boat takes wood and nails, paint and pitch, these are for him the materials, the content, to be used; while, on the other hand, the fitting and joining of the parts, the designing, the building, the finishing, all these are processes of giving to the material a form, that structure and model after which the builder of the boat must seek. Or, again, if I examine a tree I find not only leaf and branch and trunk, each with its own constituent parts, but each of these stands in definite relations to all the others; and, further, as the process of growth goes on, not only is there addition of new material and casting off of old, but there are also those transformations of inner and external relationship which are the form, the very manner of its living.

Now, it is in this sense of the term that the student of logic examining our mental activities attempts a classification of their formal elements, their similarities of procedure. His purpose is to arrange them in a diverging series leading from the most fundamental and universal down through its subforms, and the sub-forms of these, which step by step become less extensive in their scope, until we approach as near as we may to the particular modes of concrete thinking, with all their peculiarities and unique-

nesses. The results of this attempt are to be found in those lists of categories which from Aristotle down have held a central place among the achievements of the logicians. It is not my purpose at this time to suggest a list of the categories, but I should like to mention two or three of them for the sake of giving point to the thesis that formal discipline is the practise of the mind in certain forms or methods of thinking which are "common elements" in wide ranges of our experience.

The most fundamental of the categories is that which has long been expressed as the Law of Contradiction, but is now usually stated in terms of system, coherence, organization. It is a generalization of the observed fact that the mind, wherever and however it thinks, is always striving after order, is seeking to make systematic a content which has been thus far relatively chaotic and incoherent. It is a statement of the fact that you and I, as our daily life goes on, are thinking multitudes of thoughts which, upon examination, turn out to be contradictory of each other, and which, therefore, must be so modified that they may dwell together in the same thought-system. It is an expression of the principle that our various judgments and descriptions of the world are so related and interrelated that no one of them can be regarded as finally true until it has been shown to be consistent with every other judgment of fact made by the same mind about the same world. From this point of view, then, the one fundamental form of mental activity, the one "common element" in all mental procedure is the making of judgments consistent with one another, the constructing of a system of judgments within which each of them may find a proper place. In a word, it is the eradication of inconsistency, the establishing of order.

An excellent illustration of this demand for formal unity was furnished me in my own experience during the past summer. Sitting day by day looking across Long Island Sound from a point on the Connecticut shore, I had in some

way or other gotten the notion that my gaze was directed toward the north; from this it followed as a matter of direct inference that Providence lay on my right hand and New York on my left. It is true that the notion also required the revision of certain other ideas about the rising of the sun and the going down of the same, but I have not, as a matter of fact, had much interest in the rising of the sun, nor, so far as points of the compass are concerned, in its setting either. And so these obvious difficulties failed to bring my imagination into line with the descriptions which I can remember as given in my old school geography. When, however, it became necessary for me to start for Providence, other considerations appeared. Going to the station as I did, facing away from the water, I fully intended to take a train toward the left, but fortunately, station-master and brakemen intervened and quite contrary to my own imagining I was led and carried to the city and the college of my search. But not even here were my troubles ended, for during the four different journeys which I have taken along the line during the summer I have spent hours, I am sure, in trying to determine as a matter of imagination, on which side of the line the station house at New London lies, whether on your right or your left hand as you approach it from New Haven. The shock of finding it where it ought not to be gives one a feeling of turned-roundness that no one, I think, would willingly encounter. It is the shock of the failure of one's thinking. It means that one has not succeeded in bringing one's mental content into order. The judgment "the station will appear on the left" and the perceptual experience "there it is on the right" are left facing each other in such flat and blank contradiction that one feels either that he is a fool, or that, with Alice, he has wandered through the looking-glass to the region where the laws of logic no longer apply.

If now it be asked what are some of the sub-forms, the less fundamental modes of relating contents which the mind employs, it should be noted that one of them has been

already given — the form of space — of position, direction, and distance. The space relations do not apply to all the objects of our experience, nor do they exhaust all the relationships of those objects to which they do apply, but they are none the less among the most significant of the methods which the mind uses in its work. Other forms whose importance for our thinking are equally obvious are the establishing of causal relationships, which may be carried on throughout the entire field of natural phenomena, the category of likeness and difference which finds expression wherever the activities of comparison and discrimination appear. Somewhat different in type are the activities of representation in terms of written and spoken language, including the language of number upon which our sciences depend for complexity and breadth of view, as well as for accuracy of statement. These activities of comparing and discriminating, of establishing causal and spatial relations, of representing our sensuous content in the various symbolisms of language, all these are typical instances of the mind's activity as it constructs and systematizes its world. As such, each of them gives us a certain common element of "form," which will be found in wide ranges of mental activity; each of them may be developed and trained as a distinctive mode of thinking. If now we may state the doctrine of formal discipline in the terms which we have tried to define, it would run somewhat as follows: It is one of the tasks of education to so train the mind that it may do well the work of thinking. In order to accomplish this, it must select those kinds of mental activity which seem most fundamental and important for the life of the student. It must then make such selection of studies and must provide such a teacher that the student practised in these forms of thinking shall be made ready to use them as well as possible in the new situations which are his opportunities for achievement. In explanation of this statement, I should like to offer a few words of interpretation and restriction.

It has been said that formal discipline sets only one of the tasks of the educator for the reason that, obviously, the training of the mind in this sense is not all of education. There must be teaching of the will and of the emotions, as well as the merely mental processes. Quite as important, too, is the task of furnishing the mind with proper content, of giving it acquaintance with the world, of supplying it with facts, with interests, of giving it something to think about. It is a valid criticism of much of our moral teaching in the past that we have too often simply laid down the moral laws, or forms, "Thou shalt love thy neighbor," and have left our pupils in such ignorance, both of themselves and their neighbors, that their morality has expended itself in idle sentiment or in blundering stupidity. So, too, with regard to intellectual training. It seems to me that the wave of criticism against formal training as such is simply the result of that great inrush of new thought material from the natural sciences which has made us despise the thinking of those who, in an earlier time, had little of information upon which to employ their forming activities. But none the less, the formal side is essential, and it becomes more and more essential according as greater masses of material are thrust upon us to be rescued from incoherence and chaos.

Again, if the question be raised "What are the best studies for the training of the mind; ought we to study the classics or the sciences, fine arts or engineering?" I fear that I have no answer ready. I am persuaded, however, that far more important than the subject is the mind of the teacher. The one sure way to learn good thinking is to come into contact with a mind which thinks well and to feel its influence. In the game of thinking, as in the games of the athletic field, one learns best by practise in fast company. And it is not, in my opinion, necessary, as is sometimes suggested, that the method of the teacher should find expression in conscious ideals which may be communicated as guiding principles to the student. Knowledge of the

forms of logic is, alas, no guarantee of excellence in their use, just as acquaintance with the symbolism of mathematics is not always conjoined with accuracy and precision in the conduct of life.

With regard to the experimental inquiries into the problem in hand, it should be said that from the point of view here taken it does not follow that practise in a form of thinking in one set of contents must give at once equal facility in the same sort of thinking in another field. It does not follow that the college teacher or college graduate is fully equipped, in virtue of his training, to build a ship, manage a caucus, teach a school, or rule a home. In these activities, as well as in all others in which men engage, it is necessary that the mind be well stored in addition to being well trained. For the carrying on of any pursuit, we need not only talent, native or acquired, but also information, interest, practise, before the work can be successfully done. Exercise in one function should not be expected, therefore, to give equal facility in the carrying on of another. Obviously it does not, and the degree of the difficulty of transfer is determined, not only by identity or differences in the formal elements, but also by differences and similarities in the contents as well. That such a position is in accordance with the results of investigations thus far made will not, I think, be denied.

It is often asked, when words are not used in the senses which we have given them, "But are not the forms of thinking merely contents after all; does not the distinction of form and content break down, therefore, into the description of mental processes in terms of that which they contain?" To this we may answer, "Yes, the forms of thinking are mental contents in at least two legitimate senses: first, in that they are within the mind, are elements of the mental process; and, second, in that they can be stated in terms of principles and appear as fully formed judgments or ideals, as, for example, in the causal law, 'Given conditions are always followed by the same result.'" But neither of these

uses of the term content is that which we have employed; ours is the abstract resolution of every intellectual process into its material and its form, and the double or triple use of the term content should not be allowed to plunge us into ambiguity.

The one word which sums up the theory of formal discipline is method, or, rather, methods. It is the theory that the mind can be trained to do well certain kinds of work, to follow successfully certain methods of procedure. It is, I think, what Mr. Thorndike, in spite of his hostility to the theory, has in mind when, summing up the results of his own work, he says: "The chief duty of serious students of the theory of education to-day is to form the habit of inductive study and learn the logic of statistics. Long after every statement in this book has been superseded by a truer one the method which it tries to illustrate will still be profitable, and the ideals of accuracy and honesty in statistical procedure by which I hope it has been guided will still be honored."

And, finally, may I insist that the doctrine of formal discipline, as so stated, has no connection whatever with the psychology of faculties. If there is one notion which would break down the conception of a system of formal modes of procedure, it is that of the mind as broken up into the separate minds of reasoning, observation, imagination, memory, and the rest. The advocates of formal discipline may blithely join forces with their opponents in consigning to oblivion a dogma which has perished from the earth and has left behind no one to perpetuate its name.

And so with reservation and explanation I offer you for discussion an interpretation of the doctrine of formal discipline from the standpoint of the science of logic. Mental training does not seem to me by any means the whole of education, but, on the other hand, mental training is not, so far as I can see, a myth. It is a theory which has found lodging in many minds not given to mythical imaginings. It is a theory which, as one of the stand-

ard books in education seems to say, though a psychological absurdity, is yet obviously true as an explanation of the facts of mental experience. It is a theory which is, at least, respectable, and, however it may appear from another point of view, from its own standpoint it seems to have a meaning.

I cannot close this paper nor consider my task ended until I have at least stated for your consideration the secondary thesis which has been implicit throughout the discussion. It is this — that the students of educational theory seem to me to give relatively far too much attention to the descriptive work of psychology and far too little to the results of the normative sciences of ethics, esthetics, and logic. In his keen and lucid study of educational psychology Professor Thorndike draws just the distinction which I have in mind. At the beginning of the book, speaking from the standpoint of psychology he says: "The work of education is to make changes in human minds and bodies." And of the mind he says elsewhere (p. 30), "The mind is really but the sum total of an individual's feelings and acts, of the connections between outside events and its responses thereto, and of the possibilities of having such feelings, acts, and connections." In his closing chapter, however, after discussing the facts of the mental life from this point of view, he says, "A theory of education must decide two questions: (1) What ought people to be? (2) how shall we change them from what they are to what they ought to be?" With respect to the first of these questions Mr. Thorndike says, "The studies which have been made in this book have nothing to do with it." But it seems to me obvious that the question "What ought people to be?" is one which the student of education must keep in mind from the beginning to the end of his inquiry.

First he must do so for the very evident reason that if he is not simply to change his pupils, but to change them in the direction in which they ought to go, he must know the ideal in terms of which that direction is defined. And,

secondly, just so soon as he takes the standpoint of that ideal, the normative standpoint, he will find that the descriptions of mind which are made from the factual point of view are no longer adequate or true. Nowhere is this more clearly shown than in the consideration of the unity of the mind which has been the constant theme of this paper. For Mr. Thorndike the mind is very properly a "sum total of an individual's feelings and acts," etc. For certain other students who take the descriptive attitude, it is possible to say: "We mean nothing more by the unity of the mind than that it is not divided into faculties. The term can be given no positive meaning whatever." But just so soon as we take the point of view of the mental processes as directed toward a goal, as doing well or ill a task which they have undertaken, the unity of the mind appears in a sense which is essential to the statement of the task of the educator. That unity consists in the fact that each thought, each idea, is not simply conjoined with its fellows in a common receptacle, but that each is demanding of the others that they be consistent with it if they are to be held true and valuable in the experience of an individual whose thoughts they are. From this point of view the self is not a sum total: it is a unity. Its unity is that upon every mental process within its experience there is laid the same demand that it take its place in a system, and that it submit to whatever transformations may be necessary for its membership in that system. In a word, the unity of the self is essentially a normative conception. In exactly the same way as one may run through a book and find simply words, may look at a picture and find only colors, may listen to an organ and hear only sounds, so may one run through the life of the self and find simply experiences. But in no one of these cases have we taken the point of view which is most closely related to the concrete affairs of life, and in no one of them, therefore, have we included all the truth which is vital. The student of education must define his pupil primarily not from the factual point of

view, but from the evaluative point of view. When he does so define he will discover an experience whose unity appears rather in its ideals than in its processes. In my opinion he will find a unitary self, the training of whose mental processes is not a myth.

PART IV

THE CURRICULUM

THE three papers here given are extracts from reports of the President to the Trustees of Amherst College. They present definite proposals for the organization of the course of study in a liberal college. On the assumption that the purpose of liberal study is as definite and as compelling as that of a professional school, these reports condemn the theory of election in college studies and demand that college instruction be fitted to its purpose. They are not content with the establishing of the mere possibility that an education may be secured in college. They insist upon at least some measure of probability.

The report of 1914 contains a record of curriculum changes adopted at Amherst College during the years 1913 and 1914 and also a proposal of further action. The first of the two extracts here given describes the most striking of the changes which had been voted. The second extract is a discussion of a tentative plan of a college curriculum as a whole.

The report of 1918 gives an account of developments in educational discussion and policy in Amherst College since 1912. Upon this account is based a proposal to reshape the organization of the college teaching so as to adjust it to its purposes. In the extract here given it is proposed that the first two years of the course be sharply separated from the last two and that each of these divisions be given methods of teaching and examination suited to the work which it has to do.

I

A COURSE FOR FRESHMEN

THE most significant feature of the educational changes which were put into effect in the fall of 1914 is the placing of an elective course in social and economic institutions in the Freshman year. The name of the course has been left in vague outline because its exact nature must be determined by the interest and method of the teacher who gives it. Its purpose, whatever form it may take, will be to serve as an introduction to the humanistic sciences. We wish if possible to make students, at the very beginning of the college course, aware of the moral, social, and economic scheme — the society — of which they are members. Such a course should not encourage boys to believe that they have all at once found solutions of the problems by which their elder brothers are sorely perplexed; nor should it cast them down into the scepticism which regards all problems as insoluble. Its functions are rather (1) a sane, searching, revealing of the facts of the human situation, and (2) a showing of the intellectual method by which these situations may be understood. It should be primarily an introduction to ethics, logic, history, economics, law, government, and not in any large degree an end in itself. Such a course presents many problems for the teacher; for the sake of simplifying his task the course will be limited to members of the Freshman class.

It is only fair that I say that many members of the faculty and of the board of trustees regard this new Freshman course as an experiment of rather doubtful wisdom. Their chief objection is that boys in the first year of college life are not ready for the examination of human living.

They believe that such studies cannot have the accuracy nor the thoroughness which are needed to give the disciplinary quality which Freshman subjects should have. They fear vagueness and incoherence of mental content and looseness of intellectual method as a result of plunging boys into situations by which all of us, young and old alike, are baffled.

It would be idle to deny the force of this objection, and so far as the objection holds, the new course is an experiment. There are, however, considerations on the other side and they seem to me so strong as to make it essential that the course be given.

In the first place, I would suggest that incoherence and looseness of intellectual method are better discovered at the beginning of the college course than at its end. As our curriculum is now given, one of the most common of its results is that not until their college opportunities are almost past do our boys come to realise what they ought to be thinking about. Every year we send out, usually among our best minds, boys who have at last come to awareness of the human situation, but who have had no systematic training in dealing with it. Such boys are dangerous to themselves and to their fellows. Only in much greater time and with far greater effort will they work out a method, and a point of view, the beginnings of which at least they might have secured during the college years.

Again, it is just this inexactness of content, this looseness of method, which gives opportunity for the genuine teacher. If the teaching be properly done boys will perceive that their own thinking is a poor, silly, inept semblance of activity. They will be brought to face the fact that before the genuine human problems their information is scanty and inexact, their reasoning confused and inconsistent. If the teaching be properly done, the pupils will see what they have to accomplish in the three remaining years. If the teaching be not properly done — but it must be.

The simple fact is that at this point the progress of educa-

tion is following the progress of the knowledge upon which it depends. We have had no teaching in the humanistic sciences because there were no such sciences. Our direct understanding of human experience has been given on the one hand through the appreciations and concrete representations of literature, and on the other, through relatively inaccurate applications of philosophy and history. But however unwilling we may be to recognize it, it is clear that the new studies of human experience and activity are now achieving in some measure the character of science. In the beginnings of the intellectual life of Europe, our first discovery was that certain quantitative aspects of nature, admitting of mathematical expression, may thereby be brought into order, subjected to the intellectual law. It is not long since the activities of the living organism seemed hopelessly incoherent and unorderable; but we have succeeded and we are succeeding in dealing with them. And now still later the processes and conditions of individual and social experience are being brought into some sort of coherence and understanding. It is true that the work has only just been begun — but it has been begun, and no one can pretend to understand the thought of his time who does not know what is being done and what remains to be done in this field. If the college cannot give our boys an acquaintance with this task and these achievements, if it cannot arouse a vital interest in the intellectual struggle upon which we have entered, it will fail in one of its most obvious and compelling duties. My own opinion is that however difficult the task, our students should be set to it at the beginning of the college course and should be kept at it so long as, in college or out of it, the opportunities for study are still open to them.

II

A CURRICULUM FOR A LIBERAL COLLEGE

WITH your permission, I should like to suggest, in quite irresponsible fashion, the direction in which it seems to me Amherst may wisely continue her development. I am sure that, with the other liberal colleges of her kind and time, she stands at the parting of the ways and that critical problems are awaiting her decision. For the sake of stimulating the friends of the college, students, alumni, faculty, and trustees, to the discussion of principles and methods, may I sketch here the outline of a curriculum concerning which I have already had much discussion with colleagues and students. The plan is offered not as a final solution of our curriculum problems, but as a preliminary statement of a point of view which, if valid, may perhaps receive more adequate expression in other ways. It is offered not for adoption but for criticism and consideration.

Freshman Year	Sophomore Year	Junior Year	Senior Year
Social and Economic Institutions	European History	American History	Intellectual and Moral Problems
Mathematics and Formal Logic	Philosophy	History of Thought	Elective Major
Science	Science		
English	Literature	Elective Minor	
Foreign Language	Elective	Elective Minor	

As an invitation to discussion, I should like to say a few words about several features of the plan as it is proposed.

I will describe briefly each of the courses, indicate their relations to each other, attempt to formulate the underlying principles, and then speak of some advantages which might follow if the plan were adopted.

In the list of courses as given those above the lines are required, five in the Freshman, four in the Sophomore, two in the Junior, and one in the Senior year. The courses below the lines are elective, one for Sophomores, two for Juniors, and one for Seniors. In the Freshman year, the courses in foreign language and mathematics and logic should be given more time value than the other courses of the same year. In the Junior year, each course counts for a quarter of a year's work. In the Senior year, the required course takes one third of the time and the elective major two thirds of the time.

The course in social and economic institutions has already been explained. It should serve as an introduction to the humanistic sciences. The student should be made aware of the situations and the institutions with which those sciences are dealing and should be made ready to attempt an understanding of what they have done and are doing.

The course in mathematics and formal logic should give instruction and practice in deductive thinking. Mathematics and formal logic are alike interested in the endeavor to find forms of expression by the use of which meanings may be made more exact and more explicit. They alike recognize the fact that our deductive thinking is engaged in the task of giving to thought contents new forms of expression by which they may become better understood. In the course in question, the student should be instructed concerning this characteristic function of mental activity and should then be given practice in it. In geometry he will see how in the field of space relations meaning is developed by new modes of expression; algebra will give skill in the use of symbolic representations of various types; formal logic will build up the technique of accurate and coherent expression by means of words. Such a course, following the

mathematics of the preparatory school, should give a student some acquaintance with and command of the formal procedure of thinking.

The Freshman and Sophomore years have each a course in physical and natural science. My own preference would be that in each year two sciences be given (a semester for each), so that for all students there would be some knowledge of physics, chemistry, geology, and biology. For any proper understanding of the conditions of human living all four of these studies seem very desirable. My scientific friends, with their ideals of thoroughness and close contact with the facts, tell me that half year courses in science can give only smatterings and hazy outlines and are hardly worth offering. On this point I am inclined to differ with them. What we want for our required courses is not the technique of investigation, but an account of the results so far as they are significant for life and for knowledge as a whole. Such results can be given in words and, if properly organized, it would seem that they might be given in such form as to remain a valuable and significant possession. If my friends are right, we might have to offer students in one year a choice between physics and chemistry, and in the other between geology and biology. If they are wrong, we might give all four sciences in outline and in relation during the two years.

With regard to the teaching of English, one hesitates at the present time to dogmatise. Our teachers of English are attempting to carry on and to combine two processes, each of which is by itself sufficiently difficult. They are seeking to make sure that students can express themselves in simple grammatical form. They are also offering to students an opportunity to enjoy the experience of literary appreciation. One can only say that to these tasks and their combination must be set the strongest and best equipped teachers who are available.

The course in foreign language should be a continuation of an advanced language presented for admission. It

should give to the student the experience of really reading a language other than his own. As noted before, it should have more time value than is now commonly allowed for a three hour course. Like the English course, it should have value in content as well as in the structure of the language concerned. As it is to continue a subject presented for admission, one cannot determine its content without determining also the admission requirements. My own suggestion would be that we require for admission six year courses in language, three in an ancient language and three in a modern language. We could then require that the ancient language be continued in the Freshman year, and that the student be required to show by examination his reading command of the modern language. Before this matter is decided, however, we need more information concerning the value of different entrance subjects. Such information we hope to secure before another year has passed.

In the Sophomore year, European history traces through the civilization of Europe the development of the institutions revealed in the course in social and economic institutions. The course in philosophy, chiefly logic and ethics, studies the human motives and beliefs which underlie those institutions and have found expression in them. The work in science continues that already begun. In literature, the student continues one of the literatures of the Freshman year, English or foreign, according to his choice.

In the Junior year, the first course continues the historical study from Europe into the development of our own institutions. Meanwhile, the history of thought attempts to reveal in their successive forms the beliefs and purposes which have dominated our civilization, and correlates with these the scientific interpretations and, so far as possible, the literary representations in which human life has been portrayed. This course would be, in its own measure, an account of the intellectual and moral elements in the development of our civilization.

In the Senior year, the student would be expected to bring together the contributions of the two required Junior courses in order that he may face the characteristic and significant problems of his time and people. The study of European and American institutions in their development, and of the thought elements underlying and determining them, should have prepared him to form some opinions of his own about human living. I do not mean that he should be given a course in dogmatic citizenship, but I do mean that the religious, moral, political, social and economic issues of our day should be so presented and interpreted that a young man may begin to understand them, may begin to define his own thoughts on human problems in relation to the thoughts which other men have made and are making. Such a course could not be given by one teacher. It would be necessary to place in charge of it a number of teachers who might supplement each other, teaching by their differences as well as by their agreements.

On the elective side, the plan allows one free elective in the Sophomore year in order that a student may be free to carry on some special interest from the Freshman to the later years. Thus he may take a second language or continue his mathematics, or go on with his work in some other department within which his special interest lies. In the Junior year, which is divided into four courses, two of these are open to choice without limitation. In the two earlier years, all the different lines of study have been opened up and the student may now select two of them for careful and detailed study under close supervision and in small classes. In the Senior year, the major, taking two thirds of the student's time, must be a continuation of one of the four subjects of the Junior year. Here again the work would be done in small groups in close association with a teacher or group of teachers. In the two years taken together it would amount practically to a full year's work in a subject to which the student had already been intro-

duced in the early part of his college life. If the student has within him capacity for any special interest he should find in such genuine "majoring" at the end of his college course, conditions favorable for awakening the interest to full activity and for developing power in furthering it so far as we may fairly expect it to go during the undergraduate years.

Before proceeding to speak of the relations of courses, may I stop to note the omission of two subjects for which some provision must be made. I refer to the teaching of the fine arts, including music, and to practice in public speech. These subjects are left out because the plan is as yet a mere sketch. In any definite scheme they must be firmly established in some way or other.

With regard to relations between courses, may I call attention to the continuity in the series of required courses and in the sequence of elective courses as well. The required studies running through the four years form one continuous intellectual inquiry. The courses in history treat of the institutions revealed in the Freshman year, and the Senior course discusses the problems for which history has furnished material. The Freshman courses in institutions and mathematics and logic lead directly into the study of logic and ethics, which in turn leads into the history of thought, which again gives another body of content for the Senior course in problems. The courses in science lead into the history of thought, and the studies in literature give content for both historical subjects of the Junior year. In the Senior year, the entire curriculum, with its information, its problems, its methods, should be brought to bear upon the interpretation of a group of problems which are all bound together by their common human interest. In the field of electives, the same relationship holds so far as possible. The Senior major continues one of the Junior subjects, which is itself a continuation of work done in the earlier years.

It would be essential to the working out of such a plan

that the college student should, at the beginning of his studies, be informed of the general plan and outline of the curriculum. To the Freshman class there should be given a series of lectures which would sketch the course of study as a whole, giving its essential purposes and determining the relations of each study to the other studies and the curriculum of which they are parts. Such lectures if properly given would illumine and direct the instruction and study from beginning to end. They would provide a plan which every teacher and every pupil might be expected to keep in mind.

With respect to inclusiveness, the required content is intended to be representative of the system of human knowledge as a whole. Recognizing the limitation of time in four years of undergraduate study, it attempts to select the significant intellectual inquiries and to so relate them as to keep the unity of the whole while establishing acquaintance with the parts. The task is not an easy one and there is wide room for differences of opinion. But to do it in some way is better than not to do it at all. One can simply formulate one's notion and then submit it to friends and colleagues for rending and reconstruction.

The fundamental purpose of the plan is to ensure that every student who receives a liberal degree shall have gone through an intellectual procedure by which a liberal education may be secured. We are not content with the assurance that he has been for four years in an institution within which the opportunities of liberal culture are available. We prefer an arrangement by which those opportunities are made requirements. Then, recognizing the artificiality of our tests, we may teach and test in the hope that what is intended may be accomplished.

The same principle may be stated by saying that the liberal college has a definite intellectual mission and it has no right to give its degrees unless that mission has been achieved. It is not enough that a student know a little of everything; so far as it is possible, he should be given a

knowledge of the world, so extensive and so unified that by means of it he may get a fair understanding of human experience. It is not enough that he should have studied one subject three years; he should go into one field and learn how thinking is done in that field. I would define the intellectually educated man as one who can bring a unified interpretation of the world to bear on the problems of human experience, and who also appreciates how thought has achieved those results which have made his interpretation possible.

From the arrangement of courses here proposed there would follow a number of advantages which are perhaps worthy of mention.

One discouraging feature of our present work is that, each course being regarded as complete in itself, the student holds himself, or is held by us, responsible for being informed concerning its content only on the day of examination. If at some later time we should call on him for evidence of his knowledge of it, he would accuse us of injustice and violation of all the presuppositions on which his curriculum is built. But in the plan proposed, each course given is itself an examination in the courses which have been given before. If the teaching be properly done, it will be taken for granted that the results of previous courses are actually available for use, and if they are not available, then the work of the later year cannot be properly done. It would be interesting to see in this way each professor examining the teachers who have preceded him as well as the students immediately under his charge.

Again, this arrangement would make it possible to take cognizance of differences in content and method between courses. As we have spread before students lists of courses and have invited them to choose, we have inevitably come to regard every course on the list as a substitute for every other, and, therefore, as equivalent to it. The inevitable result of this has been the establishment of false uniformities

in methods of teaching. The teacher of literature and the teacher of mathematics are each expected to take the same amount of the student's time for study, to require classroom attendance for the same number of hours per week, to give the same kind of tests and examinations, to require the same sort of "scholarly" work — to make sure that the record of intellectual achievement in one course is a fair substitute for the record in another. But I think it is obvious that such uniformities and substitutions are altogether illusory. Valuable instruction may be given in subjects which admit of little work on which the student can be "tested." And there are other lines of study in which the teacher's activity may be practically limited to examining what the student has done. Some courses should claim little of a student's time outside the classroom; others can make use of far greater assignments than are now possible under our system of equivalents. But if we were teaching under such a system of requirements as is here proposed, the total demand upon the student might be compounded of whatever parts might seem best. One would give students work to do, not to keep them busy, but because the work is worth doing. And if one had nothing for them to do at any specific time, one could arrange with one's colleagues to fill up the gap.

Still another advantage for the teacher would appear in the uniformity of his class. Under the usual elective scheme, one may find Sophomores, Juniors, and Seniors in the same classroom. And again, within each of these groups there may be every possible variation of previous study and preparation. It follows from this that in the conduct of the work neither teacher nor pupil can take anything for granted. And in this way it comes to pass that each subject is taught without regard to any other, as a thing complete in itself, except as each teacher attempts by way of introduction some hasty establishment of relations. This may be the teaching of "subjects" but it does not give knowledge in any genuine or fundamental sense.

On the side of the students, the plan has an advantage which is very important. It would unite all the college in a common intellectual enterprise. The modern college has lost for its study and teaching the tremendous social sanction which in the old college was given by the sense of intellectual solidarity. Under the elective scheme, no subject is essential. Why study physics hard when other students are getting an education without it? Why, if you are seeking for a liberal education, devote yourself to a subject, without which other men are reaching the same goal for which you strive? The argument is bad but none the less convincing. But we must bring back to our students the conviction that they have a common intellectual task, that the college has a definite and compelling mission, to which as members of the group they owe loyal and enthusiastic devotion. Let us say it again — our work is as definite as that of technical or professional school; it can rightly claim equal earnestness and greater eagerness and enthusiasm.

On the purely mechanical side, the plan has the advantages of simplicity. It reduces the number of courses and so makes much more easy the arrangement of schedule and all related matters. It would enable us to adjust the sizes of divisions for instruction on some reasonable basis. At present the size of a class is commonly dependent simply on the number of students electing the subject. But if courses were required of all students, divisions could be arranged in each case to suit the nature of the work done. One of our popular fallacies is that there is a certain proper size for a college class. But it is clearly untrue. If a teacher is merely lecturing or reading there is virtually no limit of numbers except the extent of the teacher's personal power. If one is directing a piece of investigation, each student must be taken separately. And between these limits there are many adjustments to be made varying with the nature of the subject and the method of the teacher. It would conduce both to economy and to efficiency if these

adjustments could be made by choice and not by the mere chance of student election.

My impression is that in every phase of our intellectual work teachers and pupils alike would be helped by greater definiteness in understanding of the work in which we are engaged. It would help us all to realize that we are not simply giving or taking courses, but are engaged in a process of education. In the face of a real unity in that process, many of our distinctions, in the ranks of the faculty as well as among the students, would seem arbitrary and artificial.

On the elective side, the plan would have two advantages. It would put an end to the mere gathering up of unrelated courses from which can be gained little more than a smattering of knowledge. For this it would substitute the choice of a definite intellectual field and would try to ensure that in this field the student should do a piece of thorough, sustained, and systematic study. Such a "majoring" in the Junior and Senior years might be expected to establish (1) habits of intellectual work, and (2) an intellectual interest which, whether or not sustained by professional activity, would remain as a permanent element of culture and inquiry.

As I leave this proposed plan for your consideration, I must apologize for saying so much concerning its supposed advantages. May I say again that the plan is presented simply for criticism, and its claims have been set forth in the hope that counter claim and attack may reveal its defects. The plan does express certain principles in which I believe. But those principles are open to challenge. And even if they were valid, it is clear that this embodiment of them is a mere sketch which can become a plan only as it is torn apart, put together again in new forms and with needed supplementation, subjected to all the generous interpretation and criticism which men give each other when they are working together in a common cause which is more important to them than is their own discussion of it.

III

A REORGANIZATION OF THE COLLEGE CURRICULUM

THE longer one attempts to devise a liberal training by the additions and combinations of courses, the more one becomes convinced that addition is an illusion and that courses are the chimeras of an imagination perverted by the categories of mechanics. Twenty courses do not make a college education any more than twenty legs make a man, or twenty heads, or even ten hearts, two legs and eight fingers. And in the same way three courses do not make an intellectual interest, an experience of the actual process of the working mind. Something is wrong with the terms, something is radically wrong with the process of combining them.

What is the trouble? It seems to me very clear that the concepts of quantity and measurement have wrecked the organic unity of the college course. In making elective courses we have felt the genuine need of uniformity and so have established units in terms of which to measure. And having established our separate units of subjects, courses, departments, we have felt free to pluck them out of the living organism one by one, to substitute one for another, and then to put them back supposing the life process to be still rushing on in spite of all our interruptions.

If this be true, then no re-sorting of the courses will gain the ends we seek. Rather, it seems to me, we must re-think our terms and reconsider our procedure. I am inclined, therefore, to recommend to the Trustees and Faculty of the college a fairly fundamental transformation of its organization. You will not find in this suggestion

the slightest hint of any change of purpose. You will, however, find a strong conviction that the college organization in which that purpose finds expression is quite inadequate. I am proposing, therefore, that a new one take its place.

As we have postulated two aims in the defining of a liberal education, so I would, in good mechanical form, propose the division of the college into two separate colleges, a Junior and a Senior College. And if it be at once retorted that this is a vicious mechanical separation in purpose and in method, then I would reply that the division into two, if discreetly made, is not so bad as a division into twenty, and further that, in spite of bad appearances, this division of ours is not to be mechanical — never shall we take these colleges apart or try to substitute them for one another in any known relationship.

But now to state our plan in sober, honest terms! Our purpose is, we say, to set men on the road toward liberal education. And liberal education seems to have two aspects: (1) that of general apprehension of the culture of one's race and (2) that of feeling of the actual process of the mind by which that culture has been made and still is in the making. These aims are always present wherever a liberal college is. But they are often obscure in content and so hazy in outline as to be mistaken one for the other. Men say "any course of study properly pursued is liberal" and so they take some ten or twenty courses, each of necessity improperly pursued and call the process liberal. Men say "a little of everything and everything of something — that gives a liberal education." But they forget that knowledge when made up of "everythings" and "somethings" is not real knowledge at all — not knowledge in the sense of wisdom or of understanding, nor even knowledge in the actual process of its making.

It seems to me essential that these two aims should be kept clear and kept apart for fear that either may be lost or either substituted for the other. I would propose,

therefore, that we establish them and build them into the very structure of the college course. Let us have two colleges instead of one, or better two in one, the first explicitly devoted to the general aim, the second, in greater part at least, given up to special studies, and both together mastered by the common aim of trying to understand and share the labor and ecstacy of human knowledge and human apprehension.

How shall it be done? In its most external aspect the college is, of course, an institution which, having instructed students, or perhaps not having instructed them, examines them in order to determine whether or not to give them a degree which certifies that they are, in some sense agreed upon, educated men. In this external sense, one college is one set of examinations with all that thereunto belongs. If then we should establish two examinations, two sets of tests, we should in this external sense divide the four year college into two parts, each of two years. From this would follow various results as to our methods of teaching, methods of study, methods of life. According as men are to be examined so will their modes of living be. Two aims, two sets of examinations; hence two colleges — that is the program.

I would propose then that at the end of the sophomore year we establish a set of tests or one comprehensive test to determine whether or not in their two years of college work our students have been making headway toward intelligence, toward culture, toward an apprehension of human knowledge as a whole. And at the end of the senior year we should have a second test which, taking the first for granted, should try to discover what students know of some one field of knowledge, what work is done within it and what it means. Passing the first examination would give admission to the Senior College. Passing the senior test would qualify a student for his degree.

It would be essential, I think, that such examinations be set, not by the teachers who have given the instruction but

by an examining board appointed for the purpose. Teachers would still continue to give their tests at the endings of courses, and passing one's courses might be made a prerequisite for admission to the general examination. And the Board of Examiners might perhaps include some of the teachers of the college whose work is being examined. But in principle it seems to me courses and examinations should be kept far apart. The Board should set its tests not on the basis of courses taken but by the guidance of an end to be achieved, a type of education to be realized. We should examine the student, not his knowledge of the courses he has taken.

I should like now to suggest some of the advantages which it seems to me such an arrangement would bring about in the two colleges which are established by it.

THE JUNIOR COLLEGE

The first advantage of the arrangement in the Junior College would be the clarifying and validating of what the college community means by culture. It would give to the younger members of the community a compelling sense of something that must be done, some quality that must be taken on, some power that must be gained, some sensitiveness that must be won. There is now no such compelling sense of common purpose and requirement in our conglomerate arrangement of courses. In a recent pronunciamento of the largest association of colleges in the United States, it was argued that since the concept of liberal education has no generally accepted meaning, a given subject might just as well be included in the college course as any other; apparently no one could tell the difference in the result. And if our college authorities are in a haze like this, there is no wonder that freshmen and sophomores feel no compulsion of a clear and definite purpose driving them on. But we must have just that to make our college work worth while — a recognition by us all that there are certain

things which one must know, must feel, must see, must understand if he desires to be regarded as a member of this community. Unless he does the things we do and loves the things we love, he is not one of us. I think perhaps we might regard the Junior College examinations as a matriculation test, the college having given a man two years in which to show that he may rightly claim a place as one who is her own.

And may I hasten to say that the merit of such an examination as this would lie not in a great severity. I see no reason why it should be in general quality harder than any of the tests we give at present. The elimination of many students by rigid tests might easily be done. But I am not convinced that education by such elimination is the thing most needed in the American colleges just now. There would be much to be gained in private satisfaction and in high quality of scholarly achievement by the elimination of all students except the very best. But that is not the gain most sorely needed at the present time. Our task, the most important task, is that of taking the average American boy and those above the average and trying to make of them men of cultured power. No one doubts that this work can be done for boys of unusual gifts and aptitude. But what can be done in general? What are the possibilities of cultural education in the country at large? That seems to me the urgent, the almost terrifying question which now confronts our colleges of liberal education. May I say again, therefore, that the merit of this examination would be, not in this or that established degree of severity, but in the setting of a standard as such, in the making clear that "liberal" has a meaning which cuts like steel between the groups of those who are and those who are not liberal sophomores.

At this point there is a question which I know is quite inevitable. "Upon what subjects will you examine at the end of the sophomore year? The student has passed his courses one by one and answered questions on them. Will

you ask further questions on these courses? Will your examination mean a grand and general review?" May I try to answer the question in two parts, distinguishing between the method and the content of the mind with which the examination is to deal?

If we were examining the intellectual method of a sophomore to see what sort of man he is there are, I think, seven main questions which we should like to ask:

1. Can he and does he read books?

   In books is gathered up the culture and knowledge of the race. A boy who has not learned to go to them, to live in them, to understand their meanings, is not, in method at least, upon the great highroad of education.
2. Can he express his own thoughts in writing?
3. Can he speak clearly and accurately?
4. Can he listen to and understand another's speech?
5. Has he a sense of fact, distinguishing from facts the mere suggestions which are not yet established?
6. Can he derive an implication, draw an inference, and see what implications and inferences do not follow?
7. Has he a sense of values by which to feel, to appreciate, to recognize the things worth while from those not worthy of our choosing?

These are, so far as method is concerned, the questions I should like to ask about a sophomore seeking admission to a Senior College. They indicate the qualities of mind which make for education. If one has gained these qualities I think we might admit him to special studies of a liberal sort. If not, it is a sin to let him think, however many courses he has passed, that he is on the road to liberal education.

And on the side of content we should again try to discover not so much what he has done with courses as what courses, and growing, and being himself, have done to him, what sort of man he is becoming. He should be examined upon

his knowledge of literature, of natural and humanistic science, should be expected to know the essential things in them which are the common stock of men who are trying to interpret the world in which they live. And further, he should appreciate and understand in some degree the purposes and attitudes of men of letters, of scientists, and other thinkers, should know what tasks they undertake, what methods they adopt, what results they have achieved, and what, in general outline, they now propose to do. Such an examination would require knowledge of the subjects taught and studied in the courses, but it would imply as well a student's independent reading and thinking about his subjects. It would, I think, relegate the courses to their proper place as moments in a process of acquisition and understanding, a process which every student must be carrying on himself, a process which the entire community accepts as that by which it seeks its purpose of liberal education.

Such an examination could not be given by one man nor in one day. It would require a Board of Examiners and would inevitably extend over two, three, or four weeks. It would include written examinations, tests, reports, conferences. It would put into explicit and regular form such queries and associations as one would wish to have with a young man whose intellectual and personal quality one might wish to determine.

But now to return to the listing of the advantages of the Junior College examination! We have said that over against the separate courses it would set up the demand of the college as a whole for rightness of method and rightness of content in the teaching and study. There are some other advantages perhaps not so important.

I think the improvement which would be brought to sophomore study would be very great. The sophomore is our least responsible student. The enthusiasm and the docility, perhaps, of the freshman year have somewhat lessened. The ending of the college course is still three

years away. The goal toward which it leads is far and indistinct. The sophomore is not under pressure. Such a test as we have outlined, expressing a demand that must be met at the ending of the year, summing up the activities of the two years in one compelling purpose and interest — such a test would in my opinion transform the sophomore year. If so, it would give gain where now our loss is greatest. For many students it would prevent the breaking down of the college course.

Another gain would be, I think, that of placing upon the student the responsibility for the getting of his own education. The college would give no guarantee that courses would cover all the content of the general examination. In the last resort, a student should find out for himself what demands the community lays upon him; he should see that the doing of daily tasks assigned with daily regularity is good but childish. He should undertake to make himself what the college approves, should use his courses and his own self-directed studies as instruments for getting ready for the tests which the college is to give him. In the years from eighteen to twenty-three one should be getting something of the self-reliance of a man. Our present procedure tends too much to keep the students young in will as well as in intelligence.

Still another gain would come in the relations of teachers and students. The present process tends toward being one of handing out and then demanding that the thing received be given back again. The teacher is at the same time examiner. But if teacher and pupil were alike preparing for a distant test which neither is to set, there would be more of comradeship, of teaching and discipleship than we have now.

I hesitate to speak of gains so far as teaching is concerned, for, out of my own experience if in no other way, I know how jealous teachers are of their independence, how much they cherish their sovereign right to teach as they think best. And in a certain field of their relations I would not

yield to any one in fighting for the teacher's independence. But independence at this other point of which we speak is nothing else than anarchy. May I then suggest two gains that might be won for teaching.

First, I think that the separate courses taken by any student for a common test would find proper relation to each other just through their common relation to the common test. Each course would find itself called upon to play its proper part, each teacher would need to know what other teachers were doing, each would assume the work of other teachers as joining with his own. At present one teacher knows another's work by gossip, often by idle, inaccurate gossip of undergraduates, hardly ever, if at all, by genuine conference. A demand of unified knowledge accepted as the standard of the Junior College, enforced by an examination for membership in the community, would bring about, I think, some understanding of the common task and hence relating of the various parts within the unity to which they all belong.

Another gain for teachers would be that in some measure their teaching would be tested. On the whole it is not good for any man to keep on doing work on which no adequate judgment of approval or disapproval is ever passed by competent authority. The tests implied in student popularity, in the number of student elections in one's courses, in the promotions or refusals of promotion decreed by trustees and presidents, these do not satisfy our college teachers. They have many, many better reasons for disgruntlement. But one important cause of discontent lies, I think, just in the lack of any sense of right appraisal of their work. The men who publish find their judgment among their fellow scholars who do not hesitate to speak their minds. But men who teach mark their own teaching. It takes a fair amount of self-esteem to keep one's courage up. And so I think that an objective test would give relief and on the whole much satisfaction.

I am sure that there would be great gain in the separating

of Freshmen, Sophomores, Juniors and Seniors into distinct groups in the arrangement of their courses. If only Sophmores were taking the courses of the second year, and if all Sophomores had taken the same or equivalent courses in the previous year, both teacher and pupil would profit by the uniformity. The course could then be made to lead from something in the past to something in the future. It would not be a mere detached unmeaning fragment beginning from so many different sources that it has no common source at all, and leading into so many different directions that the word direction loses its meaning. The course would tend to be part of a scheme of training, a common training for a group of men seeking the same end, and hence following the same road and traveling together.

There would be, I think, distinct gain in administration, in the simplification of arrangements of hours, schedules, and other like matters. The separation of Freshmen and Sophomores from upperclassmen in class enrollments would give a genuine gain. If, as would be practically certain, Freshmen and Sophomores were separated from each other in the arranging of classes, our present difficulties as to schedules would disappear. Perhaps in this way the amount of administration in the colleges might be reduced. I am sure that very much of the time of administrative officers is spent in reconciling the conflicting desires of anxious teachers. Strangely enough, it usually seems that they, the administrative officers, have the desires from which official denials spring. But in any case, probably to the gratification both of teachers and officers, we might in this way diminish administration.

For teachers and students then it seems to me the proposal of a Junior College is worth considering. It would pledge the community to an end and to a standard. If successful, it would make the concept of general liberal education a definite one. That concept is compelling enough if only it is perceived and understood. If then, as I think it would, this proposed arrangement should bring

our common purpose into clarity and definiteness, it would set us on the road we seek and I am inclined to think that we should travel it in gay and serious fellowship.

THE SENIOR COLLEGE

The determining motive of the Senior College would be the second of our aims, to bring a student into actual contact with the working minds by which the knowledge and apprehension of mankind are made. This opportunity would be open to men coming successfully from the Junior College. Here they would find a greater freedom, greater responsibility, and more urgent obligations. My impression is that corresponding to the improvement of attitude in Sophomore year would come a definite gain for Juniors and Seniors, first from the sense of freedom and personal initiative and second from the compulsion of the higher intellectual comradeship into which they are received.

In the Senior College a very considerable part of the student's time would be given to one major interest. What does this mean? It does not mean that the work would be confined within what we now call a department. It does mean a group of related studies, taken from several departments, but all bound together by some common interest and so fusing together in terms of some central inquiry or investigation. The nature of this would of course vary with the field.

It does not mean that the student is to enter a professional school at the end of his Sophomore year. The college has given very few professional courses in the past and my impression is that it will give fewer rather than more of them in the future. I am not saying that a student's choice of his major might not be influenced by the profession which he has in view. Probably in many cases this would happen. But I do mean that during the college years the organization of the courses will be in terms of intellectual interests and problems, not in terms of immediate practical

pursuits for which specific preparation is needed. Here of course is one of the great educational issues of our time which I must not stop to consider at present. May I say simply that the policy of the college thus far seems clear and definite upon the issue; we are a non-professional college — but very practical.

But now positively, what does it mean? I am not willing to dogmatise with great specification until we have had further opportunity to examine the procedure of colleges in which like experiments have been made. I am sure, however, of several points. First, the major should be a course of study arranged under the direction of one teacher or a small group of teachers in related fields. Second, it should be regarded, not as a group of lectures or courses to be taken, but as a study or reading or investigation carried on by the student, to which the lectures of teachers contribute so far as may be. Third, it should have such unity as to admit of a single test upon it all at the close of the course. Fourth, it should be pursued more informally than our present courses, but under the immediate direction of some teacher, acting individually or as representative of a group. Fifth, it should culminate in some report, some thesis, or record of investigation, or in an examination which should give final evidence of the student's ability and achievement. Sixth, the doing of satisfactory work in such a major field should be required for a degree.

There are two beliefs involved in this proposal. First, Juniors or Seniors in college are or can be made mature enough in mind and purpose to take on genuine intellectual responsibilities; it is a sin to keep them children. Second, such intellectual responsibility calls for a different, a more informal relationship between teacher and pupil than is desirable in the earlier years.

Such a majoring plan would again postulate a scheme of independent examination for the testing of results. There would not be, of course, such general examining as that upon the work of the Junior College. But there ought to be

in each field the submitting of the evidence of the student's work to some independent and recognized authority in that field for judgment of its worth. The student should be informed and record made that he has or has not done something which men of his years and opportunities may reasonably be expected to do.

It is hardly necessary, I think, to speak of the advantages of such an arrangement. The values to students and teachers alike are clearly obvious. For students, the greater freedom, the close association with a small group of men of like interest, the immediate acquaintance with and direction by a small number of teachers, the demand upon one's powers which comes from the acceptance of a definite task, all these would stimulate as well as enlighten the student mind. For the teachers, the reduction of the amount of formal instruction would be a gain. There would be danger that much time would be taken in informal instruction but this would be so much more near to the teacher's own study that it might in many cases be of help rather than a hindrance to scholarly pursuits. Certainly there would be more of genuine satisfaction in it.

The real question as to such a plan is not, Is it desirable? but, Can it be made to work? And the question is not one to be evaded. But my own conviction is very strong that the thing can be done. I am certain that it ought to be tried. It is better to see what can be accomplished along such a line than to wait ignobly for some one else to make the attempt. As Socrates, in Plato's Euthydemus, when told that in the process of becoming wise a man must lose his ignorant life, offers himself for sacrifice, so may the college do. A death like that would be a noble ending, the sort of ending from which many splendid enterprises have sprung.

I have spoken of the "major" interest in the Senior College. It seems clear that this interest should not claim all of a student's working time. Until our plans for majors are made more definite, one cannot tell just what the

minor arrangement should be. I would suggest, however, that three fourths of the time be given to the major and one fourth reserved for the minor interests. In this case it would be necessary to provide in the Senior College courses for men not majoring in the fields in which they lie. It would be essential also to provide that the minors be taken outside the major fields. I should not now be willing to go so far as in the Report of 1914, requiring all students to take, in junior year, the history of thought and American history, and in the senior year, intellectual and moral problems. But it would seem to me essential that the general interest which controls the Junior College should not be wholly put aside. At least we should maintain a balancing of interest by requiring study outside the major field. It would not do to let our special study drive away the fundamental aim which we would make it serve, the aim of so knowing and feeling our human life and men's interpretations of it that one is free in living it. We must remain in general apprehension as well as in special study a liberal college.

CONCLUSION

There are many details to be worked out before such a reorganization as I have proposed could be adopted. The most fundamental and the most difficult is that of the establishing of Examining Boards wholly or in part distinct from the teaching faculty. This separation of the two functions of teaching and examining is not in one sense essential to the plan. Clearly the Junior and Senior Colleges could be set apart each with its own peculiar work, each with its own preliminary and final examinations — this could be done without so sharp a separation between teaching and examining. And yet the separation is suggested by the plan and would in my opinion contribute largely to its success. How far are we willing to go along this line? Are we ready to establish two Boards of Examiners correlative with the teaching Faculty? If so, shall the Faculty participate in the appointment of such

Boards, or shall it be wholly in the hands of the Trustees and President? This is a set of issues difficult to deal with. They are to be met for the sake of the realizing of the purpose of the college.

As I close this discussion, I can merely call attention to important questions which are bound up with the project which we have been considering.

The required studies of the Junior College would presumably not differ radically from the present requirements of the first and second years. I think that we are approaching settlement of the questions regarding the studies of these years.

The reorganization proposed would have great effect upon our dealings with the members of the Faculty, those now with us as well as others to be appointed. For the trying of a high experiment we must have men of high ability and courage. It is the primary task of the college to make its provision for teachers conformable to the demands upon them.

There is no implication in the plan of any radical change in our methods of admitting students. Such changes might be suggested by later experience but they are not apparent now.

Before such a plan could be put into operation it would be essential that we make careful study of like attempts in other institutions and in other countries. The most radical change in the conduct of the teaching is in the system of majoring in the Senior College. Here we must go carefully but with not too much delay.

To sum it all up, may I say that the cause of liberal education is crying aloud for intelligent and resolute support. It will not do just now to stand on the defensive. Liberal teaching must be established. If this is to be done we must go on; we are just emerging from a period of vast confusion and distraction in educational theory and practice. It is a time for knowing what you propose to do and how it is to be done, — and for doing it.

A FINAL WORD

EVERY point of view is both negative and affirmative. On the negative side it is a protest against other opinions. On the affirmative side it is a realization of its own meaning. As a last word, then, one may very properly attempt to characterise the beliefs which one abhors and the faith upon which one acts.

The underlying antipathy of these papers is directed against specific devices in education. When we consider the immense expenditure of time and ability devoted to our educational machinery how shall we explain the general ineffectiveness of its working? The only explanation which seems to fit the facts is that our various specific activities are counteracting and nullifying each other. The cult of the specific is always a dangerous one. He who seeks to cure a specific evil by the application of a specific remedy, without understanding both evil and remedy in wider terms, invites disaster. Such cures create diseases greater than those which they destroy. It has been recorded of a certain man that after all his evils had been cleared away, the latter state of that man was worse than the first. If we would avoid such disastrous remedies as this we must beware of mere devices: we must attempt to formulate our task and our procedure, each as a whole.

On the positive side these papers have contended that if one would know how knowledge is to be taught then one must try to know what knowledge is. Just as a teacher cannot bring a pupil near to learning unless he is near to it himself, so one cannot understand the teaching process unless one understands what it is that is to be taught. Our teaching must be based upon a comprehension of what learning is, of the nature of knowledge and of wisdom in

relation to human living. There is nothing more futile than the attempt to teach liberal culture by means of teachers who are not liberally educated. It is equally futile to try to impart understanding of human life and of the world if we are not ourselves striving for such understanding and making some progress toward its accomplishment. In the last resort, let it be said again, it is the purpose of education to make young people ready for living human life in this world of theirs. In order to do that we must try to understand both them and their world. On that endeavor we may found our attempt at Making Minds, and so venture to enroll ourselves as members of a Liberal College.